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Chapter – 1 
Introduction 
 
 The law of contract has in recent times to face a problem which is 
assuming new and wide dimensions. The problem has arisen out of the 
modern “large-scale and widespread” practice of concluding contracts in 
standardized forms. 
 
 The words “standard form contract” is used to include every contract, 
whether simple or under seal and whether contained in one or more 
document, one of the parties to habitually makes contract of the same type in 
a particular form and will allow little, if any, variation from that form.  
 
 The average man, the man in the street on the omni bus, is continually 
making such contracts and the probability is that they are the most important 
contracts that he ever makes. If he rents his house from the local authority or 
the owner of the estate his tenancy agreement will be in a standard form; he 
will have been supplied with gas and electricity only if he has signed a printed 
form of agreement; any item of furniture which he has brought on hire-
purchase system will be subject on agreement designed by a finance 
company; his wireless set, his motor-car and most of his electrical equipment 
will have been sold to him subject to standard terms. His work, if he is a 
manual worker in a large undertaking, a civil servant,1 a local government 
officer or on an employee of a big organization, will almost certainly be based 
upon a contract of service, the conditions of which are set out in a printed 
document. His journey to and from work will be the subject of a contract of 
carriage on abstruse but unalterable conditions, and at least one of his leisure 
time activities, his football “pools”, will be carried on subject to the most rigid 
regulations.2   
 
 The Life Corporation of India, for example, has to issue thousands of 
insurance covers everyday. Similarly, the railway administration of India has 
to make innumerable contracts of carriage. It would be difficult for such large-
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scale organizations to draw up a separate contract with every individual. 
They, therefore, keep printed forms of contract. Such standardized contracts 
contain a large number of terms and conditions in “fine print” which restrict 
and often exclude liability under the contract. The individual can hardly 
bargain with the massive organizations and, therefore, his only function is to 
accept the offer whether he likes its terms or not.  He cannot alter those terms 
or even discuss them; they are there for him to take it or leave it. He therefore 
does not undertake the laborious and profitless task of discovering what the 
terms are. 
  
 Although the roots of the law of contract lie in many disciplines – 
religion, ethics, economics, Government and philosophy – emphasis on the 
individual is the common theme. Having been cross-ruffled by economic and 
social changes, contract has become in large number. The vast majority of 
today’s “contracts” are standardized forms. Through the use of these 
contracts, substantial economics of time, effort and expense are achieved. 
Economy, adaptability and certainty are the three outstanding virtues of the 
standard contracts. The tempo and complexibility of modern life and 
commerce makes standard form contracts indispensable. 
 
 In standard form contracts contain exemption clauses in it which 
completely excludes the liability of one of the party. In all these transactions 
the bargaining power of the parties is unequal. The weaker party has no 
choice but to adhere to it may be because of monopoly or market position. 
The potential customer have no choice and the printed document which sets 
out standard conditions will never see the red, green and purple ink beloved 
of the conveyancer when negotiating his terms. 
  
 The law about exemption clauses has been much developed in recent 
years, at any rate about printed exemption clauses which so often pass 
unread. Notwithstanding earlier cases which might suggest the contrary, it is 
now settled that exempting clauses of this kind, no matter how widely they are 
expressed, only avail the party  when he is carrying out his contract in its 
essential respect……… They do not avail him when he is guilty of a breach 
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which goes to the root of the contract. The thing to do is to look at the contract 
apart from the exempting clauses and see what are the terms, express or 
implied, which impose an obligation on the party. If he has been guilty of a 
breach of those obligations in a respect which goes to the very root of the 
contract, he cannot rely on the exempting clauses………. The principle is 
sometimes said to be that the party cannot rely on an exempting clause when 
he delivers something “different in kind” from that contracted for, or has 
broken a “fundamental term “ or “fundamental contractual obligation”, but 
these are, comprehended by the general principle that a breach which goes to 
the root of the contract disentitles the party from relying the exempting 
clause.” 
 
 Exempting clauses are now- a –days all held to be subject to the 
overriding provision  that  they only avail to exempt a party when he is 
carrying out his contract, not when he is deviating from it or is guilty of a 
breach which goes to the root of it. 
 
 A.G.Guest in 1956 in his famous article on fundamental breach 
accepted that the principle was a substantive one and summed it up in these 
terms: (Fundamental Breach of contract, (1961) 77LQR 98.)    
 
 “A party who has been guilty of a fundamental breach of contract 
cannot rely on an exemption clause inserted in the contract to protect him”. 
 
 It can be said that this basic concepts as revealed in the cases and 
literature on the doctrine are deviation and core. It is submitted that exemption 
clauses can never have “so wide an ambit as in effect to deprive one party’s 
stipulations of all contractual force.” 
 
 But, always cited in power is its abuse; and contractual power is no 
exception. Not invariably but unusually the freedom to contract through 
exemption clauses and conditions is that of one party only. Though such 
contracts contain terms shaped simply to meet the practical needs of the 
transaction concerned, they also include clauses, few or many, simple or 
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complicated, that confer decided legal as well as other advantages upon the 
party who is in position to insert them. Purely economic clauses, operational 
clauses and in particular, exemption clauses may thus be imposed by the 
party of the weaker contracting position. These exemption clauses usually 
detract from the customer’s normal rights. 
 
The problems relating to exemption clauses in contracts are one that 
needs systematic analysis. The armory of law includes only some special and 
limited tools which could alleviate and mend unfair bargains but not a general 
instrument which could cut diverse forms of contractual clauses, and clauses, 
which are one, sided. It is novel in another sense, namely in the solutions 
attempted in the different legal systems of he world. 
 
Courts have recognized their responsibility for translating the 
postulates of equality and freedom. Courts interfere in extreme cases. I 
venture to write that if courts ventures to take into account the social 
implications of legal concepts and how far they should go and what further 
steps they should  take to handle the situations in India and England.  
 
* Research Methodology adopted in this thesis is as follows 
 
A. Identification/Selection of a Problem 
 
In all standard Form Contracts, the bargaining power of parties is 
unequal; on the one side there is the ordinary individual and the other a 
monopoly or powerful organization with desirable goods or services to supply. 
This standard form contract contains exemption clauses which exclude the 
liability of a stronger party and a weaker party has to sign “on the dotted Line”. 
The documents are “a prendre ad laisser”, to take it or leave it. They are really 
speaking not agreements but phenomena of agreements. Terms are 
presented in a misleading way or are formulated in a tricky manner, giving an 
incorrect impression to purchasers. So it is titled as “Validity of Exemption 
Clauses in Contract-A Comparative study of India and England.” 
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B. Objectives of the study 
 
The main objectives of the present research are as follows 
(1) To find how the society strike a just balance between the freedom of 
contract as a useful principle of social order and the increasing scope 
of public policy. 
(2) To find if there is any real distinction between ignorance of the 
existence of special conditions on the  one hand and ignorance of their 
meaning on the other hand. 
(3) To find if freedom of contract be cloak under which business 
enterprises are able, ‘to legislate in a substantially authoritarian 
manner’. 
(4) To find out the ways to prevent the exemption clauses in standard form 
contracts from becoming the instrument of oppression, exploitation and 
injustice. 
(5) To find the reasons for being such clauses accepted by the customers 
and what is the protection of consumer specially when he is not aware 
of them and even when he is aware he is not in a position to bargain 
because of the monopoly of the seller. 
(6) To find how the exemption clauses are to be interpreted by the court in 
case of ambiguity. 
(7) To find when exemption clauses are operative and inoperative and 
what the rights of third parties are and can they claim any benefit. 
(8) To find if any control is being exercised on them by the judiciary and 
legislature in both the countries under study. 
(9) To find possible reforms and their direction. 
 
C. Hypothesis  
 
The study revolves around the standardized contracts containing 
exemption clauses in it and how courts in India as well as England analyze 
and interpret it. To know whether there is freedom of contract in a real sense. 
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It examines how far different theories work. The hypothesis set up and 
focused is to check to what extent exemption clauses are legislatively and 
judicially controlled and monitored by various courts and parliament 
respectively in two different countries (India and England) under study. “ 
 
D.  Method of Research  
 
This research is comparison of India and England two different 
common law countries. It is based on systematic desk review of all relevant 
literature available related to Contract Act. 
 
In carrying out above research and all available literature on the topic 
under focus based on case-law material, reported and un-reported judgments, 
legislations, journals, articles, Law Commission Reports, the writing of jurists 
and different law web-sites. 
 
The study and comparison of case-law developed by the Supreme 
Court and different High Courts is made. It has been a research approach 
combined with limited empirical study. 
 
E. Design of the study 
 
The topics have been divided into various chapters. The constitutional 
laws, substantive legislations and procedural rules and the remedies have 
been examined to answer the hypothesis. 
 
F. Collection of data  
 
Data has been collected from Gujarat High Court Library, different law 
colleges libraries in Ahmedabad, CERC-Ahmedabad, M.S.University Library, 
GNLU- Gandhinagar, Indian Law Institute-New Delhi,etc,. Different law 
websites have been visited to access various materials. 
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G. Significance of the Study 
 
This research dares to bring in light strong position of monopoly 
markets and poor condition of the weaker parties. It tries to find out how far 
exemption clauses in contract are valid. 
 
H. Limitation of the Study 
 
This study is limited to Contract Act and area is confined to two 
countries India and England. 
 
The first chapter is introduction which deals with various standard form 
contracts and exemption clauses in it. It discusses the research methodology 
adopted in the thesis and introduces other chapters. 
 
The second chapter deals with the meaning and theories of contract. 
The nature of contract has been much discussed by lawyers interested in 
specific technical doctrines, and by moralists, economists and political 
theorists interested in general social philosophy. There is still need for some 
effort to combine these points of law. There are number of considerations 
which justify the legal enforcement of promises. The purpose of this chapter is 
to find out the reasons behind the enforcement of a promise, in the light of the 
various theories that have laid down from time to time. Whether the existing 
theories explain their true nature or change in social structure require their 
readjustment. 
  
Third chapter deals with Exemption Clauses and freedom of contract- 
An Analysis of the Modern Trends in the light of Statutory Enactments and 
Judicial Decisions. It should be noted that recent trend towards collectivisms 
is restrictive of freedom of contract. Legislative measures do curtail pre-
existing rights. E.g.: Landlord and tenancy legislation, Master and Servant 
Law, of Overseas Trade. In a social role man has to be cooperative, while he 
is competitive in his individual role. This raises the question of individual 
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needs and the demands of society and how far the Government can interfere 
in the individual’s freedom. Statutory developments leave some scope for 
interpretation by judges who have necessarily to uphold established legal 
principles while trying to reconcile between the claims of the individual and the 
needs of society. They had to readjust old principles to new needs or 
situations.3  
 
The Legislature and the courts have also imposed certain restrictions 
on freedoms of contract for reasons of Government or public policy. The 
standard forms of agreements are too common in a highly developing 
commercial society, with the result that the customer is negatively drawn into 
it by force of circumstances. He is amazed later when he is told he cannot get 
any relief under the contract. The need therefore arose to examine whether 
such clauses were fair and instances there are where Legislation had to step 
in to veto such oppressive clauses. 
 
The complexity of modern activities makes it also difficult to provide for 
all eventualities. The existence of problem is a sure indication of the growth of 
the law. Mr. Justice Holmes rightly observed:  
 
“The Law is always approaching and never reaching consistency. It is 
forever adopting new principles from life at one end and it always retains old 
ones from history at the other…….. it will become entirely consistent only 
when it ceases to grow”.4 
 
Fourth chapter is named as Exemption Clause – Interpretation and 
Incorporation. It is really a matter of fact that these exemption clauses should 
be used very tactfully. The question is whether the standard form of contract 
excludes the liability of a person in bargaining position and then to what 
extent. So it should be incorporated in such a way that there is fairness in 
contract. 
 
This chapter deals with topics like when exemption clauses are 
permissible, types of exemption clauses, the contractual force of exemption, 
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the statutory control of exemption clauses, the construction of exemption 
clauses, general rules of construction of contractual terms, some special 
exemption clauses and exemption clauses and third parties. 
  
Fifth chapter is Avoidance and Qualification of Exclusion Clauses. In 
this chapter, we discuss the methods by which the courts seek to avoid giving 
full effect to exemption clauses, notwithstanding that the clause has been 
incorporated into the contract and are apt to cover the damage which has 
occurred. 
 
Sixth chapter is Harsh and Unconscionable Bargains. It deals with 
onus of proof, liabilities under various situations like fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of rules of natural justice, oral undertakings, fundamental breach 
and fundamental term.   
  
Seventh chapter is The Effect of Discharge by Breach on Exemption 
Clauses. It was perhaps never very likely that the proponents of fundamental 
breach would allow their doctrine to die just because of some obiter dicta on 
the subject from the House of Lords. 
 
In that respect, therefore, the recent decision of the court of Appeal in 
Harbutt’s  “Plasticine” Ltd. v/s. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. Need cause 
no surprise that at least to a contract lawyer, is its findings that a contractor 
can be impressed with a liability even though he has adopted the correct 
formula for excluding it. It is rather odd and one may be forgiven for 
suspecting that somehow or somewhere, something has gone wrong. The 
Court of Appeal justified their decision by reference to discharge of the 
contract for breach. 
 
The eighth chapter is Unlawful Exemption Clauses which discusses 
Fair Trading Act 1973, Consumer transactions, Defences, Trade Descriptions 
Act, etc. 
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The ninth chapter deals with Void and Ineffective Exemption Clauses. It 
deals with Consumer Credit, Transport, Housing, Seeds Patents, Feeding 
stuffs, Disability Discrimination, Social Security, Solicitor and Client, 
Employment, etc. 
 
The tenth chapter will be the conclusions of the thesis that what is and 
what should be the exact position of exemption clauses in the standard form 
contract. To know how our law protects the poor opposite party who has the 
no alternative but to take it or leave it. To know if the party in a bargaining 
position can take the advantage of exemptions in standard form of contract.  
 
 
Reference 
1 Cf. Rodwell v Thomas (1944) 1 All.E.R.700. 
2 Such regulations will, however, be binding “in honour only” and a clause 
even stronger than that used in Rose and Frank v. Crompton Bros. ([1925] 
A.C. 425) will bar any approach to the courts: Appleson v. H. Littlewood, Ltd. 
(1939) 1 All E.R. 464.  
3 See Lord Mansfield, Law and Other Things at pp.38-54. 
4 Cited in The Sanctity Of Contract, p.77. 
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Chapter-2  
Meaning And Theories Of Contract 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The nature of contract has been much discussed by lawyers interested 
in specific technical doctrines, and by moralists, economists and political 
theorists interested in general social philosophy. There is still need for some 
effort to combine these points of law. There are number of considerations 
which justify the legal enforcement of promises. The true function and nature 
of contract should correctly be understood before proceeding on the topic. 
  
Savingly very rightly observed 
 
“This notion of contract is part of men’s stock even outside the 
field of legal science, and to men of law so familiar and necessary in its 
various applications that we might expect a settled and just 
apprehension of it to prevail everywhere. Nevertheless we are yet far 
short of this.’ 1 
 
Why should promise be enforced? 
 
 To this question various answers have been given. The simplest 
answer is that of intuitionist , namely, the promises are sacred per-se, that 
there is something inherently despicable about not keeping a promise, and 
that a properly organized society should not tolerate this, popular sentiment 
generally favours the enforcement of those promises which involve some 
quid-pro-quo [equivalent thereof]. In his common law Justice Holmes 
expressed the view that a contract is properly to be regarded as the taking of 
a risk creating liability to pay damages in a certain event. Professor 
Goodhard, who was a protagonist of moral theory said: -  
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 “That the moral basis of the contract is that the promisor 
created a reasonable expectation that it shall be kept”. 
  
According to will theory, law protects the will of the parties, for the will 
is something inherently worthy of respect. While in sharp contrast to this 
theory is what Pound has termed Injurious Reliance Theory. This lays down 
emphasis on conduct rather than on status, the reason for the enforcement of 
the contract is security rather than mystical union of wills. 
 
 The modern approach to the problem is all together different. Because 
of the welfare and social function of the state, standard form agreements, 
collective bargaining agreements and social security aspects of the contract, 
the function and substance of the law has altogether changed. 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine various theories and to see 
whether changing social and economic needs of society require re-adjustment 
of old principles to the new needs or situations. 
 
2.2 Definition of the term “Contract” 
 
This term “contract” has been defined in a good many different ways. 
Definitions have been constructed by almost all writers on law and in many 
thousands of judicial opinions.2 
  
The fact that these definitions are not in agreement has led occasionally to 
a little confusion; but the harm is not to great as might be expected. Diversity 
of definition does at times lead to a confused analysis, obscure reasoning and 
to unnecessary misunderstanding and litigation. This is, of course, socially 
harmful; and it occasionally leads to an unjust decision and to uncertainty in 
the law. It is very common error to suppose that legal terms, such as contract, 
have one absolute and eternally correct definition. The fact is that all such 
terms have many usages, among which everyone is free to select. One usage 
13 
 
is to be preferred over another only in so far as it serves our necessity and 
convenience. 
 
A study of its common usage will show that the term “contract” has been 
made to denote three different kinds of things in various combinations: 
1) The series of operative acts of the parties expressing their assent, or  
     some part of these acts; 
2) Physical document executed by the parties as an operative facts in itself  
    and as lasting evidence of their having performed other necessary acts  
    expressing their intentions ; 
3) The legal relations resulting from the operative acts of the parties;  
     always including the relation of right in one party and duty in the other. 
  
A very common definition is that a contract is a promise enforceable at law 
directly or indirectly. This has advantage of brevity, and it is perhaps as useful 
a definition as any that has been thus far suggested. It places emphasis upon 
one of the operative acts, and expression of assent. This is restricted to an 
expression that is promissory in character. By restricting it further to a promise 
that is enforceable at law, it brings into the definition the element of legal 
operation and effect. 
 
2.3 An Examination of the Maine’s Dictum, ‘Progress of society has  
hitherto been from Status to Contract.’ 
 
One of the most influential of modern law is Maine’s famous dictum 
that the progress of the society has hitherto been status from contract. It has 
generally been understood as stating not only a historical generalization but 
also a judgement of sound policy….. that a legal system wherein rights and 
duties are determined by the agreement of the parties is preferable to a 
system wherein they are determined by status. 
 
This easy assumption, that whatever happens to be outcome of history 
is necessarily for the best and cannot or ought not to be counteracted by any 
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human effort, is typical not only of the historical school of jurisprudence since 
Savigny, but also of general progressive or evolutionary of Maine’s generation 
and largely of our own. 
 
A. Status 
   
Status is a word which has no very precise connotation. Salmond3 
Gives four meanings: 
(a) legal condition of any kind, whether personal or proprietary; 
(b) personal legal condition, excluding proprietary relations; 
(c) personal capacities and incapacities as opposed to other elements of 
personal status;4 
(d) Compulsory as opposed to conventional legal position. 
 
Austin5 agrees that the term cannot be used with exactness, but thinks 
that when for case of exposition it is useful to separate a complex of rights 
and duties, of capacities and incapacities which specifically affect a narrow 
class, it is convenient to designate that complex by the term status. 
 
Very many factors may led to the creation of a status. Thus sex, 
minority and marriage are bound up with the problem of the family; illegitimacy 
shows the lack of proper family ties; mentally or bodily defect may lead to 
special treatment by the law. Caste, official position or profession may create 
certain privileges or disabilities. Criminality may destroy liberty, or bankruptcy 
may divest of property. Foreign nationality, race or color may cause the law to 
distinguish a group.6 
 
One of the best analysis is that of Allen.7 Status may be described as 
the fact or condition of membership of a group of which the powers are 
determined extrinsically by law, status affecting not merely one particular 
relationship, but being a condition affecting generally though  in varying 
degree a member’s claims and powers. Status is not merely a basis for 
classification, but a matter of great political, legal and social importance. 
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Firstly, status crises from membership of a class and the powers of that 
class are determined extrinsically by law, not by agreement between the 
parties.8 There is no power for a member to vary the conditions imposed by 
law, for example, the rules relating to the status of marriage are conclusively 
fixed. 
 
Secondly, while an infant has no choice whether he will enter the status 
of infancy or not, it is not always the case that members of a status are 
compulsorily placed within a group by law. Thus Phyllis cannot be forced into 
the status of a married woman against her will, but if she does marry, the law 
attaches to that status certain incidents which cannot be varied by the consent 
of the parties. Thus she became at common law immune from actions in tort 
brought against her by her husband: she has a claim to support from her 
husband, and in cases of necessity a power to pledge his credit. The status of 
marriage cannot be ended merely by the wish of the parties. Graveson 
suggests that the will of the party may affect the beginning or end of status, 
but never both.9 Marriage illustrates freedom at the beginning, and the control 
of law at the dissolution, of the status. An ambassador can be made such only 
by act of the state, but presumably he can destroy his status by resignation. 
 
Thirdly, Maine emphasizes that status normally arises today because 
of a defect in judgement of the members of the class in question.10 This 
statement is not universally true. Historically, status is due not to a desire to 
protect the weak, but rather to exploit them, as has already been seen in 
discussing the evolution of the law of guardianship.11 Today many typical 
cases of status do reflect a desire to protect certain classes against their own 
weaknesses, 12 but this is the only cause for the singling out of a certain class 
for special treatment. Ambassadors may suffer from occasional defects of 
judgement, but that is not the reason why the law places them in a special 
status. 
 
Fourthly, membership of a status does not always result in restricted 
power. In the case of an infant or a lunatic, legal power is restricted, but an 
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ambassador has increased privileges because he belongs to that particular 
class. It should not be thought that status creates only incapacities. 
 
Fifthly, not all groups give rise to a status. Clearly membership of the 
group must affect a person’s legal relations, or at least his power to enter 
legal relations. There is no status of the blue eyed or of bridge players, for 
although both of these groups may be regarded as forming a class, that class 
has no precise legal significance.13 It is not enough even to confine the terms 
to groups based on a classification of legal relations; thus it is inaccurate to 
speak of the status of trustees or bankers. The test is that status is a condition 
which affects generally, although in varying degree, a person’s claims, 
liberties, powers and immunities. 
 
In the case of a trustee, there are particular powers relating to the trust 
property and in particular duties owed to the beneficiary to the trust. But the 
fact that a man is a trustee does not affect his general powers. The particular 
rights and duties of a trustee spring form one particular title (the trust) and 
extend no farther. 
 
But an infant suffers from a lack of contractual power which affected at 
common law not only one contract on relationship but all his contracts save 
those which relate to necessaries. 
 
Holland asks: does the pecularity of the personality arise from anything 
unconnected with the nature of the act itself which the person of inherence 
can enforce against the person of incidence? 14 
 
I am a mortgagee because of one particular transaction and that does 
not affect my other legal relation. If Smith is lunatic so found, his power 
entirely disappears and thus he can perform no juristic acts. It is easy to draw 
the line between these two extremes, but it is not easy to determine the exact 
limits of the requirement that membership must affect generally a person’s 
claim and powers. Does a degree of judicial separation affect status? 15 
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Allen distinguishes between status which is a condition, capacity which 
is a power to acquire and exercise rights, and the rights themselves which are 
acquired by the exercise of that capacity? 16 
 
According to Hohfeild, status is the condition of being a member of a 
particular group, which membership affects generally claims, liberties, power 
and immunities. In private international law it is only reasonable for English 
law to recognize a status which may be imposed by French law on a French-
man, but English courts may refuse to recognize as effective in England some 
of the claims or powers which may arise from that status. 
 
As Scott L.J. puts it: The general principle of status is that, when 
created by the law of one country, it is ought to be judicially recognized as 
being the case everywhere, all the world over; 17 and only for imperative 
reasons of public policy should the law refuse to allow in England the normal 
results that how from a foreign status. There if a child is legitimate by his 
personal law, he should be regarded as legitimate the world over,18 but 
English law may refuse to recognize the status of slavery, or the status of a 
wife where the marriage is incestors by English Law, although valid by the law 
of the country where the marriage took place. 
 
One of Maine’s most famous epigram is that “the movement of the 
progressive societies has hither to been a movement from status to contract,19 
when we contrast the difficulty in early communities of rising above the level 
which birth imposed and the comparative freedom of social movement in the 
modern world, there seems much historical justification for Maine’s thesis. 
The law has abolished many of the lower grades of society, and the tendency 
is to confine the creation of status to those cases where there is special 
justification. What were once the lower rank begins to enjoy many of the 
privileges of their ‘betters’.20 The evaluation of the rules relating to married 
women represents an increasing power to contract, and the long- continued 
partia-potestas of Roman Law is now, for most systems, merely an historical 
curiosity. 
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But there are grave dangers involved in treating Maine’s epigrammatic 
generalization as a universal law of legal history. Some neo-Hegelians regard 
contract as the legal category in which the free will of the individual has full 
play, and hence urge that its scope not only is increasing, but ought to be 
increased in the interests of human liberty.21 Yet it may be necessary to 
restrict freedom of contract in order to give real freedom and protection of 
economically weaker classes, and inference with freedom of contract has 
been so general that it is sometimes suggested that the conception of status 
is winning back some of its ancient importance.22 In some countries the 
details of employment for particular industries are so fixed by law there is little 
scope of or free discussion by the parties. But, even where wages, hours and 
conditions of labour are rigidly laid down by arbitration courts, is it accurate to 
say that the workman enjoys a status ? is it not rather a legal determination of 
the conditions of one particular contract than a condition which affects 
capacity generally? Apart from the labour contract, does the fact that a person 
is a workman in a regulated industry affect generally his claims or powers? 
 
In one sense, marriage is a contract the terms of which are fixed by 
law, but the power of a wife 23 may be affected generally that is not only in 
relation to her husband, but in relation to third parties as well. 
 
On the other hand, the wage contract affects only the relationship of 
employer and employed. It is of course, a question of degree and it is not 
inconceivable that marriage may cease to create a status, whereas in a 
socialist state the worker may enjoy particular powers merely because he is 
such. The ambiguity of the term ‘status’ is such that dogmatic assumptions 
are unwarranted, and even on Allen’s test, it is a question of degree whether 
the modification of powers and claims is sufficiently general to justify an 
assumption that a status has been created. 
 
B. Status To Contract  
According to Maine the movement of progressive societies has been 
uniform in one respect. In the stationary societies family is the legal unit, the 
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Pater families as its head and other members- wife, children, slaves, chattels 
are dependent on the head of the family and subject to his power. Except the 
head of the family and subject to his power no one has the power to enter into 
contracts. The relationship between father and other family members is based 
on status or position and not on contract. The son, the female, the slave, has 
only status in the family. In the progressive societies, however, along with 
legal development there is a marked change towards the growth of individual 
rights. There is a disintegration of family and dissolution of family dependency 
and the individual becoming the unit of which civil law takes account. In 
Western Europe status of slave was abolished and it was superseded by 
contractual relation of master and servant. The tutelage of female and 
children also cease to exist in relation of husband and parents. As compared 
to primitive or non-progressive societies the individual in the progressive 
societies the individual in the progressive societies became a free willing and 
free thinking one with all powers to enter into contract. From this Maine 
concluded :  
“….. The movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a 
movement from status to contract.” 
 
C. The Status To Contract Theory Questioned 
 
Ever since Sir Henry Maine wrote his Ancient Law (1861) it has been a 
common place among jurists and some who are not jurists that “the 
movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status 
to contract.” The formula has generally been gratefully accepted as a very 
useful summary of many phenomena encountered in legal history. Usually, its 
original meaning is extended so as to embrace within the concept of “status” 
the immediate or the remote results of agreement. Now and then the formula 
has been modified or limited24 or exceptions to it have been noted25, then the 
universality of the doctrine began to be questioned26 and finally its applicability 
to Anglo-American law has been categorically denied. In Dean Roscoe 
Pound’s latest contribution to sociological Jurisprudence we read: 
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“But Maine’s generalization as it is commonly understood shows only 
the course of evolution of Roman Law . It has no basis in Anglo-
American legal history, and the whole course of English and American 
law today is belying it unless indeed we are progressing backward.”27 
 
The issue framed by this flat contradiction is one of fact. Viewed as an 
event in the history of Anglo-American juristic thought, the rejection of a 
fundamental concept in current jurisprudence is no more academic quibble. 
The position taken by Dean Pound seems an essential part of the ground 
work of his sociological jurisprudence. Thus he remarks upon the significance 
of theory: 
 
“The legislative development whereby duties and liabilities are imposed 
on the employer in relation of employer and employee, not because he 
has so willed, not because he is at fault, but because the nature of the 
relation is deemed to call for it.”28 
 
It is not only “significant”; it represents “the settled tendency of the 
present.” For such status the new jurisprudence speaks “the sympathetic 
judicial development which all statutes require in order to be effective”. The 
new school denies the soundness of the historical views of those courts that 
have been talking of freedom of contract in such matters. 
 
D. Reversion From Contract To Status 
 
In recent times it is being freely said that there is a reversion from 
contract to status, but this is not an accurate description of the process. 
 
In certain respects status has become more important as a source of 
rights and obligations than it was in 1861 when Sir Henry Maine propounded 
his famous dictum. National citizenship is today a more important legal status 
than it was in 1861, when there was hardly any barrier to migration. It must 
not be forgotten that Maine was mainly writing of personal status. The pattern 
21 
 
of economic relationship has been undergoing a change from a free market 
negotiated contract between individuals vis-à-vis a particular transaction, one 
to one relationship to long term continuous relationship between organizations 
inter-se or consumer and an organization or Government and supplier. 
 
Sometimes, the relationship is not even governed by a contract, e.g., 
the relationship between various Government Departments or between a 
Government Department or Government Corporation. These developments 
led to the virtual destruction of atomistic theory of society in which each 
individual was perceived as entering into free choice relationship with others 
and in which the overall social structure was made by large number of such 
one-to-one relationships. 
 
The role of the individual as the centre of the network of relationships 
has largely disappeared. This is the sense in which it is correct to speak of 
enormous decline in the role played by contract in the modern society. A 
contract must not become a disguised form of status. 
 
The Court in Horwood v. Millar’s Timber and trading Co. held a contract 
illegally by which a man had, without any limitation of time, assigned his 
salary to a money-lender, contracted with him never to terminate employment 
without the money-lender’s consent, never to obtain credit, move from his 
house, and in several other respects to restrict his personal movements. The 
shape of things in the sphere of contract takes its colour from the 
development of commerce and industry. The economic pattern has been 
changing since the later half of the nineteenth century where small business 
has been yielding place to big business. This development has been 
characterized by big business concerns and public utility undertakings 
entering into contract with the users or consumer on the same pattern on 
standardized terms and conditions evolving form a standard contract. 
 
This was initially adopted by insurers and bankers and subsequently 
taken over by railways, public-utility undertakings, companies, corporations 
and cartels, till one finds today that the normal form of business contract is the 
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standard form of contract. The traditional concept of a contract, individually 
negotiated between the contracting parties, he has given place to a uniform 
set of terms and conditions often printed in a booklet form. The result has 
been though the creation of a contract still requires the agreement of the 
parties, it is no longer true that the detailed terms of a contract depend upon 
the agreement of the contracting parties the terms and conditions of the 
contract and offers it to other for acceptance, which he must either accept as 
they are or going without. The other party cannot negotiate but merely 
adheres to the terms and conditions offered. Hence, the contract is called the 
contract of adhesion.  
 
It may be more correct to regard the relationship, which arises out of 
such standard contract as one of the status. The other contracting party 
enjoys, as it were the status of a consumer or supplier to the Government, as 
the case may be. Since, the beginning of this century, changes in political 
thought in social and economic conditions and in the law have been taking 
place at an ever-increasing pace. Most of these changes do not represent on 
entirely new departure but are a continuation of a process which was already 
in evidence during the nineteenth century. No doubt, in the purely business 
area in which merchants contract with each other for the purchase and sale of 
commodities, much freedom of contract remains even in the classical sense. 
But it is the emergence of the consumer as a contracting party which led to 
major changes. 
 
E. The Doctrine Applicable Until MAINE’S Day  
 
Now what is the fact? Is there indeed “no basis in Anglo-American legal 
history” for status to contract theory generally understood? Its original 
application was to personal relations derived from or coloured by powers and 
privileges anciently residing in the family. Is it not true that the relations of 
master and servant were originally and still is nominally a domestic relation? 
And whether the 19th century was out of line with the common law or not, is it 
not a fact that it has made of this relation a contractual one? “Employer” and 
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“Employee” (words having reference to the contract) now seem more 
appropriate terms than the older “master” and “servant” words having 
reference to status29 what of the relation has not depended on contract. 
Hence, persons incapable of making contracts are still competent to become 
agents. But in the living law of the last century this relation too, has veered 
from status to contract. The naïve statement in many textbooks and judicial 
opinions that “agency is a contract” is evidence of the tendency if not of the 
law.30 Perhaps even the marriage relation has been made somewhat subject 
to common law, at least on the property side, though, of course, here we 
should expect. Conservatism and marriage still be considered a status,31 but 
when we leave the family circle and turn the original application of the formula 
to its possible applications “ as it is commonly understood”, it becomes difficult 
to comprehend. “It is obvious from this investigation, as has been already 
indicated, that marriage has a tendency to glide into a mere contract.” Even in 
guardianship, the element of consent now plays an important part. What is 
meant when we are told that the generalization has no basis in Anglo-
American legal history. Holmes has shown the fact, whatever in Anglo-
American legal history. Holmes has shown the fact, whatever the reason, that 
the law of bailment was originally a law of status, and that the 19th century has 
stretched contract law so as to make a contract even of a gratuitous 
bailment.32 Perhaps here the change is in the theory of the law rather than in 
the law itself; but what shall we say of the law of landlord and tenant? 
Beginning in status as indicated by the terms still used – though “lessor” and 
“lessee” are displacing them- it has progressed to the point. 
 
A lease was formerly a conveyance of property, an instrument of 
status. We can even localize the point where assumpsit was allowed along 
wide of debt in the collection of rents.33 Turn to the history of assumpsit, 34 the 
early tradesman was there sued as tradesman and not as contracting party. 
We may lament this progress and blame all our ills upon it,35 if we will, but the 
fact remains that most business relations have become contractual relations 
and at least until Maine’s day all business relations had shown a tendency in 
that direction. In the law of negotiable instruments the peculiar rights and 
liabilities of the parties were connected with the status of being a trader under 
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Lord Holt declared that the “gentleman” who signed a negotiable document 
became ad-hoc a trader. The basis thereafter was agreement. But more 
significant, because deeper, than the “gentleman” who signed a negotiable 
document became ad-hoc a trader. The basis thereafter was agreement. But 
more significant, because deeper, than the change in the particular branches 
of the law, has been the development of the general theory of implied 
contract. This is illustrated in the history of possessors liens. The presence or 
absence of a lien has become imperceptibly to depend on the implied 
contract. Of course, the terms of the implied contract are to be sought in 
usage, but there was a time when usage merely dictated a lien of bailees 
whose status entitles them of one kind or another without the meditation of 
any theory of implied contract. 
 
Maine was, of course, no prophet. He could not foresee the twentieth 
century tendency of our law to go back to the year books, but as a shrewd 
observer of the tendencies about him, he was unsurpassed. At least, with 
reference to his status to contract generalization, whatever limitations we shall 
have to insert, whatever exceptions we shall be forced to engraft upon the 
rule, we must-however reluctantly – dissent from the view that it was a mere 
Romanism with no basis with no basis in Anglo-American legal history. Here 
is poetic justice, indeed Maine, who falsely accused Bralton of foisting Roman 
law on his unsuspecting countrymen, is now charged with having foisted 
Roman jurisprudence on his still unsuspecting countrymen. 
 
2.4 Intuitionist’s Theory 
 
Why should promises be enforced? To this question, the simplest 
answer is that of the intuitionists, namely that promises are sacred per-se, that 
there is something inherently despicable about not keeping a promise, and 
that a properly organized society should not tolerate this. This may also be 
said to be the common ‘man’s theory’. Learned writers ignore this because of 
their interest in showing the evil consequences of allowing promises to be 
broken. 
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There can be no doubt that common sense does generally find 
something revolting about the breaking of a promise, and this, if a fact, must 
be taken account of by the law, though it may be balanced by other factors or 
considerations. 
 
In any case, let us not ignore the fact that judges and jurists, like other 
mortals do frequently express this in the feeling that it would be an outrage to 
let one who has broken his promise escape completely. 
 
But while this intuitionist theory contains an element of truth, it is clearly 
inadequate. No legal system does or can attempt to enforce all promises. Not 
even the cannon law held all promises to be sacred. And when we came to 
draw a distinction between those promises which should be and those which 
should not be enforced, the intuitionists theory, that all promises should be 
kept, gives us not light or guiding principle. 
 
Similar to the intuitionists theory is the view of Kantians like Reinach 
that the duty to keep one’s promise is one without which rational society 
would be impossible. There can be no doubt that from an imperial or historical 
point of view. The ability to rely on the promises of others adds to the 
confidence necessary for social intercourse and enterprise. But as an 
absolute proposition this is untenable. The actual world, which assuredly is 
among the possible ones, is not one in which all promises are kept, and there 
are many people – not necessarily diplomats – who prefer a world in which 
they and others occasionally depart from the truth and go back on some 
promise. It is indeed very doubtful whether there are many who would prefer 
to live in an entirely rigid world in which one would be obliged to keep all one’s 
promises instead of the preset more viable system, in which a vaguely fair 
proportion is sufficient. Some freedom to change one’s mind is necessary of 
free intercourse between those who lack omniscience. 
 
For this reason we cannot accept Dean Pound’s theory that all 
promises in the course of business should be enforced. He is undoubtedly 
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right in his insistence that promises constitute modern wealth and that their 
enforcement is thus a necessity for maintaining wealth as a basis of 
civilization. Businessmen as a whole do not wish the law to enforce every 
promise. 
 
Though the great authority of Gierke, following Tacitus and Grotius, 
can be filled for the view that the early bermans attached great importance to 
keeping one’s word; the evidence collected by men such as Brunner Von 
Amira, Heasler and Brissaud shows that the Germans; like other peoples, 
held promises binding only if some real object passed hands or some formal 
testimony took place, otherwise, pledge or security was required. 
 
2.5. The Equivalent Theory 36 
 
In the 18th century, the Equivalent Theory gained ground. 
 
The Equivalent Theory had influenced on Anglo-American law and 
many jurists considered it to be the origin of the Theory of Consideration. 
 
The basic principle of Equivalent Theory is that every promise, in its 
ultimate analysis, is a bargain. This theory is called Bargain Theory which is a 
developed form of Equivalent Theory. 
 
Popular sentiment generally favours the enforcement of those 
promises which involve some quid pro quo. It is generally considered unfair 
that after A has given something of value or rendered B some services, B 
should fail to render anything in return. Even if what A did was by way of gift, 
B owes him gratitude and should express it in some appropriate way. And if, 
in addition, B has promised to pay A for the value or services received, the 
moral sense of the community condems B’s failure to do so as even more 
unfair. 
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The demand for justice behind the law is but an elaboration of such 
feelings of what is fair and unfair. 
 
The Equivalent theory of contract had the advantage of being 
supported by this popular sentiment. This sentiment also explains the primacy 
of real contract. 
 
While a legal theory must not ignore common sense, it must also go 
beyond it. For common sense, while generally sound at its care, is almost 
always vague and inadequate. Common sentiment, for instance demands an 
equivalent. But what things are equivalent? It is easy to answer this in regard 
to goods or services that have a standard market value. But how shall we 
measure things that are dissimilar in nature or in a market where monopolistic 
or other factors prevent a fair or just price? Modern law therefore professes to 
abandon the effort of more primitive systems to enforce material fairness 
within the contract. The parties to the contract must themselves determine 
what is fair. Thereby, however, the law loses a good deal of support in the 
moral sense of the community. 
 
Though legal historians like Amos are right in insisting that the common 
law doctrine of consideration did not originate in the la’s insistence on 
equivalence in every, the later idea cannot be eliminated altogether. It colours 
the prevailing language as to consideration, and especially the doctrine that in 
a bilateral contract each promise is a consideration for the other. If a bare 
promise is of no legal validity, how can be it of any profit to the promise or of 
any detriment to the promissory? Clearly, two things that are valueless cannot 
become of value by being exchanged for each other. The real reason for the 
sanctioning of certain exchanges of promises is that thereby certain 
transaction can be legally protected, and when we desire to achieve this result 
we try to construe the transaction as an exchange of promises. Consideration 
is in effect a formality, like an oath, the affixing of a seal, or a stipulation in 
court. 
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The difficulty in the way of Equivalent theory is that law considers 
inadequacy of consideration to be of no importance. Successive attempts 
have been made by the courts to propound principles in order to hold men to 
their undertaking; overriding consideration has been to ensure the sanctity 
and security to the transaction. A man’s word given in the course of business 
should be as good as his bond. The theory of consideration has been in 
vogue for the last four hundred years, yet up to today there is no 
comprehensive definition of consideration. In the continental countries all 
promise made deliberately are enforceable without the requirement of 
consideration.37 
 
2.6 Holmes Theory Of Law Of Contract 
 
In his “common Law” Mr. Justice Holmes expressed the view that a 
contract is properly to be regarded as the taking of a risk creating liability to 
pay damages in a certain event. The only universal consequence of a legally 
binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the 
promised event does not come to pass. His position seems to be that liability 
in contracts is completely analogous to that in Tort you commit a tort you are 
liable to pay damages, unless something happens, i.e., performance, over 
which you are liable to pay damages, unless something happens, i.e., 
performance, over which you may or may not have control it is a conditional 
liability to pay damages. There is, he holds, no reason to speak of ‘promise’ in 
the matter at all, in particular, the performance and the payment of damages 
are not to be thought of as alternative obligations (this is answer to an 
objection by Pollock).  
 
 To this Pollock makes various objections. Such a view, he says, 
disappoints reasonable expectations (one does not buy a right to damages, 
one buys a horse). It is inconsistent with the law of specific performance. It is 
inconsistent with the doctrine that anticipatory refusal to perform is a breach. It 
is inconsistent with rules about frustration and the like. To the reasonable 
expectations point Holmes answers: “I don’t see why the cases on damages 
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do not embody the principles of reasonable expectation : he must know that 
the person he contracts with believes that he accepts the contract with the 
special conditions attached to it.” That seems to be no answer; he knows, 
indeed, that it is possible that he may be put off with damages, but that is not 
what in the normal case, he either wants or expects. But perhaps the 
objection is not fatal; the law does sometimes disappoint reasonable 
expectations. As to specific performance, Holmes replies that this is not 
common law, and is exceptional. That, again, seems to be no answer. Pollock 
observes that it is the normal remedy in other systems i.e. German law. 
 
It is observed that Holmes neat parallel commit a tort , commit a 
contract- is extremely misleading. A man who has commited a tort has done a 
wrong and rendered himself liable to proceedings. That is indeed what; in this 
connection, the word ‘commit’ means. It comes to us from the Latin, probably 
through the Roman law and commission is a wrong done. But a man who 
commits a contract, in Holmes sense, that is to say makes one, has not 
rendered himself liable to legal proceedings, though later events may do so. 
He has done no wrong, and the word ‘commit’ is wholly in appropriate. 
 
2.7 The Moral Theory 
 
It was Professor Goodhart, who said, “that the moral basis of contract 
is that the promissory has by his promise created a reasonable expectation 
that it will be kept”. This theory of a moral basis has been in vague for long, 
since in 1916, Sir Thomas Erskine Holland had declared 38 “That when law 
enforces contracts it does so to prevent disappointment of well founded 
expectations, which though they usually arise from expressions truly 
representing intention, yet may occasionally arise otherwise.” There is good 
support for this in American opinion expressed by Professor Corbin in 1950 in 
his work on the Law of Contracts: 39 
 
“That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the 
law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations 
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that have been induced by the making of promise. Doubtless this is not 
only purpose by which men have been motivated in creating the law of 
contracts…….” 
 
We had already to the historical aspect of the early growth of the 
contract laws in England- the old writs then in action on the case and the 
further development of Assumpsit. The action on the case was merely an 
attempt to bring to look the promissory for his moral lapse in not fulfilling his 
promise. The earlier writs were technical and were only a means of 
enforcement of certain contracts. 
 
There was no moral or ethical emphasis in the theory of those writs. 
But in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the moral aspect forced a solution. 
The promissory by his deceit failed to carry out his promise and caused injury 
to the promise. It was but proper the latter should be enabled to recover 
damages for breach of contract. To break a contract and injure the other party 
was immoral. So the ‘Action on the case’ was resorted to as a suitable 
remedy in such cases. 
 
The moral basis was stressed also to bespeede up commerce which 
was growing in those centuries (15th and 16th), Commerce grew on credit and 
credit was matured on promise. If the promise was broken, the edifice of 
commerce stood in danger. So Sir George Paton rightly stated “credit 
depends essentially on ability to rely on the promise of others and thus can 
flourish only where there is a fully developed law of contract.” 40 
 
The third ground on which the moral basis of contract was matured 
was the cause of justice. If parties come to an agreement freely and 
independently, it is but just they are enabled to keep to the agreement. The 
law of contract is sanction for the legal enforcement of such promises; it 
guaranteed the fulfillment of reasonable expectations. As stated already the 
Court of Chancery often stepped in to fill the gap in the common law writ 
system to fulfill the moral demands of individuals and society. 
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Professor Plucknett Pithily put it: 41 
 
“The church very early took a strong view of the sanctity of 
contractual relationships, insisting that in conscience the obligation of a 
contract was completely independent of writings, forms and 
ceremonies and tried so far as he could translate this moral theory into 
terms of law.” 
 
 Though the kings court refused to ratify a pledge of faith and the 
constitution of clarendor (1164) also would not allow ecclesiastical courts from 
enforcing them, yet the later courts would not allow moral lapses in the shape 
of breach of faith. In medieval times the obligations of law and religion were 
almost indistinguishable, and despite the constitutions of claredon, the 
common lawyers would press for the moral basis of contract and their 
performance. The court of chancery hereforth offered remedies where good 
faith and honest dealing demanded promises being enforced. Gradually, this 
influenced the common law courts also to give suitable remedy for a breach of 
contract. 42 The writ of Assumpsit was the result. The doctrine of consideration 
had not yet then fully developed but the judges felt a duty to enforce moral 
obligations.43 
 
 Dutton’s case indicated the trend. Family affinity was enough moral 
bound to provide as the consideration for a promise. The theory of ‘Good’ 
family consideration was the precursor to the theory of ‘valuable 
consideration’. Lord Mansfield developed this aspect in Alkins v. Hill.44 The 
action in Assumpsit was successfully launched in that case by a legatee upon 
a promise by an executor with adequate assets to pay a legacy. The learned 
Chief Justice remarked : 
 
“It is a promise made upon a good and valuable consideration 
which in all cases is a sufficient ground to support an action. It is so in 
case obligations which would otherwise only behind a man’s 
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conscience and which without such promise, he could not be 
compelled to pay.” 
 
 The theory of moral basis was further developed by the same judge 
some years later in Hawks v. Saunders, 45 wherein he stated, “Where a man 
is under a moral obligation which no court of law or equity can enforce any 
promises, the honesty and rectitude of the thing is consideration. The tide, 
however, turned against such a general doctrine in Rann v. Hughes46 and 
Littlefield v. Sheek.47 In the last case Lord Tenderden C.J. put it : “The 
doctrine that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a subsequent 
promise is one which should be received with some limitation.” The moral 
theory had to meet the challenge in latter years of the doctrine of 
consideration. 
 
 The theory of sufficiency of consideration put the theory of moral 
obligations more and more remote. The moral theory still lingered on in Leev. 
Muggeridge48 but in Eastwood v. Kenyan49 it got its final death blow, with Lord 
Denman declaring : - 
 
 “The doctrine would annihilate the necessity for any 
consideration at all, in as much as the mere act of giving a promise 
creates a moral obligation to perform it”. 
 
 And his Lordship cited that of the many mischievous consequences to 
society and would be “The frequent performance of voluntary undertakings to 
claims for just debts.” 
 
 Thus the ‘moral’ theory which held the field for over a generation made 
its exit in the middle of the nineteenth century.50 Slowly the rationalistic school 
of Bodin and Hobbes canvassed the gospel of reason and drew a distinction 
between law and morality. Utility rather than morality provided the justification 
to the enforcement of obligations. 
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 Jeremy Bentham was the exponent of utilitarianism and gave the lead 
to John Austin’s theory of soverignity and the commands of the soverign 
which necessarily separated jurisprudence from morals. The analytical 
jurisprudence of Austin was explained by Salmond51 as : 
 
“to analyse without reference either to their ethical origin or 
development or their ethical significance or validity, the first principle of 
the law”. 
 
 Holland and Salmond walked on the footsteps of Austin and concluded 
that contracts should be enforced so as to prevent disappointment of well-
founded expectations. Alongside this analytical school , there was the 
statistical school of which Maine and George Paton could be mentioned. This 
school laid emphasis on the gradual evolution of legal institutions admist 
changing social and economic back ground. Paton in his jurisprudence 
reffered to the dictum ‘status to contract’ as not merely a convenient 
generalization of certain aspects of legal history but an external principle, the 
onward march of which could not be stayed.52 There was yet another school 
called the ‘Will Theory’ of contract where the essence of agreement was 
considered to be in the union of wills. 
 
2.8. The Will Theory 53 
 
 The every increasing needs of commerce forced the Roman Law to 
evolve the theory that every promise made intentionally is binding and 
enforceable. The theory was called the ‘Will Theory ‘ of contract. 
 
 According to the Will Theory, agreement was necessarily the outcome 
of consenting minds. There must be consensus ad idem to bring into being a 
contract. Agreement, however, is not a mental state but an act, and as an act 
is a matter of inference from conduct. The parties are to be judged, not by 
what is in their minds, but by what they have said or written or done. If one 
party makes to other a promise which is reasonably understood by that other 
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to be intended to effect legal relations and the promise, acts upon it to his 
detriment, the promisor will be contractually bound by the promise even 
though he did not intend to contract, or to contract in those terms. 
 
 In the 18th century the property orientation of the community led to the 
law being protective and paternalistic about the fairness of an exchange. The 
subsequent doctrine, that adequacy of consideration is for the parties alone, 
obtained in the 19th century, was not present in the 18th. The stress on the will 
theory of the 19th century was not present in the law of the 18th century. In the 
19th century law of contract was of regulative nature, leaning it to the parties to 
enter into any contract they liked within the permissible limits of the law and 
such a contract had to be enforced by the courts irrespective of the question 
whether it was fair or reasonable. 
 
 Law of part executed contract was slowly but surely yielding place to 
the law of executory contract, which was adopted as the classical model of 
contract. 
 
 In an executory contract, a party was liable not because of anything 
done at the time of entering into the contract but because of his promise or 
intention to do something in the future. The importance of the contract led to 
the formulation of the will theory. 
 
 Mansfield while putting emphasis on intention in the interpretation of 
the contract had also emphasized the importance of intention in the formation 
of the contract by talking of the intent of a transaction in his judgements, 54 
e.g., Kingston v. Preston.55 
 
 It was argued that if a transaction could have an intent and if the 
interpretation and effect of a contract depended on intent of the parties, why 
can’t the creation of a liability, i.e. formation of the contract depend on the 
parties intent. 
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 According to classical view, the law of contract gives expression to and 
protects the will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of 
respect. Hence, such authorities as Savigny, Windshield, Pothier, Planiol, 
Salmond and Langdell hold that the first essential of a contractis the 
agreement of the wills, or the meeting of minds. 
 
 The metaphysical difficulties of this view have often been pointed out. 
Mind or will are not in themselves existing things that we can look at and 
recognize. We are restricted in our earthly experience to the observations of 
the changes or actions of more or less animated bodies in time and space; 
and disembodied minds or wills are beyond the scope and reach of earthly 
law. But while this objection has become familiar, it has not been very 
effectively. The force of the old ideas, embodied in the traditional language, 
and has not always been overcome even by those who like Langdell and 
Salmond professes to recognize the fictional element in the will theory. 
 
 Another line of objection can be found in the incapability of the classical 
theory with the consequences that the law attaches to an offer. Law demands 
definite rules with regard to the time that an offer is accepted, if the parties are 
corresponding by post. In English law and Indian law contract is completed 
when the letter of acceptance is posted, but an offer can be revoked only 
when the revocation is communicated to the offeree. It may happen that A 
reads an offer and posts his acceptance after B has sent a telegram revoking 
the offer, but, so long as A posts the letter before he receives the telegram, 
the contract is valid, although the real will of the parties were not ad idem at 
any particular moment. 
 
 A more important objection to the theory that every contract expresses 
the consensus or agreed wills of the two parties is the fact that most litigation 
in this field arises precisely because of the advent of conditions that the two 
parties did not foresee when they entered into the transaction. 
 
 Litigation usually needs the absence of genuine agreement between 
the parties ab-initio. If both parties had foreseen the difficulty , provision would 
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have been made for in the beginning when the contract was drawn up. When 
courts thus proceed to interpret the terms of the contract they are generally 
not merely seeking to discover the actual past meanings (though that may 
sometimes be investigated) but more generally they decide the “equities” the 
rights and obligations of the parties, in such circumstances; and these legal 
relations are determined by the courts and the jural system and not by the 
agreed will of the consenting parties. 
 
 Planial and others have argued that while certain effects of a contract 
may not have been foreseen by the parties, nevertheless these are effects 
following from the original objective and are, therefore, the will of the two 
contractors. But to argue that because the law fixes certain obligations you did 
foresee something that in fact you did not see is a confusion which would be 
too ridiculous to criticize, were it not so prevalent in juristic decisions. So in 
contracts men are liable for things that they did not actually foresee; and to 
say that they intended or willed these results are a fiction designed to save 
the will theory.  
 
 The will theory leads to such a subjective view of mistake that the 
security of transaction is thereby imperiled.  Where the mistake is due to A’s 
carelessness and the other contracting party is unaware of A’s error, the real 
will of the parties cannot be regarded as ad idem, but to avoid the contract 
would frequently be very unjust. Modern law tends to take rather a narrow 
view of the kinds of mistake which void a contract. The obvious limitations of 
the will theory of contract have caused a reaction that takes the forms of 
position or behaviorism. Away with the whole notion of will – the only realities 
are specific acts to which the law attaches certain consequences, that is, if 
you do something by word of mouth, by writing or by any other act that 
someone else takes a promise, then latter can under certain conditions, bring 
an action. In its extreme form, this appears in what Dean Pound calls the state 
of strict law, which like everything called primitive, is always with us. A 
developed system of law, however, must draw some distinction, between 
voluntary and involuntary acts. Mr. Justice Holmes thinks that even a dog 
discriminates between one who stumbles over him and one who kicks him. 
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The whole of the modern law of contract, it may be argued, thus does and 
should respond to the need of greater or finer discrimination in regard to the 
intentional character of acts. The law of error, duress and fraud in contract 
would be in contract would be unintelligible apart from such distinction. 
 
2.9  Injurious Reliance Theory56   
 
In sharp contrast to the will theory is what Pound has termed the 
injurious reliance theory. Though this seems to be the favourable theory 
today, it has not yet been adequately formulated and many of those who 
subscribe to it fall back on the will theory when they come to discuss special 
topics in the law of contract. 
 
Injurious reliance theory is considerably followed in the United States, 
and places emphasis upon consensus and much more upon legal 
expectations aroused by the conduct of the parties. 
 
The difficulties attendant upon a definition of a contract in terms of 
agreement have led the supporters of this theory to concentrate their attention 
on the element of a promise, which it is said, is more suggestive of an 
objective attitude than agreement. 
 
In English Law, certain additional factors are required for the validity of 
a contractual obligation. The contract must either be executed in a certain 
form (i.e., under seal), in which case no injurious reliance need be shown, or 
there must be present some ‘consideration’ moving from the promise. As this 
consideration is normally a deteriment, or injury, to the promise, it might seem 
to accord well with the theory of injurious reliance. But this is not in fact the 
case, for the deteriment must have been incurred in return for the promise, 
and so the idea of agreement is seen once again.57 
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 In the 18th century, contractual liability was based on reasonable 
expectation (reliance) rather than on promise. Promise was assigned the role 
of an instrument of justification. 
 
 Eighteenth century witnessed a slow change. In the 18th century the 
prices of land changed very little. Contracts for future performance made in 
the 18th century contained no element of risk or very little risk if at all. Mostly 
contracts were executed contracts. 
 
 Executory contracts stipulating future performance were usually 
entered into because of some practical requirement of deferring payment of 
price or investigation of title, etc. The contracts had not yet assumed the 
characteristics of risk allocation. It was much later that he contract became an 
instrument of future planning. A person who bought at the ruling market rate 
at the time of entering into the contract with an eye to the rising market was 
rewarded for his foresight. 
 
 But in the 18th century such a transaction was not considered to be in 
good taste. Though expectation damages came subsequently to be regarded 
as reward for foresight, in 1775 they were frownwd on. The court observed in 
Flureau v. Thornhill: 58  
 
 “To ask for expectation damages is to ask the court to count the 
plaintiff’s egg as chicken before it hatched.” 
 
 The essence of theory, however, is clear enough. Contractual liabilities 
arise or should arise only where (1) some one makes a promise explicitly in 
words implicit by some act; (2) some one else relies on it and (3) suffers some 
loss thereby. The theory emphasis on conduct rather than on status of mind, 
the reason for the enforcement of the contract is security rather than any 
mystical union of wills. 
 
 This theory appeals to the general moral feeling that not only ought 
promises to be kept, but than anyone innocently injured by relying on them is 
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entitled to have his loss “made good” by the one who thus caused it. If, as 
Schopenhaver has maintained the sense of wrong is the ultimate human 
source of the law, then to base the obligation of the promise on the injury of 
the one who has relied on it, is to appeal to something really fundamental. 
 
 This theory has also appealed powerfully to modern legal theorists 
because it seems to be entirely objective and social. It does not ask the court 
to examine the intention of the promissory. Instead, the court is asked to 
consider whether what the defendant has said or done is such that 
reasonable people generally do rely on it under the circumstances. The 
resulting loss can be directly proved and to some extent, even measured. 
 
 But the injurious reliance theory is the best only an approach, for it has 
not been fully worked out. Firstly, the law of contract is not created by 
deductions from a peculiar theory, but the presence of practical needs on the 
legal structure bequeathed by history. The views of lawyers change, and in 
every legal system we find legacies from the past that conflict with modern 
views. Hence, even if it be useful to study the theories that underlie the law of 
contract, we can not expect to find a consistent approach in any one system 
of law. Thus no legal system regards mere reliance on the promise of the 
another as sufficient. Both English and Continental law require an intention to 
effect legal relations and in England there is the further requirement that there 
must be either consideration or deed. Secondly, in most systems, if a contract 
is created there is no need to prove injurious reliance. A promise by deed to 
give a donation is binding even although the recipient has not altered his 
position for the worse by relying upon it. Thirdly, the word ‘security’ has not 
been thoroughly analysed. Demogue, dealing with transfer of title, 
distinguished between static and dynamic security. Static security protects the 
rights of owners and prefers to sacrifice, if necessary, the rights of bonafide 
purchasers for value. Dynamic security results from the desire to facilitate 
transactions and to over rule some of the inconvenient consequences of the 
maxim, nemo dat non habeat. With regard to the transfer of land, the 
traditional English approach has been to protect the interests of the owners 
even at the cost of rendering transactions slow and cumbersome, although 
40 
 
legislation had lately somewhat simplified the problem. With regard to 
personal property, the instructions of dynamic security were more far 
reaching. Rules concerning Negotiable Instruments, The Factories Act of 
1889 and certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act may lead to the title of 
the true owner being defeated without his own consent. The security of which  
Pound speaks is somewhat analogous to dynamic security in that it facilitates 
the speed of transactions. But Domogue is analyzing the problem from the 
angle of the owner of property, Pound from the approach of a contracting 
party who wished to know if he may rely on the conduct of another. Security, 
in terms of the injurious reliance theory, can mean only ability to rely on 
expectations reasonably aroused by the conduct of another. 
 
 There can be no question about the soundness of the injurious reliance 
theory in accounting for a dominant phase of the law of contract, and the 
foregoing difficulties may thus seem petty. But they do call attention to 
fundamental obscurities in the very idea of “reliance” as wellm as in the 
criteria of “injury”. The injurious reliance theory, like others calls attention to a 
necessary element but does not give an adequate account of the whole of the 
law of contract. Its merits are clearer when its claims are properly limited. 
 
 The theories of reliance were over-shadowed by the consensus theory.  
 
 By the end of the 19th century, academicians had to face the problem 
regarding the place of consideration in the classical concept of contract. One 
school advocated the concept that benefit or detriment could be the 
consideration for the contract, while the other school advanced the idea that 
only detriment could be considered as sufficient consideration. It was only the 
beginning of the 20th century that the clouds cleared and the concept of the 
first school gained prominence. 
 
2.10 Modern Developments 
The old respect of the individual for his contractual obligations is not so 
much in evidence in modern days. We no longer can say that the sphere of 
41 
 
individual assertion is increasing and ought to be increased. For various 
reasons the law has interfered seriously with contractual liberty, sometimes in 
the interest of the economically weaker party, sometimes in the hope of 
regulating an industry in order to protect it from foreign competition . Non 
performance of obligations found support in the development of the doctrine 
of frustration. The demand for the relaxation of the strict letter of the contract 
to relieve hardship and the importation of terms if performance was insisted 
upon was more in evidence. Defences of illegality or immorality or public 
policy helped a party who desired to back out from his pledged word. 
Professor Friedmann in his book law in changing society has mentioned four 
major factors which are responsible for transformation in the function and 
substance of contract which is creating a widening gap between legal reality 
and the traditional text book approach. 
 
The first is the widespread process of concentration in industry and 
business, corresponding to an increasing urbanization and standardization of 
life. Its legal result is the ‘Standard Contract’ or ‘Contract of Adhesion’. 
 
The second factor is the increasing substitution of collective for 
individual bargaining in industrial society. Its legal product is the collective 
contract between management and labour, with a varying degree of state 
interference. 
 
The third factor is the tremendous expansion of the welfare and social 
service functions of the state in all common law jurisdictions; its legal product 
is two fold: on the one hand; it has led to multitude of statutory terms of 
contract, substituted for, or added to, the terms agreed between the parties, 
on the other hand, it has led to a vast increase of contracts where government 
departments or public authorities are on one side, and a private party on the 
other. The effect of this side on the law of contract, though as yet little 
explored, is profound. 
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Lastly the economic security aspect of contract, the elaboration of 
remedies for breach, is increasingly affected by the spread of such political, 
economic and social upheavals as war, revolution or inflation. 
 
Its legal result is the doctrine of frustration of contract, which its 
consequent extension of legal excuses for the non-performance of contract. 
 
All these developments affect the theory and practice of contract, but in 
different ways. The social security ideology means emphasis on stability and 
corresponding lack of mobility, especially in employment contracts. Collective 
bargaining on the other hand, has substantially restored equality of bargaining 
power between employers and employees, though increasingly at the cost of 
individual freedom, as the legal or practical compulsion to join employer’s 
associations and trade unions progresses. The imposition of statutory duties 
in the interest of social justice largely sacrifices mobility for stability and 
security. The increasing participation of public authority in contract creates the 
wider and as yet generally unexplored problem of the dual function of the 
state, as a superior and as an equal.    
 
The standardization of the contract greatly restricts the freedom of the 
weaker party, and is usually accompanied by inequality of bargaining power. 
They are too common in a highly commercial society. Customer is negatively 
drawn into these contracts by force of circumstances. He is amazed later 
when he is told that he cannot get from the court the relief he wants on 
account of the “exemption clauses” placing the promissory in an undesirably 
advantageous position. The abstract legal theory of contract as an agreement 
arrived at through discussion and regulation must be supplemented by a 
realist study of its operation in the world today. 
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58. 1775 2 W.B.L. 1078, 96 E.R. 635. 
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Chapter 3 
Exemption Clauses and Freedom of Contract-  
An Analysis of The Modern Trends In The Light of Statutory 
Enactments and Judicial Decisions. 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Freedom of contract is the most cherished aspects of individual liberty 
and it is therefore unfortunate that its ambivalent nature has resulted in its 
abuse. In the words of Sir George Jessel, 
 
“If there is one thing more than another which public policy requires, it 
is the men of full age and competent understanding shall have the 
utmost liberty of contracting and their contracts, when entered into 
freely and voluntarily, shall be entered by courts of justice”. 1 
  
Freedom of contracts has no longer absolute value attributable to it in 
the 19th century. Great inroads have been made by legislation and judiciary. 
Restrictions on the contractual freedom of parties have been inevitable. The 
doctrine of freedom of will has confronted with the social pressures and 
economic compulsions of all sorts and the principle of formal equality of the 
two contracting parties becomes an instrument of oppression and injustice in 
the face of economic inequality. As a result of humanitarian philosophy, the 
moral principle that one should abide by one’s agreement and fulfill one’s 
promises was being increasingly met by another moral principle, namely, that 
one should not take advantage of an unfair contract which one has persuaded 
another party to make economic or social pressure. 
  
The old respect of the individual for his contractual obligations is not so 
much in evidence in modern days. Non-Performance of obligations found 
support in the development of the doctrine of frustration. The demand for the 
relaxation of the strict letter of the contract to relieve hardships and the 
importation of terms, if performance was insisted upon, was more in evidence. 
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Defences of illegality, immorality or public policy helped a party who desired to 
back out from his pledged word. 
  
The philosophy of welfare state has converted the state into a giant 
business and industrial corporation, and the almost universal faith in 
economic planning has reduced, beyond recognition the scope of the freedom 
of contract. And lastly, the process of mass production and distribution has 
given birth to the standard form contract which has curtailed the parties 
freedom of contract to a very great extent.  
 
But as a freedom became a rallying cry for political reforms, freedom of 
contract was the ideological principle for development of the law of contract. 
In Main’s classical phrase, it was widely belived that “ the movement of the 
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status of contract.” 2 
 
Williston adds: “Economic writers adopted the same line of thought. 
Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham and John Staurt Mill successively insisted on 
freedom of bargaining as the fundamental and indispensable requisite of 
progress; and imposed their theories on the educated thought of their times 
with a thoroughness not common in economic speculation.”3  
 
In the 20th society the tide has turned away from the 19th century 
tendency towards the unrestricted freedom of contract. While the parties to 
the contract as they please for lawful purposes remain a basic principle of our 
legal system, it is hemmed in by increasing legislative restrictions. Two areas 
of the law serve to illustrate this. Contracts of employment are controlled by a 
wide range of Federal and State laws concerning minimum wages, hours, 
working conditions and required social insurance programs. Contracts of 
insurance, perhaps to a greater extent than labour contracts, are controlled by 
often terms of policy are dictated by statute. 
 
Apart from legislative restrictions on freedom of contract it seems likely 
that in future there will be greater restrictions imposed by courts in the 
exercise of their function of developing the common law. There has been 
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increasing recognition in legal literature that the bargaining process has 
become more limited in modern society. 
 
 In purchasing a new automobile, for example, the individual may be 
able to dicker over price, model, color, and certain other factors, but if he 
wishes to commutate the contract to purchase, he usually must sign the 
standard form prepared by the manufacturer (although he is contracting with 
an independent dealer). He has no real choice. He must take that form or 
leave it. Such contracts called contracts of “adhesion” 4 constitute a serious 
challenge too much of contract theory. 
 
 Most of contract law is premised upon a model constituting of two alert 
individuals, mindful of their self-interest, hammering out an agreement by a 
process of hard bargaining. The process of entering into a contract of 
adhesion, however “….is not one of haggle or co-operative process but rather 
of a fly and flypaper.” 5 Courts, legislators and scholars have become 
increasingly  aware of this divergence between the theory and practice of 
contract formation, and new techniques are evolving for coping with the 
challenges stemming from this divergence. 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freedom of contract presaged 
Freedom of Choice in 
the sense that nobody 
was bound to enter into 
any contract if he did 
not chose to do so. 
Freedom of Choice in 
the sense that everyone 
had a choice of persons 
with whom he can 
contract 
Freedom of choice in 
the sense that people 
could make virtually 
any kind of contract on 
any terms they chose. 
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(i) Freedom of choice in the sense that nobody was bound to enter into 
any contract if he did not choose to do so   
 
In the early nineteenth century the proposition that nobody was bound 
to enter into a contract at all if he did not choose to do so, reflected the 
realities of the situation as obtained at that time. In that period it was only in 
very few cases that a person was under a legal obligation to enter into a 
contract, e.g., Persons exercising “common calling” such as inn-keeper, 
common carrier etc. 
 
The classical concept of freedom of contract took no notice of the 
social and economic pressures, which might virtually force a person to enter 
into the contract. Even in the nineteenth century in case of persons who had 
to find a job it meant entering into a contract of service. Public services like 
supply of water, electricity etc., could only be obtained by entering into 
contracts. The conditions obtaining today virtually force a person to enter into 
a contract, which he had no desire to make. A person may be compelled to 
join a trade union (by entering into a contract), in order to exercise his trade or 
even earn his livelihood. A retailer may be virtually compelled to contract with 
a whole seller to obtain goods necessary for his business.  
 
(ii) Freedom of choice in the sense that everyone had a choice of 
persons with whom he can contract 
 
Ordinarily in a competitive society every one has a choice of persons 
with whom he could enter into a contract. But in the case of public utilities run 
by monopolistic concerns, there is no choice left to the consumer, he has to 
take it or leave it,. There is a steady modern tendency towards larger and 
larger industrial and commercial organizations culminating in monopoly, still it 
is common to find different organizations agreeing together to form a ring.7 
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(iii) Freedom of choice in the sense that people could make virtually 
any kind of contract on any terms they choose. 
 
Freedom in this sense was even in the nineteenth century somewhat 
restricted. There was always the overriding consideration of public policy and 
the courts retained the power to declare contracts to be ineffective being 
repugnant to public policy.8 As noticed the development of economic patterns 
took place by which public utilities and other spheres of activity were operated 
by monopolistic concerns or rings leaving no choice to the individual. These 
concerns developed a form of standard contract imposing their own terms, a 
contract of adhesion as it was called which in effect meant take it or leave it, 
leaving no option to the individual to negotiate the terms of the contract. 
 
The image envisaged by the classical theory  of contract of two 
physical individuals sitting across a table and negotiating terms of the contract 
is replaced by huge corporations, monopolistic concerns and industrial and 
commercial rings dictating their terms embodied in standard form of contract, 
leaving no option to the party to negotiate or settle terms of the contract.   
 
The classical theory assumed equality of bargaining power in a 
background of free market. The foundation of this concept was shared when 
corporations increasingly displaced physical persons as legal individuals as 
parties to commercial and industrial contracts. The concept of bargain 
between two equally placed individuals was no longer a reality. 
 
It is nowadays no exaggeration to say that important contracts are not 
made between individual persons at all. They are made either between two 
organizations on one side and an individual on the other, an obvious example 
of inequality of bargaining power. It may be noticed that in the purely business 
area in which merchants contract with each other for the purchase and sale of 
commodities, much freedom of contract still remains in the classical sense. 
But it is the emergence of the consumer as a contracting party with large 
corporations at the other end, which led to major changes. 
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In the first case contract may be briefest possible in the shape of 
BOUGHT and SOLD – NOTES .A TWO LINE AFFAIR- while in the second 
case the contract would be in the Standard Form a complete code in itself-A 
PRINTED BOOK. 
 
3.2 Freedom of contract as restricted by equity, legislation and common  
      law. 
 
No doubt the courts of equity even during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were inclined to assist in the enforcement of contracts. 
But it declined to exercise it in cases where the partner was guilty of 
dishonesty and sharp practice. 
 
For e.g. where A contracted to purchase the estate of B pretending that 
it was for a friend of B and therefore got it cheaper when in fact he had bought 
it for another, the court refused to help A.9  
 
In Webster v. Cecil. 10 Plaintiff sued for specific performance of contract 
to sell a certain property for £1250. The defendant’s plea was that he had 
refused to sell it to plaintiff even for £2000 but in his letter he had by mistake 
offered it for £1250. Plaintiff knowing the error accepted the written offer. The 
court refused to help the plaintiff and said it cannot compel a party to sell 
property for less than its real value. In Equity plaintiff can ask no relief though 
he may try his luck at Common Law Courts of Equity were so jealous in 
protecting the party from injustice that they did not look with favour the 
provision in section 4 of the Statute of Frauds whereby contract not in writing 
could be enforced. 
 
In Half Penny v. Ballot 11 the court stated that they cannot allow the 
statute to be made a cloak for frauds and that it would be something like 
frauds if the promise is true on oral evidence and yet the promise would take 
shelter under the statute. 
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(A) Legislative Encroachments    
 
The sanctity of contracts had thus suffered a setback and an 
encroachment by the provisions in the Statute of Frauds. But the reason for 
the statute was to prevent frauds on innocent persons by manipulated oral 
evidence. There were also some other legislative encroachments upon the 
freedom of contract. They are  
(1) The Sunday Observance Act, 1677 made all contracts entered into on 
Sunday void due to religious reasons prompted by the puritan influence 
in the early days on legislation. 
(2) Wagering contracts were another field for what may be called moral 
legislation to put down gambling. Wagering contracts were not illegal or 
unenforceable at Common Law. 
(3) The Gaming Act,1840 declared all contracts or agreements by way of 
gaming or wagering null and void, except where it was a contribution 
towards a lawful prize. The contracts were yet not illegal in the strict 
sense. 
(4) The Gaming Act, 1892 made void any promise to repay any person 
money paid by him under the Gaming Act, 1945 or any agreement to 
pay a sum of money by way of fee or reward in respect of any services 
relating to such  contract. 
(5) In the mater of Infants contract the Infants Relief Act, 1874 declared 
three clauses of infant contracts absolutely void e.g.: contracts to repay 
money loans, contracts for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than 
necessaries) and all accounts stated. 
(6) The Truck Act, 1831, was another instance of an inroad into contract 
law. It made it an offence for an employer to contract that wages 
payable to his servant should be paid otherwise than in current coin of 
the realm and declared such contracts as illegal. This saved the 
employee from exploitation by the employer in compelling in the 
employees shop at his price. 
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(7) The Money-lenders Act 1900 and 1927 were further statutory inroads 
in private contracts with object of saving the debtor from usury and 
malpractices indulged in by the lender. 
(8) The Hire Purchase Acts, 1938 and 1954 were further instances 
intended for protection of the Hire Purchasers in the lower income 
groups. 
(9) The Trade Unions Act,1871 provided that the purposes of Trade Union 
should not by reason only that they were in restraint of trade be treated 
as unlawful either : 
i. So as to make members of the association criminally liable for  
           conspiracy or 
ii. So as to render void or voidable any agreement entered into by  
them. For political and industrial reasons certain trade union 
contracts have been made statutorily unenforceable by courts. 
 
(B) At Common Law   
 
Freedom of contract is at present regulated in several respects by 
statutory provisions and judicial decisions. It is no longer a freedom to make 
a contract which one wishes to make, but a contract which one ought to 
make. One of the tools of this kind of regulation is the theory of implied 
terms. One of the statutory tools is the Unfair (Contract Terms) Act, 1978. 
 
(a) Doctrine of implied terms   
 
Sir Frederick Pollock, had observed:12 “Courts were averse to going 
beyond the strict letter of instruments and would only in extreme cases imply 
terms that were not expressed or at least imported by some generally 
understood custom.” 
 
Often businessmen enter into contract and respect the usages and 
conventions vogue in the business though the written contract may not have 
those reduced to writing. 
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Bowen L.J. 13 was of the view that in business transactions “what the 
law desires to effect by the implication as must have been intended at all 
events by both parties who are businessmen; not to impose on one side all 
the parties of the transactions, or to emancipate on one side from all the 
chances of failure, but to make such party promise in law as such at all 
events, as it must have been in the contemplation of both parties that he 
should be responsible for in respect of those perils or chances.” These 
opinions crystallized slowly and were codified in the (English) Sale of Goods 
Act, 1898. 
 
The statutory provisions only gave effect to the intention or will of the 
parties, in the background of trade usage, or past professional dealings. 
 
Difficulties arose when such background was not available. Then the 
court was driven to find out what provisions the parties would have made as 
reasonable persons “if they had contemplated facts which had proved to be 
beyond their provision.”14 
 
The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882., The Sale of Goods Act, 1889, 
Merchannt Shipping Ac, 1894, Marine Insurance Act, 1906, Landlord and 
Tenant Act,1927, Housing Act, 1936, Hire-purchase Act, 1938 are all 
statutory provisions containing what may be called “terms implied by 
statute.” 
 
The theory of implied terms gradually developed and judges like 
Denning L.J.15 would “no longer credit a party with the foresight of a prophet 
or his lawyer with the draftsmanship of a Chalmers” and so would prevent 
injustice. By reading into the contract the necessary implied terms. The 
tendency was to make wider use of the theory of implied terms for adjusting 
the rights and obligations of parties. 
 
In Haive Ltd. V Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd.16 employees of 
Plaintiff Company worked in their spare time for the revival concern 
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producing the same appliances. Injunction against them was granted on the 
ground “that there should be implied into the contract of employment of term 
that the servant undertakes to serve his master with good faith and fidelity.”  
 
Implied terms have been read into contracts in umpteen cases.17 
 
A word of caution has however sounded by Mackinnon L.J.18 to this effect: 
  
“I recognize that the right or duty of a court to find the existence 
of implied terms in a written contract is a matter to be exercised with 
care and a court is too often invited to do so on vague and uncertain 
grounds.” 
 
A too wide application of “implied terms” theory, in the words of 
Denning L.J.,19 “have seriously damaged the sanctity of contracts.” 
 
(aa) Terms implied by courts   
 
Halsbury 20 catalogues :some instances in this regard are catalogued 
in Halsbury : 
 
(I) The Moorcock’s case 21, postulates that the court should give efficacy 
to a contract and prevent such failure of consideration as cannot be 
within the contemplation of either side. 
 
In a King’s Bench case,22 the parties had contracted for the sale and 
purchase of seed to be shipped by a named ship at a specified date. It was 
held there was no warranty that the ship should continue to exist upon that 
date since the parties must have known that the performance of the contract 
would become impossible unless the ship continued to exist. 
 
(II) In Reigate  v. Union Mfg. Co. (Rambottom)23 and other cases are 
instances where the terms are implied by statute which cannot be 
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excluded by any contrary agreement. “Prima facie that which in any 
contract is left to be implied and need not be expressed is something 
so obvious that it goes without saying ; so that if while the parties 
were making their bargain, an officious by stander were to suggest 
some express provision for it in their agreement they would suppress 
him with a common “oh ! of course”24 
 
(III) Notwithstanding that the court has no discretion to create a new 
contract 25, the principle is that a term will be implied into a contract 
when it is necessary to give it business efficacy.26 
 
* Following are some instances of the application of implied terms : 
 
(i) In a contract of service that the employee will observe good faith 
towards his employer.27 
(ii) That he will not divulge information obtained in the course of 
employment28 and will not be required to do any lawful act.29 
(iii) Implied terms read into a charter party as to the measurement of 
cargo at the port of loading 30; into a contract for a Turkish bath that 
the couches for reclining on are free from Vermin 31; into a contract to 
print bank notes, not to use the plates for any unauthorized purpose32; 
into a contract for a employment of a director that the articles of the 
company will not be altered and then acted upon so as to terminate 
his contract of service 33, into a building contract where  work 
commenced long before the contract was made that the agreement 
would operate respectively34; into a contract of bailment the purpose 
of which was the use of the goods by the bailee, authority to do in 
relation to the goods all things reasonably incidental to their use35; 
into an oral contract made between two parties both of whom were 
heirs of plant, that the usual standard form conditions of hire 
applied.36 
 
(IV) In general a term is necessarily implied in any contract (provided the 
other terms do not repel the implication)37 that neither party shall 
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prevent the other from performing it and that a party so preventing the 
other is guilty of breach.38 (vide 9 Halsbury’s para 359.) 
 
Lord Asquith adds:” There can be no breach if the term in question is illegal, 
contrary to public policy or (in the case of a corporation) ultravires the 
contracting party”. 
 
Halsbury adds: “Not only is reasonableness at the very foundation of the 
principle that a term may be implied into a contract if necessary to give 
efficacy to it but the courts have frequently actually implied a provision as to 
reasonableness of contracts in some cases in order to care an uncertainty 
which would otherwise be fatal to the very existence of the contract, e.g., 
implying a term as to a reasonable price39, valuation40 ore sum41. 
 
(V) Reasonableness principle has been invoked by courts only for 
reasonable duration of a contract42, that a right under a contract will 
be exercised within a reasonable time43, that rent may be increased 
by giving reasonable notice.44 
 
(VI) Implied term as to export and import licenses also arise45. Thus 
parties may expressly provide as to who should assume responsibility 
of obtaining the necessary licence46 (in the absence of any express 
term there may be an implied term to that effect) 47. 
 
(VII) There have been instances where the implied terms principle stood 
rejected.48 There has been a strong judicial warning given against the 
over ready application of the principle to justify the implication of 
terms.49 
 
 In a contract to carry mails for the crown, there can be no implied 
condition that the crown would employ the contractor to carry any particular 
quantity of mails.50 
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 In a contract for the sale of a patent, no implied term can be invoked 
that the buyer would keep the patent alive.51 
 
 In a contract for the sale of all the grain to be manufactured by the 
seller, there can be no implied term that the seller would retain his 
business.52 
 
(a)  When performance is impossible and frustrated 
 
 The common law postulated that a person was bound by terms of his 
contract, physical or legal impossibility of performance being no answer.53 
 
 But courts found the implied terms theory handy to grant the needed 
relief if there is frustration of contract, due to an intervening event or change 
of circumstances so fundamental as to strike at the root of the agreement.54 
 
 Lord Loreburn 55 explained that courts discharged a contract in certain 
events as it was able to “infer from the nature of the contract and the 
surrounding circumstances that a condition which was not expressed was 
the foundation upon which the parties contracted”. 
 
 The doctrine of frustration found a good explanation in the speech of 
Lord Russel of Killowen in Re. Badishe Co.56: 
 
 “It rests on an implications arising from the presumed intention of 
parties. If the supervening events or circumstances are such that it is 
impossible to hold that reasonable men could have contemplated that event 
or those circumstances and yet have entered into the bargain expressed in 
the document, a term should be implied dissolving the contract upon the 
happening of the event or circumstances. The dissolution lies not in the 
choice of one or other of the parties, but results automatically from a term of 
the contract. The term to be implied must not be inconsistent with any 
express term of the contract.” 
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 The doctrine of frustration on the basis of implied term theory would 
however appear unjustified if the parties to the contract had adverted to the 
possible happening of the frustrating event but nevertheless decided to do 
nothing about it and made the contract in absolute terms. 57 
 
 The doctrine may not also be invoked when the parties had provided 
in general terms what was to happen on the occurrence of the frustrating 
event. In such a case a term could not be implied if it would conflict or be 
inconsistent with the parties express provision. Yet in Bank Line Ltd. v Capel 
58 the House of Lords decided otherwise.   
 
 So the position in law now is that the contract is deemed frustrated on 
the occurrence of the frustrating event irrespective of the volition or the 
intention of the parties or their knowledge as to that particular event.59 
 
 As Streatfield J. stated “Their own belief and their own intention is 
evidence only, upon which the court can form its own view whether the 
changed circumstances were So fundamental as to strike of the root of the 
contract and not to have been contemplated by the parties.” 
 
 Thus the court by a legal fiction can assume the jurisdiction to modify 
or dissolve contractual obligations with a view to dispense justice, having 
due regard to the change of circumstances beyond the control of parties. 
 
(C)  When contract is opposed to Law or Morality  
 
 The common law courts gradually followed the footsteps of the courts 
of chancery and the legislature in the sense that they also sanctified 
encroachments on freedom of contract on the ground of illegality or 
immorality. It appeared paradoxical that the courts who looked into the 
morality of upholding contractual obligations, were disposed to destroy them 
on the ground of public policy. 
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 Lord Mansfield’s pronouncement in Holman v Johnson.60 is oft quoted 
in this connection:  
 
 “The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff 
and defendant. If is not for his sake, however, that the objection is allowed; 
but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the 
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by 
accident, if I may so. The principle of public policy is this , exdolamalo now 
oriter action. No court will lend its aid to a man who found the cause of action 
upon an immoral or illegal act. If from the plaintiff’s own stating, or otherwise, 
the cause  of action appears to arise ex turpi causa , to the transgression of 
a Positive Law of this country, there the courts say he has no right to be 
assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes; not for the sake of 
defendants, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So the 
plaintiff and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the 
latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault, 
potior est condition defenden  lis.” 
 
 It appears distinctly wretched and distasteful than man who has made 
a promise should be allowed to wriggle out of that promise on the plea of 
illegality or immorality. A person who had work done for him by a building 
contractor, could refuse to pay on the plea that the contractor had no license 
and so the transaction was vitiated.61 
 
 Justice Cordozo put it like this : “If the moral and physical fibre of 
manhood and womanhood is not a state concern, the question is what  is? 62 
 
 One could however agree with Lord Atkin 63 in his statement “the 
doctrine should only be invoked in clear cases in which the harm to the 
public is substantially incondensable and does not depend upon the 
idiosyncratic inferences of few judicial minds.” 
 
 61
 The suicide is a crime and so if the policy holder shoots himself 
before the policy matured, the executors could not recover the insured 
amount since as Lord Wright put it 64 “the court must we think, apply the 
general principle that it will not allow a criminal or his representative to reap 
by the judgement of the court the fruits of his crime.” 
  
(D)  Restraints of trade   
 
 Courts in England even as early as the middle of the previous century 
considered restraints of trade harmful to the development of commerce. 
Such restraints in business contracts have a tendency to create 
monopolies.65 
 
 In Lord Macnaughton’s words66:  “The public have an interest in every 
persons carrying on his trade freely : so has the individual. All interference 
with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of 
themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy and 
therefore void.” 
 
 Courts will strike down contracts with restraint clauses. The 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 has a provision (s.21) to the effect that 
all registerable restrictive agreements within the Act are presumed to be 
contrary to public interest unless they are justifiable under the Act. The 
whole thing rests on the ground of public policy. What is public policy is 
difficult to precise definition. 
 
 Lord Truro would say 67 that it was a “principle of judicial legislation or 
interpretation founded on the current needs of the community.” 
 
 Lord Wright would put it differently68 as “considerations of public 
interest which require the courts to depart from their primary function of 
enforcing contracts and exceptionally refuse to enforce them….. Certain 
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rules of public policy have to be moulded to suit new conditions of a 
changing world.” 
 
 Trade Unions and Trade Associations have their own regulations to 
guide them instead of seeking their aid to court. The need thus arose for a 
new machinery to protect the public from restrictive and monopolistic trade 
practices. 
 
 The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1948 brought 
about the appointment of a commission to investigate and report on those 
restrictive trade agreements which were referred to it by the Board of Trade. 
This led to the legislation called the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956 
which enabled the maintenance of a Registrar of Agreements register able 
under the Act. 
 
 The restrictions related to prices and control of supplies or 
manufacturers and whether the restrictions were in public interest had to be 
restricted in the Restrictive Practices Court, which is manned by Judges with 
experience in industry, commerce or public affairs, failing which, they were 
declare void. These provisions gave a major shake up to almost every 
section of industry.” 69   
 
(E)  Executive Arrangements and Freedom of Contract  
 
 Prof. J.D.B. Michell70 amply explains as to how executive agreements 
are more in the nature of governmental directives than as enforceable 
contracts. He says.71 
 
“The principle is simply that in the last resort the law permits a 
governmental agency to fulfill fundamental purposes for which it was 
created, even though so doing may involve interference with vested 
contractual rights which an individual may have against that agency.” 
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 The special purpose for which governmental agencies exist, the 
service of the community requires that on occasions those agencies must be 
released from or may be able to override, their obligations….. this limitation 
of the obligation of contracts depend not on the acceptance of any particular 
theory of political philosophy but upon practical necessity.72 
 
 An instance is furnished in the case The Amhitrite 73 where a Swedish 
ship in 1918, during the First World War, was able to sail and deliver her 
cargo on the undertaking extended by the British Legation in Stockholm that 
at least sixty percent of the goods should be approved goods. But on its 
second voyage to England clearance was refused to the ship as it was 
contrary to British practice. Basing its claim for damages on the undertaking 
given by Legation, the ship owners launched a suit, which was rejected since 
no agreement can bind governmental actions. 
 
 In India, Government contracts are governed by the provisions in 
Article 299 of the Constitution of India. The citizen is thereby assured of his 
remedy against the government provided the requirements of that Article are 
fulfilled. Executive arrangements in India have been protected by the Article 
to a great extent. 
 
3.3 Freedom of Contract and the No Liability Clause   
 
 In the last few years the courts in England have had occasion to 
consider the effect in an ordinary business contract of a clause purporting to 
free either of the contracting parties from all liability for any breach on their 
part of the obligations which they had undertaken. 
 
 In Crouch v Jevens Pty Ltd., 74 the facts shortly were as follows. The 
Plaintiff left an article to be cleaned, received in exchange a document which 
set out the terms of the transaction, and the article was lost by the company. 
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The document contained two clauses exempting the company from liability 
as follows      
  
“We are responsible for goods left over three months.” 
 
 Conditions: “No responsibility is accepted for loss or damage to any 
article through any cause whatsoever, but every possible care is taken.” 
 
 The contention put forward on behalf of the company and which 
received support of the majority of the Full Court was that the exemption 
headed “CONDITIONS” completely freed the company from liability for lost 
or damaged articles and the last five words were merely narrative and in no 
way contractual. 
 
 It is suggested that such on interpretation is erroneous and that the 
clause is open to a further construction which gives force to every part of it. 
 
 However, whether the decision in Crouch v Jeeres Ltd. or any other 
similar case was right or wrong is not of real importance – some one sooner 
or later will no draft a clause excluding liability and which will be beyond 
criticism. The important thing is to consider whether or not the many 
conflicting decisions on the subject can be reconciled and if not, what is 
there can be done. In attempting to reach a conclusion as to whether the 
various decisions are reconcilable, one is at once met with the difficulty that 
one finds oneself seeking to construe by the rules relating to the 
interpretation of contracts a clause which, as has been said previously, in its 
very nature negatives the existence of a contract at all. 
 
 Anson, Law of Contracts, 17th edn. P. 1 says “the law of contract is 
intended to ensure that what a men has been led to expect shall come to 
pass; that what has been promised him shall be performed.” A provision 
successfully releasing one party from “all liability” is a flat denial of and could 
not be part of such a law. It is a complete and direct negation of Anson<s 
definition. The real position is that such a clause has no more right to 
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attempt to exist in our law of contract and the only alternative will be and 
should be for either the legislatures or the courts to look at such exemption 
clause with somewhat jealous eyes and ask themselves the question is it in 
the public interest that such clauses should exist, is it in the public interest 
that a party may enter into an agreement promising to do certain paid 
consideration and then add a term freeing himself completely from any 
liability for his failure to perform his solemn obligations. 
 
 The legislature has taken steps to protect people who purchase on 
the hire purchase and lay by systems. 
 
 The courts have dealt with terms inserted in courts which seek to oust 
their jurisdiction and have retained for themselves the right to decide what is 
penalty and what liquidated damages. 
 
 Such inferences with freedom to contract have readily been accepted 
and I feel there is no valid reason why further intervention should not be 
made in the direction of preserving the validity of contractual liabilities. So 
that a person who enters into a contract shall find with some certainty that 
“what has been promised to him shall be performed.” 
 
 One has some difficulty in appreciating the distinction of a clause in a 
contract which limits liabilities perhaps to a mere pittance or frees him from 
liability altogether from on the other hand a clause which provides that 
should there be a breach the other party is precluded from enforcing his 
remedies in the courts at all 75 or a clause which states a party’s liability in 
case of breach to be an amount which the court is free to refuse to enforce 
as being a penalty. There should be no difference between the effect of such 
clauses, but at present there is.  
 
3.4 Concept of Reasonable Man 
 By this time it may seem that the parties themselves have become so 
far disembodied spirits that their actual persons should be allowed to rest in 
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peace. In their place there rises the figure of the fair and reasonable man. 
And the spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who represents after all 
no more than the anthropomorphic conception of justice, is the court itself.76 
The idea that contractual obligations are based on agreement must be 
qualified in relation to the scope of the principle of freedom of contract. In the 
nineteenth century judges took the view that persons of full capacity should, 
in general, be allowed to make what contracts they liked. The law only 
interfered on fairly specific grounds, such as, misrepresentation, undue 
influence or illegality. It did not interfere merely because one party was 
economically more powerful than the other and so able to drive a hard 
bargain. This attitude became particularly important when standard form 
contracts, by which one party excluded or limited his common law liabilities, 
were held valid. 
 
3.5 Impact of Inequality of Bargaining Power on Freedom of Contract   
 
 The older theory of freedom of contract presupposed that any party to 
a contract was free to choose whether or not he would enter into it. If, 
therefore, he chooses to enter into a contract which was onerous to him, he 
had only himself to blame. The courts would not interfere. 
 
 Today the position is seen in a very different light. Freedom of 
contract is a reasonable social ideal only to the extent that equality of 
bargaining power between contracting parties can be assumed and no injury 
is done to the economic interest of the community at large. It is now realized 
that economic interest of the community at large. It is now realized that 
economic equality often does not exist in any real sense and that individual 
interests have to be made to sub serve those of the community. Hence, 
there have been fundamental changes both in our social outlook and in the 
policy of the legislature towards contract and the law today interferes at 
numerous points with the freedom of the parties to make what contract they 
like. 
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 As early as 1877 in Parker v South Eastern Railway Co. 77 Bramuell 
C.J., thought: “There is an implied understanding that there is no condition 
unreasonable to the knowledge of the parties tendering the documents and 
in insisting on it be read no condition not relevant to the matter in hand.” 
Lord Denning, M.R. has on numerous occasions maintained that an 
exemption clause will not be given effect if it is unreasonable or if it would be 
unreasonable to apply it in the circumstances of the case, for “there is the 
vigilance of the common law which, while allowing freedom of contract, 
watches to see that it is not abused.78 
 
3.6  Position in the nineteenth century: 
 (Reported case in Robson (1831)) 
 
 In the nineteenth century freedom of contract was assured. The 
parties had the choice of dealing with anybody they liked on the terms 
mutually agreed. According to the law, the parties were not accountable to 
the courts for the reasons for their decisions embodied in the contract. The 
right to decide with whom to deal was carried to such a length that in a 
reported case where a person had to agreed to hire a boat from a firm 
consisting of ‘S’ and ‘R’ he was entitled to give up the contract when ‘S’ 
retired and the business was carried on by ‘R’ alone. Robson and Sharpe v 
Drummon ,79 It was observed by the court that the defendant may have been 
induced to enter into this contract by reason of the personal confidence 
which he reported in ‘S’ but this was a mere possibility and advanced as an 
argument but not a fact which was enquired into, as it was neither pleaded 
nor relied on. 
 
3.7 Changing Attitude to Contractual Relationships   
      Reported case of Esso Petroleum (1976) 
  
 The decision in Esso Petroleum  v Marden, 80 well illustrates the 
changing attitude to contractual relationships. In this case there was a lease 
of petrol station by the plaintiffs to the defendant. The rent stipulated in the 
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contract was based on an estimate of the sales potential of the petrol station 
prepared by the plaintiff’s staff and relied on by the defendant. It transpired 
that the estimates were found to be widely over sanguine and as the 
defendant were unable to sell anything like the estimated quantities; he 
defaulted in the payment of rent. The plaintiff sued for the rent stipulated. 
The defendant counter claimed damages. The defendant succeeded in the 
case. The court observed that the plaintiffs owed a duty to take care in the 
preparation of the estimates as they knew that the defendant was entering 
into the contract having placed reliance on those estimates and reasonable 
expectations of the defendant were protected. This decision holds one party 
to a prospective contract to owe a duty to the other party to give him 
misleading information on matters of estimate and judgement as 
distinguished from straight away question of fact and therefore is utterly 
opposed to the basic idea underlying the free market contract. The basic 
concept of classical contract or a free market contract is that each party in 
the market makes his own judgement and estimates and that the striking of a 
bargain by free consent is a way of allocating the risk of future events as to 
such matters. This decision established that such a concept is no longer 
accepted. The concept so far has been that neither party owes any duty to 
the other until a deal is struck. 
 
 During negotiations neither party owes any duty to volunteer 
information to the other. Law goes so far as to hold that if one party labours 
under same misapprehension, the other is under no obligation to undeceive 
him. It has also been held that silence is not binding even where a reply 
might be expected. The party concerned has to rely on its own judgement 
and act at its own peril, the only exception being fraud or misrepresentation 
on the part of the other party. 81 It is, therefore, that the above decision is a 
significant departure from this concept and must be carefully considered and 
specially noted. 
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3.8 Modern trend of courts to overuse the fairness of Bargain   
  
It must be noticed that the theory obtained in classical law of contract 
that parties had the absolute right of entering into contract they liked and the 
court refuse to examine reasons which prompted the parties to enter into the 
contract, has been gradually giving way to the courts looking into the 
surrounding facts and examining reasons for decisions of the parties to enter 
into the contract and to judge their reasonableness by objective tests. 
 
These contrasting attitudes across a century may be illustrated by two 
typical cases. The first case of Bowes v Shaud,82 the House of Lords held 
that in case of contract for the sale of Madras rice to be shipped in March 
and/or April, the buyer was entitled to reject the rice loaded on the ship in 
February. They observed that it was immaterial why the buyer rejected the 
rice and why the contract was in this form. It was observed that these were 
solely matters for the parties and that it was in this form. It was observed that 
these were solely matters for the parties and that it was not the business of 
the courts to enquire into the reasons for the party’s action. 
 
The second case is of Rear Den Smith Line v Hansen Tangen.83 It is 
a contract for the construction of a ship at Yard No.354 of Osaka Zosen in 
Japan but the ship was built at a different yard. The defendant declined to 
accept it, although there was no suggestion that the ship did not comply with 
the stipulated specifications. The court examined the surrounding 
circumstances and came to the conclusion that the mention of the number of 
the Yard and the location of the Yard was of no substantial significance and 
it was held that defendant had wrongly rejected the ship though built of 
different yard. The defendant was therefore, held liable. 
 
Analyzing the approach in both the cases it is clear that there has 
been change in the judicial thinking process and the values to be assessed. 
There is no longer the same judicial willingness to accept the parties as the 
ultimate and sole arbiters of the importance of matters arising in the 
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performance of contract. Much greater willingness is exhibited by the courts 
in examining the facts of a case in detail to see where the merits lie and not 
plead helplessness and confine their role to an enforcing agency of the 
contract entered into by the parties. 
 
In the words of Lord Denning: “The day is done when we can excuse 
an unforeseen injustice by saying to the sufferer: ‘It is your own folly. You 
ought not to have passed that form of words. You ought to have put in a 
clause to protect yourself. We no longer credit a party with the foresight of a 
prophet or his lawyer with the draftsmanship of Chalmers. We realize that 
they have limitations and make allowances accordingly.”84 However, this 
view was repudiated on appeal by the House of Lords85 by reaffirming the 
view that no court has an absolving power. 
 
However, subsequent judicial decisions have veered round to the 
view that the courts can impose on the party’s just and reasonable solution 
that the new situation may demand. Well has it been said that this in keeping 
with the object of the judicial process which is to reach a just and reasonable 
solution between litigating parties. But this doctrine has to be accepted with 
care test it may be taken to suggest that the court has an inherent 
jurisdiction to go behind the literal words of the contract and to make such 
changes, as it considers desirable in the circumstances. Such a power may 
amount to re-writing the contract, which certainly is not permissible in law. 
 
3.9 Impact of Abnormal Conditions on Contract        
 
 One interesting feature of the development of law of contract, as an 
impact of war, was that due to circumstances beyond the control of the 
contracting party, the contract could not be performed. This state of affairs 
continued long after the termination of the war because of its impact on the 
economic conditions. The war led to devaluation of currency consequent on 
post war inflation, social unrest, fixation of higher wages for labour; in short, 
social and economic upheaveal against the background on international 
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tensions resulting in uncertainties which definitely went beyond the 
reasonable calculations of economic risk contemplated by the parties when 
entering into the contract. While it was considered reasonable to hold the 
parties to risks attendant upon fluctuations of the market in normal times, it 
was considered unreasonable to hold the parties to their contractual 
obligations in view of these abnormal conditions. 
 
 This state of affairs gave rise to the enlargement of the doctrine of 
frustration in U.K. and liberal interpretation of the French doctrine of 
imprecision in administrative contracts. In England, this doctrine of frustration 
developed due to the conditions obtained after the First World War and 
heightened by the Second World War. It was considered reasonable to hold 
that where circumstances occur, neither foreseen nor reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of entering into the contracts, it may be taken that it 
was not intended by the parties that the contract would be binding in 
unanticipated situations. This was sought to be introduced by way of 
construction of the contract holding that the broad terms do not cover 
unforeseen and unforeseeable contingencies and, as such, there was a gap 
in the contract and, by proper interpretation, the courts performed the gap 
filling function. 
 
 But the courts stopped short of varying the terms of the contract until 
the decision in England, in Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. v 
Commissioners of Works and Public Building86, the Court of Appeal followed 
some continental models and boldly revised the terms of the contract. A 
contract between the Commissioner of Works and private firm had stipulated 
that the sum to be paid to the contractor should not be greater than the 
actual cost plus net remuneration of £3,00,000. The parties had contracted 
for about £ 5,00,000 but extra work ordered brought the total cost up to £ 
66,83,000. The court awarded the contractors extra remuneration in 
proportion to the excess cost. 
 
 In another case 87 a contract for the supply of news films made during 
the war was to continue until a Cinematograph Film Order, made in 1943, 
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under the Defence Act,1939 was cancelled. When the Defence Act expired 
after the war, the order was continued under the Supplies and Services Act, 
1945. The Court of Appeal considered the circumstances, which had led to 
the agreement and came to the conclusion that the order had been 
continued for reasons different from those leading to the original 
Cinematograph Film Order, and it discharged the defendants from further 
performance of the contract, despite its clear wordinig.88 The court really 
exercised the qualifying power, i.e. a power to qualify the absolute, literal or 
wide terms of the contract, in order to do what it considered to be just and 
reasonable in the new situation which had arisen.  
 
 Until recently, the court only exercised that power when there was a 
frustrating event, i.e. a supervening event which struck away the foundations 
of the contract. Subsequently, however, the court exercised such a power 
when there was no frustrating event but only uncontemplated turn of events 
as in the case of Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. v Commissioners of Works 
and Public Buildings. But the House of Lords reversed the decision and 
repudiated the suggestion that the courts had a broad qualifying power in 
regard to contracts and thus the decision in Parkinson’s case was therefore 
reduced to one of construction of the language of contract. 
 
3.10 Review of concept of contract    
 
      A review of the developments of the concept of contract in various 
fields historical, political and legal throughout the ages reveals that while the 
outward appearance has been maintained, the inner core has changed very 
considerably. While the textbook concept of the contract as agreement and 
obligation remains the same, the connotation and the actual working of the 
concept of agreement in reality is totally different from what obtained in the 
early nineteenth century under the influence of the doctrine of laissez faire. 
 
      While at that time it was thought that the people had full freedom of 
entering into the contract, which meant to enter into the contract or not at all, 
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to make a contract or unmake a contract, free choice of persons with whom 
to enter into a contract, free choice of setting the terms of the contract based 
on the assumptions that parties had equal bargaining power and that there 
was a free market and conditions of competition untrammeled by controls 
and uncontrolled by large corporation of rings; subsequently with the 
economic development and the change of political theory resulting in 
assumption by the state of functions in conformity with its role as a Welfare 
State, the conditions totally changed and the field of operation of agreement 
was increasingly circumscribed, reaching a point of compulsory contracts. 
 
      Law of Contract differs from other branches of the law of obligations 
in one important respect that parties themselves are free to make their own 
terms on which to enter into a contract, which the legal machinery will 
enforce as a private piece of legislation. 
 
      The law of contract does not prescribe the rights and obligations of 
the parties but imposes a number of restrictions subject to which the parties 
may create, by their contract, such rights and obligations a they may agree 
to, so, long as they do not infringe the legal prohibition. 
 
      The parties cannot for instance, render valid a contract which 
according to the law is illegal or that a contract, which the law requires to be 
in writing, shall be enforceable without such writing. 
 
      It may be noticed that this position of the law has changed with the 
times. This position was obtained when the doctrine of laissez faire was 
permitted to have its full force but with the change of times and the virtual 
eclipse of the doctrine of laissez-faire as a political force, there is an 
indication that people no longer think or feel in the same way about the law. 
No longer is the law of contract seen as a negative instrument whose main 
function is merely to enforce agreements which people have chosen to 
make. The tendency nowadays is to look on the law as a positive instrument 
for the achievement of justice. The moral principle that one should abide by 
one’s agreements and fulfill one’s promises is being increasingly met by 
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another moral principle, namely, that one should not take advantage of an 
unfair contract which one has “perused” another party to make under 
economic or social pressure. 
 
      This has profoundly affected both moral and legal ideas about 
freedom of contract and sanctity of contract. The process of development of 
the concept of contract over the ages has thrown up the doctrine of 
frustration as a device to do justice between man and man, to be fair and 
reasonable to both the parties of the contract in the event of uncontemplated 
or unforeseen, involuntary supervening circumstances affecting the 
operation of the contract.   
 
3.11 Position of Freedom of Contract in India   
 
      So long as any agreement is based on this substantial equality of 
bargaining position between the two parties and represents a method of 
satisfaction of their needs by mutual exchange, there is no question of 
unfairness or unreasonableness or injustice between them as free 
agreement itself is constitutive of justice. In such a case the doctrine of 
freedom of contract itself embraces the value of fairness or justness, and the 
only ground of such an agreement will be public policy as representing other 
values or public interests. 
 
      We find in India judges proclaiming in the most traditionalists and 
classic way the freedom and sanctity of contract. Mark the words of Justice 
Sarkar, “there is very little the courts can do if the words used in the contract 
are clear.”89 and of Mr. Justice Hidayatullah, “where parties agree upon 
certain terms which are to be regulate their relationship it is not for the courts 
to make a new contract, however, reasonable, if the parties have not made it 
for themselves.”90 
 
      Section 23 of The Indian Contract Act is one of the most important 
grounds of invalidity of any agreement. The concept expresses the 
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fundamental values and principles of the society. The principle underlying 
this section is that any type of contractual relation can be created by a 
contract unless it is hit by section 23 of the Contract Act, other sections of 
The Contract Act or other laws. 
 
      The idea of welfare state has necessarily led to the expansion of the 
functions of the state, affecting each and every aspect of the individual and 
social life, and has consequently converted the modern legislature into a 
very busy machine enacting a large number of laws at an accelerating rate 
every year e.g.: Hire Purchase Act, Laws restraining monopoly, Factory Act, 
Industrial Dispute Act, Sale of Goods Act, various laws protecting consumers 
etc. These laws affect the freedom of contract at various points and in 
different degrees and therefore, give rise to a large number of cases where 
the agreement is challenged on the ground of its inconsistency with any of 
these laws. Moreover, the changing socio-economic structure of our society, 
the clear articulation of the fundamental values of liberty, equality and socio-
economic justice in our constitution and the pervading influence of the 
philosophy of humanitarianism necessarily lead to the expanding scope of 
public policy which will continue to impugned moral and upon freedom of 
contract. So, long as the society continues to recognize the utility of the 
doctrine of the freedom of contract as an instrument of social engineering, 
the courts will have to perform a very difficult task of striking a just balance 
between public policy which supports and seeks to maintain the contract as 
a useful principle of social order and public policy which seeks to protect 
other social interests and values.  
 
      In K.T.Chandy v Mansa Ram Zade, 91 the Supreme Court had the 
occasion to make certain observations on the principle of freedom of 
contract. Seemingly, it is a small case. However, as observed by Dwivedi J., 
it brings into the flashpoint on issue of great importance to liberty of contract. 
Where to draw the dividing line between the area of contempt of courts and 
the area of operation of contractual rights. 
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      The facts of the said case were that M was employed by C on a 
contract of service. The contract contained a provision for termination of M’s 
services by giving him three months notice or three months pay in lieu 
thereof and without assigning any reason. On February 21, 1968, C served 
M with a notice terminating his services. M soon rushed for relief to the 
Munsif’s court. He did not ask the Munsif to grant an interim injunction 
restraining C from terminating his services during the pending of his suit. So 
no interim injunction was operating at the relevant time. While the suit was 
pending, C issued second notice terminating M’s services. M moved the 
court for taking contempt of court proceedings against C. 
 
      The High Court of Calcutta held that C’s notice terminating M’s 
services during the pendency of the suit amounts to contempt of court. 
Against this decision C came in appeal to the Supreme Court. The question 
before Supreme Court was whether C had committed contempt of munsif’s 
court by terminating M’s services while the suit was pending in the court. The 
Supreme Court, answering the question in negative observed: 
 
“It is true that the Law of Contract is essential for keeping the 
administration of justice pure and unified. It is also well to remember 
that our society is also interested in the fulfillment of man’s 
expectation under a contract. Assigning an unlimited and undefined 
area to either of them would unduly curtail the area of the other. Each 
should have the viable area so that justice may hold higher head and 
contract is not cribbed and cramped.” 
 
      In Central Bank of India v H.F.Insurance Co., 92 the Supreme Court 
unambiguously and emphatically declared that is the duty of the court, to 
give effect to the bargains of the parties according to their (declared) 
intention and that the plain and categorical language cannot be radically 
changed relying upon the surrounding circumstances. 
 
     In Indian Airlines v Madhuri Choudhri 93 – Calcutta High Court has 
recognized that no doubt it is their primary duty to enforce a promise which 
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the parties have made and to uphold sanctity of contracts provided they are 
not hit by any provision of the law in the land. 
 
      In Life Insurance Corporation v Paravarthavardhini, 94 the 
considerations of justice had influenced the Madras High Court to give to the 
terms of such agreement a construction favourable to the weaker party. The 
court required from the corporation a strict proof of misrepresentation when 
the later wanted to repudiate a policy after it had become a claim. The 
following observations in the judgement are significant: 
 
      The business of Life Insurance has been nationalized and in the 
matter of its business activities, the Corporation has a great responsibility to 
the public. Whenever the claims are repudiated and disputes come to the 
court of law, the Life Insurance Corporations should not put fight on the 
pattern of ordinary litigants.  But it must be on a higher plane so as to inspire 
confidence in the public.95 
 
      Similarly, in Shivnath v Union of India, 96 the Supreme Court imposed 
on the railways the duty to take responsible care of goods eventhough the 
legislation provided for liability only in cases of misconduct. The consignment 
in this case was lost in communal disturbances but the railway administration 
was held liable for the loss even in in the absence of a definitive proof of 
misconduct on the part of its employees. Evidently the court expects these 
monopolies in the public sector to maintain a high standard of service to the 
people. 
 
      In Ramula v The Director of Tamilnadu Raffle 97 the court observed if 
the terms of contract are so unconscionable and if one of the terms is in 
terroyem and without any consideration known to law and is, therefore, 
against public and then the party affected can approach the High Court 
under Art.226 for relief…. The sine qua non, however, in such cases is that 
the term in the bargain should be unreasonable and against public policy. 
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      The concluding picture that emerges from the above study is that 
these are two sets of decisions – one upholding the freedom of contracts 
and sanctity of promises while the other refusing it under certain 
circumstances. The picture that has emerged is that has emerged is that of 
conflicting decision and doubtful distinctions. While upholding the freedom of 
contract court ignore the one party getting away from his obligation under a 
contract to the deteriment and loss of other by reason of a clause in it to 
which the aggrieved party could never have been a party had it know its full 
implications or at any rate which runs counter to the main object of the 
contract. 
 
3.12 Position of Freedom of Contract in England   
 
      The English law of contract is rooted in the nation that a promise 
which has been freely and fairly bargained for ought to be performed, when 
a promisor makes a binding promise, he makes a partial surrender of his 
freedom, and it is fair that he should be able to make that surrender on 
terms. If he may promise to be liable, if some event happens he may equally 
well stipulate that he will not be liable if some event happens. The common 
law leaves the parties to allocate contractual risks in their own way, and in 
the absence of dishonesty or unfairness the arrangement will be unheld. 
 
      The rationale of the common law approach is that parties who enter 
into contracts without compulsion are the best judges of their own bargains. 
It is not for the courts to interfere between the parties to make the results of 
their bargain more reasonably balanced; their only concern is to find the 
intention of the parties (in an objective sense) at the time of contracting, and 
to give effect to it98 “pacta sunt senvada”, writes Professor Friedman, “must 
still be a cardinal principle of law, else there will be little foundation for any 
law.” It has recently been affirmed that “courts of equity have never 
interested with contracts merely by reason of their being improvident… If a 
man made a foolish or a improvident one so much the worse for him.”100 And 
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Nottingham’s apohism “the chancery mends no mans bargain” is still cited by 
chancery judges with approval.101 
 
      But even under common law this freedom of contract is not absolute. 
In case of fraud, misrepresentation, duress court will declare the contract 
voidable. Equity has gone further and given relief where, in circumstances 
falling short of legal duress, the party’s freedom to make the contract was 
unreal. Thus, a contract was unreal. Thus, a contract may be upset if unfair 
advantage is taken of an uneducated or weak minded person, or of a 
desperate person in pecuniary distress; but the imposition of the superior 
party must be such as would shock the conscience, by the manifest 
inequality of the situation.102  
 
      It is common place learning in the present century, with the increase 
of large scale commercial organizations and the widespread use of standard 
form contracts, that legal freedom of contract is sometimes far removed from 
economic freedom. Even if a party has the freedom to refuse to make a 
particular contract, he rarely use the freedom to refuse to make a particular 
contract, he rarely has the freedom to co-ordinate the terms of contract; and 
very often, because of the universality of standardized forms or the existence 
of monopolies, neither kind of freedom is present. Many writers have 
touched this lack of freedom in daily life.103 
 
The Position has been summed up by Professor Atiyah as follows   
 
“The moral principle that one should abide by one’s agreements and 
fulfill one’s promises is being increasingly met by another moral 
principle, namely, that one should not take advantage of an unfair 
contract which one has persuaded another party to make under 
economic or social pressure.”104 
 
      But even today the position has not much changed. Professor 
Wedderburn has warned courts that “frolics of their own into interpretation of 
contract based upon economic theory are notoriously dangerous journeys for 
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common law judges” and the judges have not overcome their fear of this un 
chartered territory. Only recently, Donaldson J. affirmed that “if (an 
exemption clause) occurred in a printed form of contract between the parties 
of unequal bargaining power, it would be socially undesirable but of no less 
equal validity.105 It has even been held that a contract cannot be avoided on 
the ground of economic duress, where a party under necessity is obliged to 
agree to a suppliers terms because the supplier enjoys a de-facto monopoly. 
Tucker L.J. answered the objection that in such a situation there is no 
freedom of contract with the assertion:  
 
     “It is truly said that for a contract to be enforceable it must be freely 
entered into, but that does not mean that one party to a contract can 
escape its provisions merely because he was compelled to accept the 
terms of the other contracting party because there was no one else 
with whom he could contract for the supply of the particular 
commodity required.”106 
 
      In spite of these decisions if inequality of the party clearly 
demonstrated, equitable relief can be granted. Although there are no clear 
cases on this point reference may be made to D and C Builders v Rees 107 
where Court of Appeal treated as void an agreement by a creditor in a 
financial difficulties to accept part of a debt in satisfaction of the whole; apart 
from the absence of consideration, the agreement was unreal because of 
the economic pressure. In Bonsor v Musicians Union.108 Lord Denning 
attacked a contract between a “closed shop” Trade Union and a member on 
the ground that it was not a free contract. 
 
      Whatever view one takes of the present state of English law, 
however, there can be little doubt that the judges do not have the means to 
redress mere inequalities of bargaining power. It is not their provinence, 
because once the recognized principles of law are laid aside the problem 
becomes a political and social rather than a legal one. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that, so long as the law permits individuals  to bind themselves by 
agreement – an exemption clause which has been agreed upon must be 
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treated as binding, however, extravagant it may appear unless the apparent 
agreement is demonstrated not a real agreement. Any written contract is 
open to attack if it does not represent a true bargain. Of course, the courts 
have an inherent power to refuse to sanction certain kinds of contract on the 
ground of public policy; but that unruly horse has not been let loose in this 
field.109 
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Chapter 4 
Exemption Clauses- Interpretation and Incorporation  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
      Ordinary business transactions today, be it the servicing or repair of a 
motor-car, its deposit at a parking lot or station, the hire of a rental car, the repair 
of an umbrella or shoe, the framing of a painting or a dry cleaning of a suit, the 
dispatch of goods by the sea or land, even the use of public transport, are 
generally conducted on the basis that the proprietor either will not be liable for 
any loss of or damage to the property of his customer or for any personal injury 
to the latter (even though caused by the proprietor’s negligence), or that, if liable, 
such liability shall be limited to a stipulated amount. Invariably, the proprietor is in 
the stronger bargaining position1 and uses a standard form of contract which the 
customer must accept or go without the service he seeks.2 
 
      The question arises as to the legal effect of these various stipulations. Are 
they to be given effect to according to their tenor on the theory that each party is 
perfectly free to enter into the contract or not as he wishes and that having done 
so the courts will not lightly interfere with the freedom of contract? Or is regard to 
be paid to the realities of the situation, and recognition be given to that fact that 
the party called upon to agree to the clauses exempting the other party from the 
liability for his own carelessness is in anything but a strong bargaining position 
and generally has no choice in the matter at all? 
 
      There is no principle of English Law which renders it incompetent for 
parties to make an agreement involving exemption from liability in any number of 
situations for one of the parties.3 The Common Law notion of freedom of 
contract4 necessarily involves acceptance of this proposition although it is not 
without relevance to not that, in at least some American Jurisdictions, the 
inclusion in contracts of clauses purporting to relive from or limit the liability of a 
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party for injury or loss due to negligence, is regarded as against public policy, 
and hence the clauses are null and void.5 
 
      In the course for the last hundred years numerous decisions have been 
given on the validity of the exemption clauses appearing in various types of 
contracts6 and while the attitude of Courts has not always been consistent, it is 
well established that, in absence of statutory prohibition, liability at common law 
can be excluded by suitably worded clauses in contracts of bailment, carriage 
and for the performance of skilled work, and in license to enter upon land or 
premises. 
 
      Certain principles have been evolved regarding the interpretation of these 
exemption clauses. For instances, it has been emphasized over and over again 
that a condition seeking to exempt a party from liability must be expressed in 
clear and in ambiguous language to be effective.7 
 
      Again, it has been said on many occasions that an exemption clause is to 
be construed strictly and against the person who seeks to rely on it.8 
 
4.2 Exemption Clauses when Permissible 9 
 
      It is hardly possible to mention all those circumstances which justify 
derogation from the normal rights of a consumer by standard contract. But 
certain factors which are relevant and sometimes have already been taken into 
account may be indicated  
 
(A)  Substitution of Rights 
 
 Derogation from certain normal rights of the consumer may be admitted 
as long as his legal position as a whole (by the grant of other rights) is not 
materially deteriorated. For instance, it may be admissible that the usual 
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remedies of a buyer are temporarily excluded until the seller has had a chance to 
repair a defect, especially in case where defects are rather common, as with 
second hand cars. 
 
(B)  Undeterminable or Unusually High Risks  
In certain cases, where the risk are undeterminable or unusually high, as 
is often true with regard to consequential damages, a limitation, perhaps even 
the exclusion of the liability may be adequate, e.g., by the manufacturer of the 
electronic equipment for planes. In so far as cases of products liability are 
concerned, it can be important whether the product in question is a novelty, 
whether there is the risk of unusual or unknown damages and whether the 
customer has been informed of this fact. 
 
(C)  Offer of  “Choice of  Rates”   
 
The factor “choice of rates” has played a part in United States. Thus it has 
been recognized by the American Courts that a common carrier may plead an 
exemption clause if it has offered to the customer a choice of rates: The 
customer must have had the opportunity to choose between the lower price 
couples with a limited liability and higher price coupled with an unrestricted 
liability. The requirement of a “choice of rates” was rooted in the consideration 
doctrine, but become later on independent of its historical origin. The underlying 
idea is not restricted to the common law systems but is of general importance. A 
customer who has the free choice whether he want full protection of his goods for 
a higher price or only partial protection for a lower price may not complain if- 
according to his choice- the liability of the supplier is limited. 
 
(D)  Insurance 
 
The last mentioned consideration touched another factor, namely the 
factor of insurance. The German Bundes-gerichts of has in several decisions 
 88
pointed out that the question of whether the customer has, or could have, 
protected himself by insurance can in certain cases relevant. But the cases were 
exceptional: in the one case, there was no dispute that the price had been fixed 
too low to cover the risk of damage and in the other the supplier had pointed out 
the necessity of insurance. 
 
If the supplier takes insurance in favour of the customer he should be 
allowed to exclude his liability so fast as the customer is protected by the 
insurance coverage. Thus according to German, “General condition of 
Forwardness” of 1927 the forwarding agent is relieved of his liability by insuring 
the goods in favour of the owner. 
 
(E)  Kind of Violated Obligations and of Affected Interests   
 
The more important the obligation is which the debtor offends against, the 
less the exemption clauses should be admitted. This idea underlies the doctrine 
of “fundamental breach”. 
 
Closely connected with this aspect is the weight of the interest which is 
affected by the debtor’s misconduct. In case of personal injuries the protection 
against exemption clauses should as a ruler be stronger than in cases of 
economic loss. The international tendency seems to correspond to this postulate. 
Thus, according to the prevailing French view nobody is allowed to exclude his 
liability for personal injuries caused by negligence. And the Uniform Commercial 
Code, although in principal admitting exemption clauses, prescribes that 
limitation of consequential damages for injury to the persons in the case of 
consumer goods is to be regarded “prima facie unconscionable” 
 
(F)  Kind of Misconduct 
Finally, the degree of Debtor’s fault (gross, average or slight negligence) 
should be taken into account: the more the debtors conduct is to be blamed the 
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less he should be protected by exemption clauses. This idea has found 
expression in German and French case law. It is also respected by American 
Courts which allow common carriers and innkeepers to exonerate themselves 
within certain limit from strict liability, but not from liability for negligence. 
 
4.3 Types of Exemption Clauses  
     
A. Exemption from Liability For Breach 
 
Some clauses may be in a form which purports to excuse the defendant 
from any liability incurred as a result of his breach; others may appear to limit or 
define the circumstances in which the proferens will be bound under the contract. 
 
However, the form is by no means conclusive as to the effects of the 
clause and, a clause drafted in terms that apparently exclude liability for a pre-
existing breach may be construed in such a way as to prevent certain acts or 
omissions ever being regarded as breaches of contracts at all. 
 
The flavour of the problem may, perhaps, be gleaned from the following 
exclusion found in the engineering company’s “back of order” terms: 
 
“The company’s liability under any order is limited to replacement or 
remedial work undertaken under these conditions of sale, to the entire 
exclusion of any other remedies which, but for this condition, the buyer might 
have. Any representation, condition, warranty or other undertaking in relation 
to the contract whether express or implied by statue, common law, custom or 
otherwise and whether made or given before or after the date of order or 
acceptance thereof, is hereby excluded for all purposes. Save as provided in 
these conditions, the company shall be under no liability of any sort (however 
arising) and shall not in any circumstances be liable for any damage, injury, 
direct consequential or other loss or loss of profits or costs, charges and 
expenses, however arising.” 
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B. Limitations Of Liability Or Remedies  
 
  These will be provisions in the contract that restricts the exercise of a right 
or remedy arising out of the breach of any obligation, express or implied, in the 
contract. So, for example, a term commonly found in building and civil 
engineering contract that the contractor’s liability for failure to complete on the 
due date shall not exceed a specified figure, is such a clause. Similar clauses are 
found in contracts of carriage. 
 
The following example is contained in clause 12 of the standard conditions 
of carriage issued by the Road Haulge Association. 
 
Subject to these conditions the liability of the carrier in respect of any one 
consignment shall in any case be limited: 
 
(1) Where the loss or damage however sustained is in respect of the whole of 
the consignment to a sum at the rate of £ 800 per ton on either the gross 
weight of the consignment as computed for the purpose of charges under 
clause 9 hereof (the provisions for calculating carriage charges by weight) 
or where no such computations have been made, the actual gross weight; 
(2) Where loss or damages however sustained is in respect of a part of a 
consignment to the proportion of a sum ascertained in accordance with (1) 
of this condition which the actual value of that part of consignment bears to 
the actual value of that part of the consignment bears to the actual value of 
the whole of the consignment. 
 
Provided That 
 
(a) nothing in this clause shall limit the carrier’s liability below the sum of £ 10 in 
respect of any one consignment; 
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(b) the carrier shall not in any case be liable for indirect or consequential 
damages or for a loss of particular market whether held daily or at intervals; 
(c) the carrier shall be entitled to require proof of the value of the whole of the 
consignment….” 
 
It would seem that clauses of this type are not agreements for liquidated 
damages, since they are not genuine pre-estimated of damage, nor are they 
penalty clauses.10 
 
They do not destroy the contract and the content of the initial promise, but 
simply qualify the right to enforce the promise by imposing limits on the quantum 
of damages recoverable. 
 
Some clauses may go further and purport to exclude the right to damages 
or the right to reject altogether. 11It could be argued that excluding the right to 
damages altogether is rather different in effect from simply limiting damages. By 
denying the remedy of damages the promisor is depriving his promise of any 
contractual content.12 This is not the case with a clause denying the promisee 
the right to repudiate, since it leaves the remedy of damages intact. 
 
C. Time Limit Clauses 
  
 These clauses are generally designed to limit the time within which suit must 
be brought. They can be of two kinds. A clause may impose time limit shorter 
than that fixed by the general law for the enforcement of a right or remedy, or 
alternatively it may impose a time limit on action necessary (e.g. notification of 
claims) before any right, remedy, duty or liability arises. The purpose of a time 
limit clause may not always be immediately apparent. Thus the clause whereby 
“the carrier….shall be discharged from all the liability….unless suit is brought 
within one year” was held not merely to bar the remedy but extinguished the 
claim.13 An example of a time limit clause may again be cited from the conditions 
of carriage of the Road Haulage Association: 
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“The carrier should not be liable: 
 
(1) (a) for loss from a package or from an unpacked consignment;  
(b) for damage, deviation, misdelivery, delay or detention; 
 
Unless he is advised thereof in writing otherwise than upon a consignment 
note or delivery document within three days and the claim be made in writing 
within seven days after the termination of transit; 
 
(2) for loss or non-delivery of whole of the consignment or of any 
separate package forming part of the consignment; 
 
Unless he is advised of the loss or non delivery in writing (other than upon 
the consignment note or delivery document) within twenty –eight days and the 
claim made in writing within forty two days after the commencement of transit” 
 
D. Control On Evidence 
 
 Some limitation clauses may attempt to affect the question of how certain 
items of evidence are to be treated in the event of any claim being made 
against the proferens. It may purport to alter the onus of proof of matters under 
the contract, or provide that one matter is to be treated as conclusive evidence 
of another. An old case that provides a clause combining the effect of a time 
limit clause and a clause affecting evidentiary matters is that of Buchanan v 
Parnshow.14 In that case a horse sold at auction was warranted to be six years 
old and sound. It was the term of the sale that, if the horse was unsound, it 
should be returned within two days was, therefore, made conclusive evidence 
of soundness. 
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E. Indemnity Clause  
   
     Any clause which requires the promise to indemnify another as a 
consequence of the promise having exercised a right or remedy under the 
contract can have the same effect as a straight forward exclusion clause. 
 
F. Arbitration Clause  
 
An arbitration clause would seem to be only procedural in that a provison 
whereby the parties agree that any disputes should be submitted to arbitration 
does not exclude or limit rights or remedies but simply provides a procedure 
under which parties may settle their grievance. 
 
The Courts have held that such a clause is not an exclusion clause proper15 
and the parties are free, such a clause, notwithstanding, to pursue their claims 
in the courts16 (see Doleman & Sons v/s. Osset Corporation (1912) 3. K.B. 259) 
subject to the right of the court to grant the stay of proceedings.17 
 
However, one type of arbitration can have substantive effect in that it can 
make the obligation to perform contingent upon the happening of an event. This 
clause is the so called Scott v/s. Avery clause 18 under which the parties agree 
that no action shall be brought upon the contract  until the arbitrator’s award 
has been made, or the promisor’s liability shall be to pay only such a sum as an 
arbitrator shall award. 
 
However, notwithstanding the difference between these clauses and the 
more normal type of arbitration clause, the court has still be reluctant to treat 
them as exclusion clauses and the Law Commission, in its second report in 
Exemption clauses be treated as other exclusion clauses. 
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The Unfair Contract Terms Bill contained a clause controlling the use of 
arbitration clauses in consumer agreements, but this was dropped during the 
passage of the Bill through the House of Lords. 
 
It is, however, arguable that a Scott v Avery clause at least would be subject 
to the statutory control on Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 were it not for 
section 13(2) of that Act, which provides that “an agreement in writing to submit 
present or future differences to arbitration is not to be treated under (the Act) as 
excluding or restricting any liability” 
 
G. Liquidated Damages Clause  
 
A liquidated damages clause, unlike a clause that simply fixes a maximum 
limit on the amount of damages recoverable, is a genuine attempt at a pre-
estimate of damages.19 
 
     Where, however, the contract stipulates for a named sum, not for the 
purpose of fixing in advance the loss which the parties consider is likely to flow 
from the breach, but as a penalty, to secure the performance of the contract, a 
claim on the penalty will succeed only to the extent of the loss actually suffered 
by the innocent party.20 A valid liquidated damage clause may in practice limit 
the liability that would have been imposed on a party in breach of contract had 
there been no such provision. A term providing liquidated damages is not, 
however, normally regarded as exemption clause. 
 
 In Suisse Atlantique Societe’d Armement S.A. v N. V. Rotterdamsche Kolen 
Centrale21 it was argued that a demurrage clause (a clause making a pre-
estimate of damage caused to a ship owner by delay of he vessel in port after 
he date specified in the charter party as the due sailing date)m should be trated 
as an exemption clauses, but Lord Upjohn distinguished between “a clauses 
which are truly clauses of exception or limitation, that is to say clauses 
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essentially inserted for the purpose only of protecting one contracting party 
from terms which would otherwise be implied by law or from the terms of the 
contract regarded as a whole.” And clauses inserted for the benefit of both 
parties, such as agreed damage clauses. A distinction was drawn in that case 
between a clause agreeing a figure of damages where no proof of loss was 
needed (a liquidated damage clause), and a clause imposing a limit where 
proof of loss at least upto the limit would be necessary (an exemption clause). 
 
H. Excepted Perils clauses and promissory warranties in contract of 
insurance  
 
 In the law of insurance, the word “warranty” should be clearly distinguished 
from its use in other branches of the law of contract.22 The common use of the 
term is to denote a promise, the breach of which only entitles the party 
aggrieved to damages, leaving him still liable to perform his side of the bargain. 
A warranty in a policy of insurance, on the other hand, corresponds with a 
condition in any other contract, and breach of it entitles the insurers to 
repudiate liability under the policy. Examples of such warranty would be 
stipulations in the policy that the assured will not proceed abroad, or that he will 
fit a certain type of burglar alarm to his promises. Until breach the insurers are 
bound; a breach, even after the contract is complete, relieves the insurers from 
liability. Warranties relating to the future are sometimes described as 
“promissory warranties”.23 This term is misleading, however, as most 
warranties are, in an sense promissory.24 In fact, in marine insurance 
“promissory “ warranties are contrasted with warranties which merely define the 
risk insured against,25 which can only relate to the future. These risk defining 
warranties, e.g. the stipulation in a policy of marine insurance that a ship is 
“warranted free of capture” by an F.C. and S clause,26 are not the warranties in 
the sense of contractual conditions at all. There is no question of a term of the 
policy being broken, thus allowing repudiation, should the stipulation not be 
met. The warranty in this instance simply expresses an excepted peril. So, if a 
vessel “warranted free of capture” is captured or requisitioned, the underwriters 
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will not be responsible for that loss, since that was a peril accepted from the 
cover, but they will be liable for a subsequent loss by a peril of the sea, 
provided the capture was not the proximate cause of it.27  
 
  In general insurance law also, any representation that is warranted to be 
true is sometimes spoken of as being, for that reason, a “promissory” 
warranty.28 These “promissory” warranties are, in effect, conditions precedent 
to the insurer’s liability and must be clearly distinguished from terms or clauses 
in a contract which define or limit the risk, such as the “promissory” warranties 
just discussed in the context of marine insurance. They will include stipulations 
as to safety precautions the insured must take, or essential repairs or works he 
must carry out, before the policy comes into effect. 
 
  In addition, however, it will invariably be the case that the policy willl 
contain some clauses or “warranties” that define the risk in a positive fashion, 
and still more that cut down its scope negatively by means of exception or 
accepted perils. Such excepted perils are frequently printed among the 
conditions of the policy, exempting the insurers from liability for certain kinds of 
loss which would otherwise be covered by it.29 
 
  So, the occurrence of an excepted peril will not preclude the assured from 
recovery unless it is also the proximate cause of the loss. In the case of the 
breach of a promissory warranty entitles the insurers to repudiate, even if it had 
nothing whatever to do with the loss. 
 
  Thus, in Provincial Insurance v Morgan30 assured stated that a lorry in 
respect of which he took out cover, was to be used to carry coal, and the policy 
was limited to transportation in connection with his business. He also warranted 
his answers to be true. He occasionally uses the lorry to carry timber, but was 
involved in an accident when carrying coal only. It was held that the effect of his 
statement was only to limit the risk covered by the insurers to use the lorry 
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while carrying coal, and that, while he would not be insured while carrying 
timber, he could recover in respect of the accident since then the vehicle was 
being used for the activity in respect of which the insurers had undertaken the 
risk of damage. 
 
  Similarly, in Farr v Motor Traders Mutual Insurances Society Ltd. a 
statement by the assured that a club was only to be driven on one shift per 
twenty-four hours was held to be only a description of the risk and was not 
constructed as a promissory warranty. 
 
  In de. Maurier (Jewels) v Bastion Insurance Co. Donaldson J. held that a 
warranty regarding locks and alarms fitted to vehicles was not of a promissory 
character, it delimited and was part of the description of the risk. 
 
  On the other hand, in Balatine Insurance v Gregory fire insurances on 
timber were made “subject to the fifty feet clear space clause attached.” The 
clear space of clause read: “Warranted by the assured that a clear space of fifty 
feet shall hereafter be maintained between the timber hereby insured and any 
sawmill.” It was held that this clause amounted to a promissory warranty and 
was not merely definitional of the cover afforded. The problem is really one of 
construction as to whether the court finds the statement to be “promissory”, or 
alternatively defining the risk covered. 
 
4.4 The Contractual Force of Exemption 
(A)  Incorporation into Contracts 
  An exemption clause will only operate to limit or modify contractual rights 
or remedies when it has been incorporated into contracts upon which it purports 
to have effect. This apparently obvious statement is no more than an illustration 
of the general proportion that not all the words which the parties said or wrote 
during their negotiations will become part of the contract. If the contract is wholly 
oral, its contents are a matter of fact to be established by evidence proving what 
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the parties said and intended. If the contract is wholly written then there will 
rarely be any dispute of fact as to what was agreed but instead a disagreement 
as to what the words used actually mean, which is a matter of interpretation foe 
the judge. 34 
 
 However, where the contract is wholly in writing, extrinsic evidence is 
generally inadmissible when it would, if accepted, have the effect of adding to, 
varying or contradicting the terms of a document constituting a valid and 
effective contract. In Bank of Australia v Palmer, 35 Lord Morris said (at p.545): 
Parol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary add to or subtract from 
the terms of the written contract, or the terms in which the parties have 
deliberately agreed to record any part of their contract.36   
 
 Were this to be unshakeable principle of contractual construction there would 
be no occasion when an exemption clause, not found in the original written 
contract, would bind the parties. Despite the obvious hostility of the courts 
towards exemption clauses in the context of “non-negotiable” contracts, the 
courts seem curiously to have resisted the temptation to place heavy reliance on 
the pay-roll evidence rule in order to counter attempts to import exemption 
clauses into written contracts.37 Evidence may be admitted to prove a custom or 
trade usage, notwithstanding the absence of any mention of such matters in the 
written document. Indeed, the practical effect of “payroll evidence rule” can be 
completely negative by the court finding that the document only contains part of 
the terms, i.e., the contracts was made partly in writing and partly by word of 
mouth or by conduct. While the presence of writing raises a presumption that the 
writing contains the whole contract.38 this presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence that he parties did not intend the writing to be exclusive.39 In the 
particular context of exemption clauses, it may sometimes be argued by the party 
seeking to rely on the clause that, notwithstanding its apparent absence from the 
contractual document in question, that document does not represent the entire 
contract between the parties and a clause of exemption should still apply40 
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because, for instance, the parties intended it to be implied into their agreement 
from a previous course of dealing. 
 
 The problems created by attempts to incorporate exemption clauses from 
previous dealings between the parties into contracts, whether those contracts be 
written or oral, are not new41, although there is little doubt that the attitude of the 
judiciary towards them has changed radically as the “consumer interest” as the 
area of primary intervention.42 The courts initially look the view that businessmen 
who were used to dealing with each other over a long period on virtually identical 
terms on each occasion, may not necessarily read all the contract documents 
every time, but simply assume them to be in conformity with the previous course 
of dealing.43 
 
 That being so, incorporation of an exemption clause into the instant contract 
could be inferred from a previous course of dealing between the parties. For 
instance, in J. Spurling Ltd. v Bradshaw44, the defendant delivered eight barrels 
of orange juice to the plaintiff warehousemen, with whom he had frequently dealt 
in the past. Some days later the defendant received a “landing account” 
acknowledging receipt of the barrels and referring on its face to a set of “contract 
conditions” printed on the back. These conditions contained a clause purporting 
to exempt the plaintiffs from liability for loss or damage “occasioned by the 
negligence, wrongful act or default” of themselves, their servant or agents. When 
the defendant eventually collected the barrels somewhere empty, some 
contained dirty water and some were leaking badly. The defendant failed to pay 
the storage charges and the plaintiffs sued him. The defendant counter claimed 
foe damages alleging that the plaintiffs either were in breach of an implied term 
of the contract of bailment to take reasonable care of barrels or were guilty of 
negligence in the storage. The plaintiffs pleaded the exemption clause but the 
defendant argued that since he had only received the “landing account” after 
conclusion of the contract, the exemption clauses contained therein should not 
affect him. However, the defendant did give evidence to the effect that he had 
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received many landing accounts from the plaintiffs in the past in respect of other 
goods but that he had never read them. As a result of this previous course of 
business dealing between the parties the defendant was held to be bound by the 
clause which had thus become incorporated into the instant contract. 
 
 Despite the view of Lord Devlin that cases in which terms will be implied in to 
agreements by usage or by a course of dealing between the parties will be of 
increasing rarity in modern commercial practice,45 it still appears to be relatively 
easy to show that terms are included in a contract by a course of dealing. 
 
 In British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd. v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd.46, the plaintiffs 
and defendants were both engaged in the business of hiring out earthmoving 
equipment. The defendants were also involved in draining some marshy ground 
and urgently required some crane. They agreed to hire a crane from the plaintiffs. 
The terms of payment were agreed but no mention was made of the plaintiff’s 
conditions of hire. The plaintiff’s sent the defendants a copy of such conditions 
which provided, inter-alia that the hirer would be responsible for all expenses 
arising out of the crane’s use. Before the defendants signed the form containing 
the conditions, the crane sank into the marsh through no fault of the defendants 
and the plaintiffs claimed the cost of recovering the crane. The Court of Appeal 
held that since the bargaining power of the defendants was equal to the plaintiffs 
and the defendants knew that he printed conditions in similar terms to those of 
the plaintiffs were in common use in the business, the plaintiffs were entitled to 
conclude that the defendants wee accepting the crane on the terms of their 
conditions. The conditions had therefore been incorporated into contract on the 
basis of the common understanding of the parties and accordingly the plaintiffs 
claim succeeded. 
 
 It would appear to follow from this that where the bargaining power of the 
parties is not equal, as is frequently the case in the consumer context, 47 
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implications of terms by reference to a previous course of dealing is far more 
difficult. 
 
 While it does sometimes happen that the doctrine enunciated in J.Spurling 
Ltd. v Bradshaw is applied in consumer cases, 48 it is comparatively rare. 
 
 For example, in Hollier v Rambler Motors (A.M.C.) Ltd., the plaintiff 
telephoned the defendant’s garage and asked if they would repair his car. The 
defendant’s manager said that they would if the plaintiff had it towed to the 
garage. While in the garage the car was damaged by a fire which started as a 
result of the garage’s negligence. On three or four occasions in the previous five 
years the plaintiff had made use of the repair services of the garage and on each 
of those occasions had signed a form which stated that “The Company is not 
responsible for damage caused by fire to customer’s car on the premises.” In an 
action by the plaintiff claiming damages for negligence the defendants contended 
that, although the plaintiff had not signed the form on this occasion, the 
exemption clause had been incorporated into the oral contract between them by 
a course of dealing and that its effect was to exclude liability for negligence 
causing a fire while the car was in their care.50 
 
 The Court of Appeal held inter-alia, that the defendants were liable to the 
plaintiff because three or four transactions in the course of five years were not 
sufficient to establish a course of dealing and so the clause was not incorporated 
intro the oral contract. 
 
 Commenting on that decision, Lord Denning M.R., observed in British Crane 
Hire Corporation v Isswich Plant Hire Ltd.: “That was a case of a private 
individual who had signed forms with conditions on three or four occasions. The 
plaintiff there was not of equal bargaining power with the garage company which 
repaired the car. The conditions were not incorporated.” The implication is clear. 
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Had he parties both been commercial men, contracting on equal terms, the result 
might well have been different. 
 
 However, of equal significance in the Hollier case, and other cases in which a 
previous pattern of business is relied upon to incorporate an exemption clause 
into a contract, Is the problem of what constitutes a previous course of dealing 
between the parties? Some degree of regularity of conduct is required but the 
precise amount is subject to doubt. 
 
 In J.Spurling Ltd., v Bradshaw, for example, it was merely stated that the 
defendant “had received many landing accounts before.” In Henry Kendall & 
Sons v William Lillico & Sons, a contract of sale was made orally by one Golden 
on the Bury St. Edmunds Corn Exchange for the sale of poultry feeding stuffs to 
the Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association Ltd., by Grimsale and Sons 
Ltd. They contracted by a confirmation note containing a conditions of sale. The 
frequency of previous dealing here was three or four agreements a month in the 
previous three years involving the use of such confirmation notes. In British 
Crane Hire Corporation Ltd. v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd. there were only two 
transactions many months before, although there was also trade usage to take 
account of. In Hollier v Rambler Motors (A.M.C.)Ltd., on the other hand, there 
were three or four transactions over a period of five years. This was not sufficient 
to show a course of dealing although, as has already been noted, this may, in 
part, depend upon the fact that the case involved a “consumer” as opposed to a 
“commercial “transaction. 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that the previous course of dealing must at least be 
consistent and regular, and there is even an implication in the Victoria Fur 
Traders case that there be some proof of the parties having deemed themselves 
bound by the particular clause in question. This observation is perhaps 
dependant upon the view that it is simply constructive knowledge of the term to 
be implied, rather than actual knowledge that is material. 
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 This is contrary to the opinion expressed by Lord Devlin in the House of Lords 
in Mc. Cutcheon v David Mac Brayne Ltd. The usual procedure of signing a 
written note of the terms was not adopted. Lord Pearce stated (at P.138) that the 
ordinary course of business could not be of help to the carrier, since the 
transaction did not follow the ordinary course, no written control having been 
supplied. This does seem a more satisfactory explanation of the result than Lord 
Devlin’s reliance on actual as against constructive knowledge.54 
 
 Certainly there were written terms, although the actual contract was oral. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the parties were “dealing” on the plaintiffs 
written standard terms of business and therefore that, were it to be decided 
today, this and similar cases would fall within the Act. In any event, the fact that 
the proferens needs to rely upon a previous course of dealing between the 
parties, whether or not such dealing was on written terms, may, in itself, be a 
factor to take into account in deciding whether the exemption clause is a fair and 
reasonable one to be included, within section 11(1) of the 1977 Act, or a fair and 
reasonable one to be relied upon, at common law.55 
 
(B) The Effect of Signature 
 
 Where a contractual document is signed by a party, the fact of agreement is 
proved by his Signature and, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, or 
the availability of non est factum, 56 it is wholly immaterial that he has not read 
the contract and does not know its contents or even that he cannot speak or 
read English.57 He will therefore be unable to argue that he has no notice of an 
exemption clause contained in a contractual document to which he has put his 
signature. Thus, in L’Estrange v Gracoub, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from 
the defendants a cigarette vending machine. The agreement provided for 
payment by installments and it contained a clause excluding liability for 
breaches of warranty or condition. The plaintiff signed the agreement without 
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reading its terms. The machine was faulty and the plaintiff purported to 
terminate for breach of condition. It was held that she could not do so since the 
exemption clause had effectively excluded all liability on the part of the seller. 
Scrutton L.J. said:   
 
 “In cases in which the contract is contained in a railway ticket or othe 
unsigned document, it is necessary to prove that an alleged party was aware, or 
ought to have been aware, of its terms and conditions. These cases have no 
application when the document has been signed. When a document containing 
contractual term is signed, then in the absence of fraud, containing contractual 
terms is signed, then in the absence of fraud, or, I will add, misrepresentation, 
the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the 
document or not.” 
 
 In some cases, however, the absolute effect of the signature will not be 
enforced. So, where an employee of a dry cleaning firm misrepresented to the 
customer the true purpose of the receipt signed by customer, the Court of 
Appeal held that the defendant company was precluded from enjoying the full 
force of exemption clause contained therein.59 
 
 Statute has also had some impact on this area. So, for example, the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977, S.2(3) provides that “where a contract term of notice 
purports to exclude or restrict liability for a negligence a person’s agreement to 
or awareness of it is not of itself to be taken as indicating his voluntary 
acceptance of any risk.” The meaning of this provision is not entirely clear, 
although it appears to prevent the defence of volenti non fit injuria being raised 
in an action in tort solely on the ground that the plaintiff was aware of a clause 
excluding or restricting liability. Since, the fiction applied at common law to a 
signatory to a contractual document is that, by his signature he at least has 
knowledge of, if not consents to, any exemption clause contained in that 
document, Section 2(3) would seem to prevent such a rule being applied so as 
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to make the signatory volents to the risk in a tortuous action, in the absence of 
any other evidence that the risk was accepted. 
 
 Certain statutory provisions60 have rendered certain types of contractual 
provision, including exemption clauses, totally void in certain circumstances. 
Notwithstanding, therefore, that a contract document has been signed at a 
common law clauses contained in it are regarded as part of the contract 
between the parties, these statutory provisions would still operate on these 
clauses, as would any common law invalidatory rule, such as the rule against 
penalties. 
 
(C) Written Clauses of Exemption 
 
 It is rare to encounter an oral exemption clause. In theory there is nothing 
against such clauses, but in practice the evidentary problems make them 
unlikely. Thus, exemption or limitation clauses will normally be written, either 
within the contract itself, or upon notices, tickets, receipts or other documents 
which the party seeking to rely on them hopes to incorporate into the 
transaction. 
 
 In those cases, in which the contract partly oral and partly written, the party 
seeking to rely on the exemption clause will have to show that he has 
incorporated it into the bargain between the parties and in the case of contracts 
falling within The Unfair Terms Act 1977 that it is reasonable one to have been 
incorporated.61 And it must be signed by the other party as a proof that it is 
accepted as a written part of the transaction. In the absence of either of these 
possibilities, the exemption clause will only be treated as part of the agreement 
if it has been brought to the notice of the party affected by it.62 
 
 There has been a very great deal of litigation on the problem of what 
constitutes sufficient notice of a written exemption clause for it to be regarded as 
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part of the agreement. The first point of significance is the timing of the notice in 
that for a term to become a binding part of the contract it must be brought to the 
notice of the party affected by it, and he must expressly or impliedly assent to it, 
before or at the time that the contract is made. 
 
 The classic illustration of this principle is to be found in Olley v Marlborough 
Court Ltd.63, where the plaintiff and her husband booked and paid for in advance 
a week’s board and residence in the defendant’s hotel. They then went up to 
their room, where a notice was exhibited which contained the following clause: 
“The proprietors will not hold themselves responsible for articles lost or stolen 
unless held to mangers for safe custody.” Owing to the negligence of the hotel 
staff in allowing a third party access to the room key, the wife’s furs were stolen. 
The plaintiff sued and the defendants attempted to rely on the exemption clause, 
arguing that it had been incorporated into the contract by the notice in the room. 
 
 The Court of Appeal held that the contract was made at the reception desk 
when the defendants agreed to accept the weeks booking from the plaintiff. The 
notice, therefore, could not form part of contract since the plaintiff could not have 
seen it until after the contract was made and the defendants were thus liable for 
the loss. 
 
 Similarly, in Daly v General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.64, the plaintiff’s 
husband had booked passage on the defendant’s ship. His attention to the 
conditions of the carriage was not drawn at any point of time during contract. 
Later the ticket arrived, by post, in a folder on which were set out the conditions 
of carriage including a clause purporting to exempt the defendants from liability 
for any injury or accident sustained by a passenger. Such a provision would now 
be void by virtue of The Unfair Terms Act 1977. S.2(1), but the contract in the 
case was concluded before the Act came into force. During voyage plaintiff was 
injured. Bradon J. held , interalia, that the contract of carriage was concluded 
when the bookings were made and confirmed, at which time neither the plaintiff 
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nor her husband, were aware of the conditions. The defendants could not rely 
upon conditions subsequently and ultimately introduced, into the contract, and 
accordingly they had no defence, based upon the exemption, to the plaintiff’s 
action.65 
 
 The problem of contemporaneity can be raised in a particularly striking form 
when the contract is concluded through the medium of automatic machine. 
 
 In so far as notice of any exemption clause must be given before or at the 
time of concluding the agreement, the precise moment when the offer is 
accepted, and indeed the question of who makes the offer and who the 
acceptance, is of especial significance where the contract is concluded through 
the medium of a machine which accepts money or tokens.   
 
 In Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., 66 the plaintiff drove his car into a park 
which held an automatic barrier. He had never been there before. A notice 
outside gave the charges and stated that all cars were “parked at owner’s risk”. A 
traffic light at the entrance showed red and a machine produced a ticket when 
the car stopped beside it. The plaintiff took the ticket and the light having turned 
to green, drove into the garage and parked his car. On returning to collect it there 
was an accident in which he was injured. In his action against the garage for 
damages the garage contended inter-alia, that the ticket incorporated a condition 
exempting them from liability. It was mentioned on the ticket at bottom in small - 
print:”issued subject to conditions….displayed on the premises.” 
 
 The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was not bound by the conditions 
printed on the ticket; the contract was concluded when the car was driven to the 
entrance of the garage, causing the ticket to be issued, and the plaintiff could not 
be bound by conditions brought to his attention after this. 
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 This case, while specifically involving an automatic machine, raised in a 
general sense a further point concerning the adequacy of the notice that must be 
given by a party seeking to rely on an exemption clause. 
 
 This is almost certainly going too far, although a similar principle was applied 
in Holling-worth v Southern Ferries Ltd., 67 to prevent incorporation of an 
exemption clause in a contract for a cruise, where the brochure from which the 
trip was booked merely referred to a set of conditions that could be inspected at 
the company’s offices; the conditions themselves not being furnished to the 
passenger until after the contract of carriage was concluded. It seems, therefore, 
that the defendant must establish that adequate steps have been taken to draw 
the plaintiff’s attention in the most explicit way to the particular clause relied on. 
 
 Such a line of argument is based, essentially, on the reasonableness of the 
steps that have been taken to draw the clauses to the attention of the party 
allegedly affected by them. It has an old and respected pedigree, stemming from 
the judgement of Mellish L.J. in Parker v South Eastern Railway Co. Ltd.68 Lord 
Hudson commenting in Mc Cutcheon v David Mac-Brayne Ltd.69 the judgement 
of Mallish L.J. said that the correct questions to ask in a ticket case were the 
following  
(1) Did the person receiving the ticket know that there was printing on it? If 
not, he is not bound. 
(2) Did he know that the ticket contained or referred to condition? If he did, 
then he will be bound. 
(3) Did the party seeking to rely on the clause do what was reasonable in the 
way of notifying prospective contracting parties of the existence of 
conditions and where their terms might be considered? If he did then, 
notwithstanding a negative answer to (1) above, the clause will be part of 
the contract. If he did not then, unless there is an affirmative answer to (2) 
above, the conditions will not be part of the contract.  
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 In the words of Denning L.J.(as he was then) in J.Spurling Ltd. v Bradshaw70 : 
“some clauses which I have seen would need to be printed in red ink on the face 
of the document with a red hand pointing to it before the notice could be held to 
be sufficient.71 
 
 Although the question of the reasonableness of the steps taken is one of fact, 
the test of reasonableness is objective, so that the fact the plaintiff is under 
some disability, for instance, he is blind or illiterate or cannot speak English72 is 
irrelevant, provided that the notice is reasonably sufficient for a person normally 
entering into such a transaction who is not under the disability. 
 
 In Thompson v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co. Ltd.,73 the plaintiff 
who was illiterate, asked her niece purchase for her a railway excursion ticket 
on the face of which were the words: ”For conditions see back.” The plaintiff 
suffered injuries. The conditions exempted the company’s liability. 
 
 The Court of Appeal held that the defendant company had taken reasonable 
steps to bring the conditions to the notice of ordinary travelers and even had 
she bought the ticket herself instead of through an agent, the judgement seem 
to indicate that the particular illiteracy of the plaintiff would have been irrelevant.  
 
 It could be argued from this that if the party affected by the clause is known, 
for whatever reason, to be unable to read it, then for greater diligence is 
required of the party seeking to rely on the clause to bring it to the other’s 
attention before the steps taken will be held to be sufficient to effect 
incorporation.  
 
 One factor that will clearly affect the reasonableness of the notice is the kind 
of document inn which the exemption clause is contained. 
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 In Chapleton v Barry U.D.C.74, the plaintiff hired one of the defendant’s desk-
chairs for the beach, paying and receiving a ticket in return from the attendant. 
He sat on it and fell through the canvas. He suffered the personal injuries as a 
result and when he sued the defendants for damages they set up the 
exemption clause printed on the back of the ticket as a defence. 
 
 The plaintiff admitted that he had glanced at the ticket, but had not realized 
that it contained conditions. The court took the vie that such a ticket was not of 
a type that one would normally regard as a contractual document, and thus one 
would not reasonably expect it to contain contractual conditions. So, the 
defendants were not protected by the exemption clause since the ticket was 
simply a voucher or receipt. It did not purport to set out the conditions of hire 
but merely to show for how long the chair had been hired and that the hire 
charge had been paid. 
 
 Simply calling a document “a receipt” does not, however, automatically 
prevent it from being treated as “a contractual document”75 It may be intended 
by the parties to have this effect or be delivered to the party to be affected by 
the conditions in such circumstances as to give him reasonable notice of 
them.76 Whether a document is or is not a “contractual” document, i.e., one that 
could reasonably be expected to contain contractual terms, is a question of fact 
that may change with commercial or consumer practices. 
 
(D) The “Battle of The Forms” 
 
 This term is frequently used to describe the situation that arises where one 
party sends a standard form (possibly an “order form”) stating that the contract is 
on his terms and the other party responds by returning another standard 
form(possibly an “acceptance note”.) stating that the contract one of his terms. 
The terms may either be set out in the forms themselves, or stated to be 
available on request, as in Smith v South Wales Switchgear Ltd.77 Frequently 
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such standard forms will contain exclusions. The usual approach to this problem 
is through the medium of offer and acceptance and it can produce several 
solutions. It may be it will yield a contract on the first party’s terms, on the second 
party’s terms a contract on such terms as may be implied at common law, a 
contract on both standard forms, or on contract at all.  
 
 The offer and acceptance analysis is almost certainly the best to adopt where 
one party seeks to substitute his conditions for he other’s and neither party 
explicitly acknowledges assent,78 although it may fall down where both the 
parties simultaneously send out standard forms and each proceeds to trade on 
the assumption that its own conditions apply.79  
 
 In B.R.S. v Arthur Crutenley Ltd., 80a consignment of whisky was delivered by 
the plaintiffs driver to the defendants warehouse for storage. The driver 
presented a receipt, which incorporated the plaintiff’s standard trading conditions, 
for signature. The warehouseman signed the receipt but added in writing that it 
was subject to the defendant’s own conditions. The court held that this 
constituted a counter offer which nullified the original offer and was accepted by 
the driver’s subsequent unqualified delivery of the goods.81 
 
 The decision was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Butter 
Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v Ex-Cell-O-Corporation (England) Ltd.82 
 
 Here, in this case in response to an enquiry by the buyers, the sellers offered 
to sell a machine tool for £ 75,535, delivery to be in 10 months time. The offer 
was on the sellers standard conditions, which were stated to “prevail over any 
terms and conditions in the buyer’s order. ”These conditions included a price-
variation clause providing for the goods to be charged at the price current on the 
date of delivery. The buyer’s replied accepting the order, but on terms and 
conditions which were materially different from those put forward by the seller’s 
and which in particular contained no provision for a price-variation. 
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 The buyers conditions had a tear-off slip attached, which the sellers signed 
and returned, containing the words “we accept your order on the Terms and 
Conditions thereon.” The returned slip was accompanied by a letter from the 
sellers stating that buyers order was being entered in accordance with the 
seller’s original offer when the machine tool was delivered, the sellers claimed on 
additional £ 2,892 under the price variation provision contained in their terms. 
The buyers argued that the contract had been concluded on their, rather that 
seller’s terms and was therefore a fixed-price contract. 
 
 The Court of Appeal analysed the issue between the parties as one of offer 
and acceptance and held that the sellers had contracted on the buyer’s terms, 
since the return of acknowledgement slip amounted to an acceptance of the 
buyer’s counter offer, but merely confirmed that the price and identity of the 
machine. Hence, the sellers could not claim to increase eh price. Had the sellers 
not returned the tear-off slip, but simply sent the letter, both Lawten and Bridge, 
L.JJ. Express the view that there would have been no contract at all between the 
parties. They do not, however, consider what would then happen if the goods 
were delivered by the sellers and accepted by the buyers. 
 
 No solution is ideal. The analysis of offer and acceptance, while conceptually 
correct, is often difficult to reconcile with business practic4e and the view the 
parties took of what they were doing. Lord Denning’s view has at least the merit 
of allowing a fair measure of flexibility. 
 
4.5  The Statutory Control of Exemption Clauses 
 
 There have been many attempts to control by statute the operation of 
exemption clauses, or their incorporation into contracts, and several different 
legislative techniques have been used.83 However, these techniques all have 
one characteristic in common – they view exemption clauses as something 
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separate from the other promises and undertakings in the contract.84 On one 
view, an exemption clause is simply one form of incorporating into a contract a 
statement of what the parties are promising, or not promising, to do a negative 
statement delineating positive obligations rather than a shield or defence to a 
liability already undertaken or accrued. Statutory attempts at control do not 
appear to acknowledge this and, to a greater or lesser degree, regard clauses of 
exemption as terms apart from the promises and liabilities of the contract. While 
this used to reflect the judicial attitude also, there are clear signs now that some 
judges are taking a different view of such clauses.85 However, so far as statute 
is concerned, the unchanging view of the legislature seems to be that exemption 
clauses have an exclusively prophylactic function, and this has produced some 
remarkable problems of statutory interpretation. 
 
4.5.1 Total Invalidity 
 
 Certain types off exemption clauses are declared absolutely void by statute. 
They are void either because the type of damage for which they purport to 
exclude liability or the contractual duty, the breach of which it is hoped to 
exclude, is such that by statutory control, the public consumer of commercial 
interest is thereby better served. 
 
 There are many examples of legislation rendering clauses void on account of 
the type of damage for which they seek to exclude liability. Thus, any provision 
attempting to negative or limit the liability of the operator of a public service road 
vehicle for causing the death of or personal injury to a passenger is void (Road 
Traffic Act 1960, S.151). There is a similar provision in section 43(7) of The 
Transport Act 1962 to cover the carriage of passengers by rail; thus making void 
a clause such as that held to be operative in Thompson v London, Midland and 
Scottish Railway Co. Ltd. 86 Any antecedent agreement or understanding 
between the user of a motor vehicle and his passenger which purports to restrict 
the driver’s liability to that passenger in respect of risks for which compulsory 
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insurance cover is required (see Road Traffic Act 1972, S.143), is void under 
Section 148(3) of the Road Traffic Act,1972. 
 
 All these and many more attempts to relieve from liability for causing death or 
personal injury have been brought within the net of voidness by section 2(1) of 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977. Under the terms of this section, any 
clause or notice (thus bringing into statutory control those areas where liability in 
negligence does not depend upon a pre-existing contract) will be void in so far 
as it purports to exclude or restrict liability for death or personal injury arising as 
a result of negligence. This provision does not apply, however, to this list of 
exceptions set out in Schedule 1, paragraph 1, nor to contractual limitations on 
liability which are permitted by international convention, or by a statutory 
enactment which extends provisions based on a convention to domestic 
carriage (such as The Civil Aviation Act, 1971). Nor does section 2(1) extend to 
a contract of employment, except in favour of the employees (scheld.1, para 4) 
and will only apply to “business liability”. 
 
 However, this apparently straight forward statutory ban is not entirely 
unambiguous, since it must be read in conjunction with section 13(1). This 
requires that  
 
 “To the extent that this part of this Act. [i.e., Sections 1-14] prevents the 
exclusion or restriction of any liability…… sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent 
excluding or restricting liabililty by reference to terms or notices while exclude or 
restrict the relevant obligations or duty.” 
 
 It will be noted that section 2(1) is drafted in terms of restriction or exclusion 
of liability – “liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence.” 
Negligence is itself defined in terms of a breach of an existing obligation. This 
may be an obligation to take reasonable care of exercise reasonable skill arising 
by way of contract (S. 1 (1) (a) or by way of any common law duty of care. In 
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other words, in all cases contemplated by sec-2(1), the duty of care. In other 
words, in all cases contemplated by sec-2(1), the duty of care is pre-supposed. 
 
 Section 13(1) appears to require that the same prohibition which section 2(1) 
applies to an exclusion or restriction of liability must also be applied to an 
exclusion or restriction of the duty of care itself, the breach of which would have 
produced that liability. Just as liability for death or personal injury arising from 
conduct performed in the course of business cannot be excluded, so the 
relevant duty of care itself cannot be excluded. 
 
 Suppose a departure store attaches a notice to its lifts stating that they are 
out of order and not to be used, and that it will not be responsible for injury 
caused to anyone who uses them. Suppose, that a customer of full age and 
capacity uses the lift and is injured. Undoubtedly, the notice purports to restrict 
the store’s common duty of care under the Liability Act, 1957, s. 2(10. Can the 
customer, therefore, argue that the notice is totally inoperative under section 
2(1) and 13(1) of the 1977 Act? If the notice (and the knowledge conferred 
thereby) is deleted from the parties relationship, the charter of the customer as a 
trespasser may be lost, and the store’s common duty of care owed to a lawful 
entrant (which on common sense grounds this customer is not) would revive. 
Such, a reading of section 13(1) mutilates legal relationships into a set of 
standard stereotypes.87 
 
 The Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 also renders void some Exemption 
Clause on the ground that the particular duty, the breach of which it is hoped the 
clause will excuse or obviate, is not one which, on the grounds of policy, may be 
omitted from the contractual relations between the parties. In their original 
forms, sections 13,14 and 15 of what is now the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
contained terms to be implied, in the absence of contrary evidence, in all 
contracts for The Sale of Goods, dealing with such matters as correspondence 
of the goods, dealing with such matters as correspondence of the goods, 
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dealing with such matters as correspondence of goods to contract description, 
fitness of the goods for their purpose, the merchantability of the goods, and their 
correspondence with sample. The original intention of the draftsmen was to fill 
any gaps left by commercial men in their agreements by means of implied 
terms.88  
 
 The general tendency of the law of contract over the past twenty-five years to 
shift away from the protection of the commercial interest has resulted in the 
statutory insertion of compulsorily imposed terms as to quality by redrafting of 
section 12 to 15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 into the form in which they now 
appear in the act of 1979. Any attempt to exclude the implied undertakings as to 
title in contracts of sale or hire-purchase will be of no effect.89 In consumer 
contracts of sale or hire-purchase, the seller or owner’s implied undertakings as 
to conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to their quality, or fitness 
for a particular purpose, cannot be excluded or restricted.90 Similar provisions 
apply, under The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, S 7(2), to contracts which 
involve the transfer of ownership or possession of goods from one person to 
another or the use of or expenditure on goods from one person to another or the 
use of or expenditure on goods in the performance of any services, such as 
contracts of hire, exchange and for work and materials.91 As to the exact content 
of this last group of implied terms, the common law is  unclear92 and there is, as 
yet, no statutory definition93 of them. The 1977 Act provides that, whatever these 
implied terms may be relating to correspondence with the description or sample, 
quality or fitness for purpose, they may not be excluded or restricted in 
consumer contracts. 
 
 This technique of multifying attempts to contract out of duties imposed by 
contract or legislation is becoming a common feature on our statute books. 94 It 
does, however, inhibit the reasonable bargains of reasonable parties, and 
creates extremely difficult points of interpretation. Where, for instance, in relation 
to section 13 of The sale of Goods Act, 1979, should one draw the line between 
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a term that excludes a particular characteristics from the description of the 
contract goods and one which exempts the supplier from liability for supplying 
goods lacking that characteristic? 95 
 
 Suppose that consumer then buys the car for the asking price without further 
examination and later relies upon those defects in a claim that the vehicle is not 
of mercantable quality. Normally, no condition to this effect would arise with 
regard to defects that are specifically indicated.96 Is the position altered by the 
fact that the term or notice undoubtedly prevents the relevant obligation from 
arising? 
 
 There are other objections that could be made to section 13(1). These 
proceed mainly on semantic grounds but taken literally, they suggest that the 
provision may, in fact, be discarded as wholly meaningless. Thus, the provision 
refers to “excluding or restricting liability” by terms or notices which exclude or 
restrict the relevant duty, whereas if the original duty were excluded no liability 
would arise. Again, it refers to “terms or notices which exclude or restrict the 
relevant obligation or duty,” whereas the main object of the provision is to 
ensure that (in certain circumstances at least) the obligation or duty should not 
be excluded or restricted at all: what then, is to be made of a provision which 
achieves this object by assuming that the very thing it sought to prohibit has 
occurred?   
 
 Such results flow, in part, from treating exemption clauses as if they had an 
existence completely independent of the promises and undertakings contained 
in the contract. So, for instance, in relation to the implied undertakings as to 
quality and fitness in the Sale of Goods Act1979, the statutory controls on 
exemption clauses appear to ignore the basic function of such clauses, which is 
to allocate contractual risks or, put another way, to determine who is going to 
pay if the goods are defective. The firs priority under the legislation is the 
domestic consumer and his interests are safeguarded in so far as any exclusion 
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attempt by the retailer in relation to the statutorily implied terms will be void. 
However, the ultimate responsibility will, in many cases, be that of the 
manufacturer depends upon the view the statute takes of exemption clause in 
non-consumer sales which depends, in turn, as we shall see, upon an element 
of judicial discretion. This applies without distinction between commercial sales 
of consumer durables in the chain between the manufacturer, whose fault the 
defect may well be and the retailer. 
 
4.5.2 The “Reasonable” Exemption Clause 
 
 Some statutes have given the courts discretion to control exemption clauses 
according to whether the clause is fair and reasonable. By far the most 
important of these is now The Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977. As against a 
person dealing other than a consumer, 97 statutorily implied terms as to quality, 
fitness for purpose and correspondence with description or sample in contracts 
for the sale of goods or hire-purchase, 98 or the similar terms implied by the 
common law into analogous contracts for the supply of goods, 99 can be 
excluded, but only insofar as the exemption satisfies the statutory concept of 
reasonableness. 
 
(A) Misrepresentation 
 
 Section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, 100 as substituted by The Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, 1977, S.8 (1), enacts that any provision in any agreement 
which purports to exclude or restrict any liability of a contracting party for a 
misrepresentation, or any remedy available to the other party by reason of the 
misrepresentation, “shall be of no effect except in so far as it satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness.” 
 
 The section appears to apply to clauses excluding liability for misdescriptions, 
however, trivial, but the usual commercial stipulations for a margin in, for 
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example, specification of goods, would not be invalidated, either because there 
would be no misrepresentation at all if the deviation from specifications fell 
within the stipulated margin, or, more doubtfully, on the ground that such a 
provision did not exclude or restrict a liability or remedy, but merely prevented 
the liability or remedy from arising in the first place. 
 
 Professor Atiyah raises an interesting problem concerning the fate of agreed 
damages clause under section 3 of the 1967 Act.101 It is clearly a clause 
restricting liability and so prima facie does fall within section 3. However, as the 
members of the House of Lords observed in the Suisse Atlantique Case102, 
genuine pre-estimates of damages differ from the usual type of exemption 
clause in that they are inserted into contracts for the benefit of both parties. 
 
 Although section 3 of the 1967 Act is clearly aimed both at clauses excluding 
liability and at those restricting remedies, there is no statutory definition of either. 
Provided the draftsman is able to prevent his clause looking like an exclusion or 
restriction, he has a sporting chance of escaping the section altogether. In 
Overbrook Estate ltd. v Glencombe Properties Ltd.103, an arrangement whereby 
a principal limited the authority of his agent to make representations was held 
not to be a clause limiting or excluding the liability of the principal seller, and so 
not within section 3.104    
 
 Another type of case where there would appear, on the face of it, to be no 
restriction or exclusion of a liability or a remedy which would otherwise arise is 
that in which the representor tries to evade the normal consequences of 
misrepresentation by stipulating that there should be no reliance placed upon 
the statements, reliance, of course, being essential before it can be said that 
there is an operative misrepresentation in the first place.105 For example, “The 
buyer warrants that he has examined the vehicle(s) and has not relied on any 
representation made to him by the seller, but solely upon his judgement.” 
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 One difficulty with this type of clause is that by the courts would not likely to 
permit reliance upon it, the 1967 act notwithstanding, where to do so would be 
to uphold a sham. 
 
 That this might well be the approach taken by the courts to similar kinds of 
clauses in misrepresentation cases was hinted at by Fox J. in Cremdean 
Properties Ltd. v Nash, 106 where the plaintiffs claimed rescission of contracts for 
the sale of two properties, alleging innocent misrepresentation of the area of 
letable office space. The defendant relied upon of disclaimer of responsibility for 
the accuracy of the particulars in the following terms:   
 
 “[The Agents} for themselves for the vendors or land lords whose agents they 
are give notice that (a) these particulars are prepared for the convenience of an 
interesting purchaser or tenant, and although they are believed to be correct 
their accuracy is not guaranteed and any error omission or misdescription shall 
not annul the sale or be grounds on which compensation may be claimed and 
neither do they constitute any part of an offer of a contract (b) any intending 
purchaser or tenant must satisfy himself by inspection or otherwise as to the 
correctness of each of the statements contained in these particulars.” 
 
 The case was merely the trial of a preliminary issue in which one of the 
defendants sought a declaration that the notice took effect to exclude any 
liability otherwise imposed by The Misrepresentation Act, 1967. The declaration 
was refused, but this did not mean that the notice was invalid. Fox J. thought 
that the question could not be disposed of interlocutory proceedings, but only at 
the full trial when all the facts were known. 
 
 The decision of Fox J. was confirmed by the Court of Appeal107 Bridge L.J., 
delivering the leading judgement, found himself unable to accept the argument 
that the effect of the clause was to nullify any representation in the document. 
He said (at P.551): “If the ingenuity of a draftsman was to devise language 
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which would have that effect, I am extremely doubtful whether the court would 
allow it to operate so as to defeat section 3….. I should not have thought that 
the courts would have been ready to allow such ingenuity in forms of language 
to defeat the plain purpose at which section 3 is aimed.” 
 
 The operation of the exemption clause is totally dependent upon the 
discretion of the court, which may not merely uphold or reject the clause, but 
uphold it, “in so far as it satisfies the requirements of reasonableness.”   
 
 Whether this gives the court a power to rewrite an exemption clause 
altogether, perhaps by modifying a clause which prevents an award of damages 
or rescission (as in the Cremdean properties case) by striking out the ban on 
rescission as being reasonable in the circumstances, remains to be seen. 
 
 The statutory form of words would certainly seem to contemplate severance, 
although, given the court’s well-established reluctance to engage in redrafting 
exercises on behalf of parties to a contract, it is unlikely that the words would be 
constructed as permitting any greater modification of clauses. 
 
(B) Indemnity Clauses 
 
 By virtue of The Unfair Contract terms act, 1977 s.4(1), any person dealing as 
a consumer cannot be required, under a term of the contract, to identify another 
in respect of liability that may be incurred by that other for negligence or breach 
of contract, except to the extent that the term satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness. 
 
 An indemnity contract arises between A and B where the indemnifier (A) 
promises to meet any legal liability which the indemnifiee (B) is held to be under. 
Therefore, if A, dealing as a consumer, enters into a contract with b (a removal 
contractor) for the removal of A’s effects a new house, and A, in that contract, 
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promises to indemnify B against “all claims and demands whatsoever” in excess 
of a stipulated sum108 should A’s goods be damaged as a result of B’s 
negligence in the course of removal, A would have a claim against B, but B 
would then be entitled to call upon A to indemnify him and, therefore, the effect 
of the indemnity clause is to produce a result very similar to an exemption 
clause. It is, therefore, entirely reasonable that such clauses also be statutorily 
controlled. The provisions controlling indemnities apply whether the indemnity is 
given in favour of the other party to the other party to the contract or some third 
person (such as his insurers), and is to operate whether the indemnity is in 
respect of a liability to the consumer himself or to someone else (such as, to 
revert to our example, the landlord whose access stairways and common parts 
have suffered damage as a result of the antics of the removalists attempting to 
install if the liability to be indemnified is vicarious.109 
 
 Section 4 of the 1977 act does appear, however, to cause certain injusticies. 
First, it only applies where the indemnifier deals as a consumer, so that if the 
contract is purely commercial and the indemnity is not given by a party dealing 
as a consumer, the inference is that the clause escapes all statutory control 
even though, had it been framed as an exemption rather than an indemnity, it 
might have been subject to the statutory test of reasonableness. This pecularity 
is an inevitable result of the failure to appreciate the true role of exclusions and 
exclusionary devices, as promise – defining terms. A second apparent injustice 
lies in the fact that, in a consumer context, section 4 only applies a test of 
reasonableness to an indemnity whereas, had an exemption clause been used 
instead, the liability in question could not have been excluded at all.110  
 
 Technically, section 4 (1) actually applies the reasonableness test on the 
clause imposing the liability to indemnify, rather than on the terms of the 
indemnity, which may be set out in another clause of the contract. However, it is 
likely that a court would rely upon its general powers “to have regard to the 
circumstances” (s.11(1)), which would clearly include the terms of the indemnity, 
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when deciding the question of reasonableness in order to deal with any attempt 
at circumvention of the statutory provisions by splitting the indemnity up into 
several contractual clauses.111 
 
(C) Guarantees 
 
 Although The unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 s.5 imposes statutory controls 
over exemption clauses contained in guarantees, it does not do so by subjecting 
them to a reasonable test. 
 
(D) Terms or Notices Excluding Liability for Loss or Damage arising from 
Negligence, other than Personal Injury or Death 
 
 Although these terms and notices are made subject to the reasonableness 
test under The Unfair Contract Terms Act,1977, s.2(2), detailed consideration of 
the statutory provisions will be deferred until the general question of excluding 
liability for negligence has been dealt with. 
 
(E) Unfair Terms in Standard Form or Consumer Contracts 
 
 As the above heading indicates, this is, in a sense, the real “meat” of the 1977 
act and also the part which contains some of the greatest difficulties of 
construction. Under section 3(1), where one of the parties to a contract deals “as 
a consumer”, or deals on the other’s written standard terms of business, and that 
contract contains an exemption clause, then that clause cannot be relied upon 
“except in so far as” it “satisfies the requirement of reasonableness”. For this 
purpose, an exemption clause is any clause which (s.3(2)): 
 
(a) excludes or restricts the liability of the party in breach in respect of that 
breach: 
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(b) permits the promisor to render a contractual performance substantially 
different from that which was reasonably expected of him; or 
(c) permits the promisor in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual 
obligation to render no performance at all. 
 
 Section 13(1) decrees that any term which makes any liability or its 
enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions (which are not defined), 
or which excludes or restricts a right or remedy in respect of liability, or subjects 
any person to any prejudice in consequences of his pursuing any such right or 
remedy, or which excludes or restricts rules of evidence or procedure, are all 
exemption clauses and thus subject to the controls of the Act. 
 
 An example of a clause restricting or excluding a remedy would be one that, 
for example, purported to deny the remedy of repudiation, or limited the damages 
recoverable to a specified, pre-determined sum.112  
 
 An example of a clause making liability or its enforcement subject to 
restrictive or onerous conditions would be a clause making the promisor’s liability 
dependent upon his receipt of claims within a short period of time (such as three 
days). 
 
 A clause subjecting a person to prejudice inconsequence of his pursuing his 
rights or remedies would be one that resulted in a blacklisting or an automatic 
lesser of future supplies. A clause excluding or restricting rules of evidence or 
procedure would be one that attempts to reverse the normal burden of proof or 
provides that particular conduct will be deemed to be conclusive evidence of a 
fact, eg. “failure to notify the consignors to the contrary within three days of 
delivery shall be deemed to be conclusive evidence that the goods comply with 
the contract.” 
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 These clauses are expressed in such a way that the promise is led into 
thinking that the promisor is undertaking an obligation more valuable to the 
promise than it in fact is. 
 
 Suppose, under standard written terms of business, a security firm agreed 
with a factory owner to provide security services by way of night patrols at the 
factory.113 Suppose also that the factory and its stock are destroyed by a fire 
started deliberately by a member of the night patrol staff. Suppose finally the 
contract provided that the security firm would not be liable for any breach of the 
contract occasioned by an injurious act or default by a member of the patrol staff. 
This is a clause which purports to exclude the liability of the party in breach (the 
security firm) and, therefore, could only be relied upon to the extent that it 
satisfies the requirement of reasonableness within section 3(2)(a) of the 1977 
Act. 
 
 However, suppose instead of clause is drafted thus (as it was in Photo 
Production Ltd. v Securior Transport Ltd.)114: 
 
 “Under no circumstances will (the security firm) be responsible for any 
injurious act or default by any employee…..unless such act or default could have 
been foreseen and avoided by the exercise of due diligence on the part of the 
(security firm) as his employer; nor, in any event, shall the (security firm) be held 
responsible for…. Any loss suffered by the (factory owner) through…… fire or 
any other cause, except in so far as such loss is solely attributable to the 
negligence of the (security firm’s ) employees acting within the course of their 
employment.” 
 
 Assuming that he patrol officer is a person of satisfactory antecedents who by 
want of care starts a fire, which then gets out of control and destroys the factory 
and its contents, would such a clause protect the security company in the light of 
the 1977 act? 
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  In similar circumstances at least one member of the House of Lords, has 
taken in the view, that by lighting the fire and destroying the factory, the patrol 
officer did not put his employer in breach of contract at all. The effect of the 
exemption clause is not to limit liability in the event of breach, but to prevent 
certain conduct ever being a breach of contract in the first place. 
   
  The effect, then of clause is not exclude liability, but to modify the terms of 
the promise given in such a way that a much lower standard of performance than 
perhaps might be expected is necessary before the contract is broken. 
 
  It therefore follows that section 3(2)(a) of the 1977 Act cannot assist here, 
since that only operates on exemption clauses where there has been a breach of 
contract and on the analysis by Lord Diplock of our example, there has been no 
breach at all. 
 
  However, it is difficult to see how, in the absence of fraud or 
misrepresentation, the factory owner could “reasonably” expect the security firm 
to do anything more than they have promised to do. They have only promised to 
be careful and reasonable employers of patrol staff, not to be absolutely liable for 
all the consequences of misconduct by their employees outside the terms of their 
employment. Surely one can only say that the factory owner “expected” any other 
promise than the one he got; either if one assumes that he misread the contract 
(which surely cannot be a ground for subjecting a contractual term to statutory 
control) or one reads the contract without the clause in dispute. This latter 
solution is fraught with difficulty. 
 
(F) Secondary Contract 
 
 Section 10 of The Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 while drafted in a 
somewhat obscure fashion, appears to provide against evasion of the statutory 
provisions controlling exemption and related clauses by means of secondary 
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contracts, so that where there are two related or linked contracts the second 
such contract cannot seek to impose exemptions of duties, rights, liabilities or 
remedies indirect upon the first contract. 
 
 For example, in a consumer contract for the sale of a deep-frezer, there 
would be implied certain terms as to quality and fitness under section 14 of The 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 which by virtue of section 6 of The Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 could not be excluded or restricted. A related contract to supply 
frozen food, or to provide maintenance on breakdown, made either with the same 
supplier or some other trader, may seek to exclude or restrict the sellers liability 
on the sale of the freezer under The Sale of Goods Act 1979. s.14, by providing 
that the consumer will surrender those rights in consideration of the goods or 
services provided under the related contract. Such a restriction by means of the 
secondary contract would be rendered ineffective by section 10 of the 1977 Act.  
 
 In the event that the related contract is made with a different supplier from the 
one with whom the first contract was made, there would need to be an 
agreement between the two suppliers that the second would indemnify the first 
should the consumer ignore the contractual exemptions in the secondary 
contract and sue the first supplier. Otherwise, even apart from section 10 of the 
1977 Act, the second supplier would not be able to claim an injunction to restrain 
the consumer’s action against the first supplier, nor be able to recover substantial 
damages against him in the event of his action against the first supplier 
secceeding.115 
 
 If the primary contracts were, however, a non-consumer sale, then the 
secondary contract would escape section 10 altogether. This is because section 
10 is drafted so as to operate only where the 1977 Act “prevents” the seller from 
excluding or restricting liability. 
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 The Unfair Contract Terms Act does not “prevent” the exclusion or restriction 
of liability for breach of section 14 of The Sale of Goods Act 1979 in non-
consumer sales, it merely requires the exclusion or restriction to satisfy a 
requirement of reasonableness before it is upheld.  
 
4.5.3 Statutorily Imposed Exemption Clauses 
 
 In a few instances, exemption or exclusion from liability will be statutorily 
imposed into contracts.116 Where this is done, the statute will also normally 
prohibit any further limitation of liability over and above the statutory provisions. 
So, the liability of a ship-owner for goods exported from the United Kingdom is 
governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, 117 which applies to all 
outward shipments under bills of lading, except for a few minor exceptions, and 
the parties can not contract out the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (s-29{1}). 
The responsibilities of the ship owner in respect of the safety of goods entrusted 
to his care are described in detail in the Hague Rules (Article III is that the ship 
owner is only liable if acting negligently, but the responsibilities of the ship-owner 
under the Act are lighter than they are at Common Law,118  and this is then 
compensated for by a provision that no contracting out is permitted. In those 
cases where the 1971 Act applies, the Rules further provide maximum limits for 
the ship owner’s liability for damage to, or loss of, the goods shipped. These 
maximum limits if liability may be increased (but not decreased) by agreement of 
the parties or by a declaration of the nature and valve of the shipped goods by 
the shipper before shipment, together with insertion of this declaration in the bill 
of Lading, 119   
 
 It is, in theory possible for exclusion clauses to find their way into 
agreement as a result of the Fair Trading Act 1973, already discussed, though it 
must be admitted that the practical likelihood of this seems remote. The director 
General of Fair Trading may include in his recommendations to the Advisory 
Committee proposals relating to any matters mentioned in schedule 6 to the Act. 
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These include the prohibition of exclusion clauses but also envisage the 
imposition of a requirement that specified terms be included. These prohibitions 
or requirement may be incorporated in the Secretary of state’s order. It is 
conceivable, therefore, that the Director General would, as a corollary to the 
imposition of certain statutory obligations (e.g. participation in a compulsory “no – 
fault” insurance scheme) also recommend the compulsory inclusion of certain 
limitations on liability on one or other side of a consumer transaction.  
 
 In a different way, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 imposes a limitation of 
liability on the parties in that in one case they are not permitted their own 
limitations clause but if any reduction of liability on the part of the seller is 
required the statutory limitation only may be used. Section 12(1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 implies into every contract for the sale of goods, other than one 
to which sub-section (2) applies, an undertaking in the form of a condition given 
by the seller that he has, or will have at the time when the property is to pass, a 
good right to sell. It further implies a warranty of quiet possession and a warranty 
that the goods are free from encumbrances. Section 12(2) now applies where it 
can be inferred from the circumstances of the contract, or where it is expressly 
stated, that the seller only undertook to sell such title as he or some named third 
party, might have. It implies a warranty on the part of the seller that all charges or 
encumbrances known to him, but not known to the buyer, have been disclosed 
before the sale. There is a further implied warranty of quiet possession against 
disturbance by the seller, any third person whose title the seller has supported to 
transfer, and any person claiming the through or under the seller or that third 
person claiming title through or under the seller or that third person, subject only 
to encumbrances already disclosed to known.  
 
 There was formerly doubt 120 as to whether the operation of the old, 
unamended section 12, as it appeared in The Sale of Goods Act 1893, could 
have been excluded by contrary agreement. This very doubt may itself have 
discouraged the draftsman of standard form agreements from attempting to 
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exclude section 12 at all. Section 12 as it now appears in the 1979 Act gives the 
draftsmen an alternative.121 While, no doubt, the intention behind the redrafted 
section 12 (2) was to enable sellers to dispose the goods the title to which in 
insecure the results may be, in practise, to encourage sellers, as a general rule, 
to adopt the less potent warranty in section 12(2) rather then leave the more 
onerous implied terms in section 12 (1) inoperative in their contracts. There is 
nothing in the legislation to prevent this happening and buyers will, of course 
always be the sufferers by it. 
 
 Contracting out of section 12 altogether is prohibited in that any term 
attempting to exclude the implied undertaking is void. So, either the condition of 
good right to sell and the warranties for quiet possession and freedom from 
encumbrances apply, or the warranties in section 12(2) apply (Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977, S.6 (1) (a). It is not possible to exclude both groups of implied 
undertakings. There are similar provisions covering hire-purchase (S.6 (1) 6). In 
the case of the analogous contracts under which goods pass, section 7 (4) of the 
1977 Act provides that exclusion of liability in respect of the right to transfer 
ownership of the goods or give possession, or the assurance of quiet possession 
given to a person taking the goods under the contract, is subject to the test of 
reasonableness. 
 
 Problems arise, however when an attempt is made to exclude both 
undertakings. Here the question is which of the two sets of undertaking is the 
court to imply into the contract having declared the exclusion void? Presumably, 
the normal implication would be the undertakings is section 12(1), but these are 
not to be implied if it appears from the contract of is to be inferred from the 
circumstances that the lesser obligations of section 12(2) to apply. The parties 
clearly intend no obligation to be imposed at all but, if that is impossible, their 
intention presumably is to take the next best thing. i.e. the limited obligations of 
section 12(2). However if the exclusion is void, will the courts still pay any regard 
to it? If they do not, then there may well be nothing in the contract or the 
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circumstances surrounding it to indicate that the parties intended anything but 
section 12(1) to apply. The result will, therefore in some cases, be the very 
opposite of that which the parties intended and in commercial sales, insured 
against. This is one further example of the distortion of bargains from regarding 
an exclusion clause as something separate and distinct from the “obligation-
defining” terms of the contract. 
 
4.6 The Construction of Exemption Clauses  
 
 The exemption clause must be constructed so as to determine its impact 
on the obligation undertaken by the contract as a whole. This raises the first of 
many problems in this area: to what extent, in constructing an exemption clause, 
are the other terms of the contract relevant? Is the exclusion clause merely a 
shield to a claim for damages in which case its construction will be matter totally 
separate the rest of the contract? Or is it just another means, along with all the 
other terms of the contract, of delimiting the extent of the obligations undertaken 
by the agreement? 
 
4.6.1 Defence or definition122 
 
 The real issue, then, is whether an exclusion clause operates simply as 
defence breaches of the obligations of the contract, as determined apart from the 
exclusion clause, or whether the clause has a part to play in defining those 
obligations in the first place. 
 
 The conventional view has been that an exclusion clause operates as a 
shield to a claim for damages or repudiation. The duties of the promisor are 
ascertained by construing the contract in ignorance of the exclusion and where 
there has been a failure to perform one or more of those duties, regarding that as 
a breach. 
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 The function of the exclusion clause is, then, to bar a claim based on a 
such a breach. This view was put buy Denning L.J. is Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. V 
Wallis 123 
 
 “The thing to do is to look at the contract apart from the exempting clauses 
and see what are the terms, expresses or implied, which impose an obligation on 
the party.”124 
 
 There is of course, a grave illogicality in such approach. Why should it be 
that one clause of the contract should be ignored when construing the rest of the 
contractual document and then that ignored clause itself be given separate 
construction? Taken in to its logical conclusion, it could result in a situation in 
which, viewing the contract apart from the exclusion, the parties have created 
valid contractual rights and duties, and yet a construction of a separate exclusion 
clause renders those rights and duties unenforceable.  
 
 For example, suppose a seller contracts to sell a blue G.T.Brooklands 
2000 special motor car, but provides in the written sale agreement that he 
accepts no responsibility whatsoever if the vehicle should be of a different colour, 
model, make and engine capacity and any statements made by the seller as to 
these matters are not intended to be, and should not be, relied upon by the 
buyer. There seems little logic in a court holding that the seller had promised to 
deliver a blue G.T. Brookhands 200 special but that if he delivered a green 
Boneshaker 1500 he would not be liable because the exclusion provided a 
defence. The simple fact is that the seller has promised nothing at all in respect 
of colour, model, make and engine-capacity. He has merely promised to deliver 
“a car “.125 
 
 On this analysis, it is possible to deal with some exclusion clauses in a 
totally different way. A clause drafted in exceptionally wide terms would not just 
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be struck out as repugnant to the contract, leaving all the other terms standing 
and enforceable on both sides.126 
 
 Instead it would be seen as a “bargain” in which one party had agreed to 
be bound to his side while the other party had promised to do nothing whatever. 
It thus becomes clear that what has been concluded is not a contract at all since 
party provides no consideration. It is simply as arrangement at will. To use the 
words of Lord Willberforce in the Susse Atlantique case. 127 
 
 “ one may safely say that the parties can not , in a contract, have 
contemplated that the clause should have so wide an ambit as in effect to 
deprive one party’s stipulations of all contractual force : to do so would be to 
reduce the contract to a mere declaration of intend.” 
 
 In extreme cases of this sort, this has always been the attitude of the 
courts. For instance, unconditional covenants not to sue are taken as a release. 
128 
 
 Until quite recently, however, the judicial attitude towards the function of 
exclusion clauses in the majority of contracts, where the illusory nature of the 
promises given was not so apparent, has been to treat them simply as 
prophylactics, purporting to protect the profaners from the legal consequences of 
breach of duties otherwise arising under the contract. There is now some 
evidence of a judicial change of heart. 
 
 In addition to the passage from the speech of Lord Willberforce in the 
Susse Atlantique case quoted above, there are other examples in which judges 
have been prepared to view exclusion clauses as having a more positive role in 
the initial formulation of the contractual undertakings given.  
 
In Kenyen, son & Craven v Baxter Hoare & Co. 129 
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 “ Protective conditions are of three distinct types, namely, first, those 
which limit or reduce what would otherwise be the defendants duty; second, 
those which exclude the defendant’s liability for breach of specified aspects of 
that duty; and third, those which limit the extent to which the defendant is bound 
to indemnify the plaintiff in respect of the consequences of breaches of duty. A 
condition which provided that a warehouseman should be under no obligation to 
take greater care of perishable goods than was appropriate to imperishable 
goods would constitute a good example of a first category of protective 
conditions. If, in such case, the warehouseman takes such care of perishable 
goods as would be appropriate has they been imperishable , and damage 
results, he will escape liability not because the clause exempts his from liability 
for breach of contract.... but because there has been no breach of contract.”  
 
 Donaldson J. describes such a clause as “a distinct type” rather then citing 
it as an “example” of judicial construction. 
 
 There seems, given that the first two categories are “distinct types” , little 
difference between them in result. An exclusion of liability for breach of duty is 
simply another way of limiting the duty itself. 
 
 This point was made a year later by Kerr.J. in Trade and Transport Inc. V 
Line Kaium Kaisha. 130 The rather complex facts of this case turned on whether 
the owners of a vessel could terminate the charter on the ground of the failure, by 
the chatterers, to produce a cargo before the expiry of a frustrating time, 
notwithstanding the existence in the charter party of a clause excepting the 
chatterers from liability for failure to provide a cargo in certain specified 
circumstances including unavoidable hindrance. 
  
Although Kerr.J’s judgement refers extensively to the doctrine of 
fundamental breach, it is worth setting out his analysis at length, since it explains, 
succinctly, the point that is here being argued. 
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  Here, then Kerr.J. Displays a willingness to define the extent of the 
chatterer’s obligation to load and clause 2 together; that is regarding the 
exclusion clause as a negative way of defining the promises in the contract. 
 
 The validity of such an approach has recently been confirmed by the 
speech of Lord Diplock in Photo Production Ltd. V Securior Transport Ltd. 131 In 
that case Lord Willberforce (at pp. 852-843) and Lord Doplock (at p.850), though 
for different reasons, suggest that where the effect of the clause is to relieve the 
profaners from any obligation to perform at all ( or, if the clause is regarded 
merely as a defence, to absolve from liability for a total failure of consideration) 
the value of the promisor’s promise is illusionary and the arrangement is devoid 
of contractual content. 132 
 
 In some cases this may be a legitimate conclusion. In others, the clause 
may have quite a different effect, operating at the logically prior stage at which 
primary obligation are created, even so as to define or modify them ab-initio 
rather then to vary any secondary duty to compensate for their breach.133 
 
 This “definitional” approach will clearly have an effect upon the way in 
which exclusion clauses themselves are constructed as part of the terms setting 
out the primary undertakings of the contract and, although there is already in 
existence an impressive array of interpretative devices for containing exemption 
clauses. 134 the justification for their rigorous imposition is, in some measure, 
reduced. 
 
 There is no reason why exclusion clauses should be subject to different 
rules of construction from any other terms of contract. This view, however, which 
is a logical extension of the “definitional” approach, has yet to receive judicial 
acceptance and hence there is still a need to examine these “interpretative 
devices” that have been brought to points of high refinement by the courts in their 
endeavors to contains exclusion and limitation clauses within reasonable bounds.  
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4.6.2 Interpretative devices 
 
(A) Strict Interpretation of the Clause 
 
 In order to gain exemption from a legal liability under a contract, it is 
necessary for a person to use the clearest possible words (per scrutton L.J. in 
Alison (J. Gardon) Ltd. V Wallsend Shipway and Engineering Co. Ltd. 135 The 
clause must exactly cover the liability which is sought to exclude.136 So, a clause 
excluding liability for breach of warranty will not cover a beach of condition, and 
this will be so even where the term broken, although a condition , is treated as a 
breach of warranty by virtue of acceptance.137 
 
 Further exclusion of implied conditions and warranties will not exclude an 
express term. 138 nor will a clause excluding liability for “ latent defects” to be 
construed as excluding the implied condition as to fitness for purpose under 
section 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.139 The same strictness of 
interpretation is applied to indemnity clauses as to clauses that more obviously 
apply exclusions and limitations. 140 
 
 To be effective, therefore, it is necessary for the clause on its true 
construction, to cover exactly the event which has occurred. 
 
 A useful illustrations of this principle, may be found in a case decided 
under what is now section 15 of The Sale of Goods Act 1979, which deals with 
the conditions to be implied on a sale of goods by sample where a sale is by 
sample are implied into contract to the effect that : 
(a) The bulk shall correspond to the sample in quality 
(b) The buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with 
the sample and  
(c) The goods shall be free from any defect rendering them un-merchantable, 
which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample. 
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Whether or not the goods are un-merchantable is to be judged by the 
reference to the statutory test of merchantable quality in section 14(6) although at 
the time the case about to be considered was decided, the test of merchantable 
quality was a matter for the common law.   
 
 Further under section 13(2), where there is a sale by sample as well as by 
description, it is an implied condition of the contract of sale that the goods 
correspond both with the sample and with the description. 
 
 In Nichol v Godts (1854) 10 Exch.191, the seller sold “foreign refined rape 
oil, warranted only equal to sample.” They delivered oil which did not answer the 
description of foreign refined rape oil, and was not equal to sample in quality. It 
was held that the exclusion clause only related to quality; so that while it might 
have excluded the condition now implied by section 15(2) (c) , it could not be 
construed so s additionally to excuse the sellers from their duty to supply goods 
answering the contract description. 
 
 Similarly a contract that the goods are to be supplied “with all faults” will 
not assist a seller in a non-consumer contract who supplies a bulk not 
corresponding with the sample, although it might be effective to exclude the 
condition implied by section 15(2) (c). 
 
 Any clause, then, will be given to the narrowest possible scope consistent 
with the intention of the parties. Indeed, the courts may even, on occasion, ignore 
the obvious intention of a contractual document and adopt a construction even 
more unfavourable to the preferences. 141 
 
 This has the consequence for example, than an express warranty will be 
considered to have been given in addition to (and not in lieu of) any implied 
warranties, unless there are indications to the contrary. This was the rule at 
common law.142 and now has statutory affect by virtue of section 55(2) of the 
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Sale of Goods Act 1979. On this basis a guarantee or undertaking in a factory, 
warranty would not oust the implied conditions of merchantability and fitness for 
purpose otherwise applicable.143 
 
 Under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 the operation of exclusion 
clauses in guarantees is closely controlled. 144 
 
 Section 5 provides that any contract term or notice contained in a 
guarantee of goods will be of no effect in so far as it purports to exclude liability 
for certain loss or damage To come within the section, the loss or damage for 
which the guarantee aims at excluding liability must be such as arises from the 
goods proving to be defective while in consumer use, and must also result from 
the negligence of a person concerned in the manufacture or distribution of goods. 
 
 Manufacturers ( Donoghue v Stenvenson) 145 and distributors ( Fisher v 
Harrods Ltd.) 146 are potentially liable to the ultimate “consumer” of the product if 
they fail to observe the standard of care in the manufacture, storage, assembly or 
distribution of the product which is reasonably expect of them.  
 
Section 5 (2) provides that “anything in writing is a guarantee if it contains 
or purports to contain some promise or assurance (however worded or 
presented) that defects will be made good by complete or partial replacement, or 
by repair, monetary compensation or otherwise.” 
 
 Where the exclusion clause is not in the form of a guarantee, but simply in 
the form of a notice or warning that damage might result, eg. a notice that the 
goods may cause injury, that notice will not, by itself, be sufficient to indicate the 
voluntary acceptance of any risk for the purpose of the principle of volenti non-fit 
injuria, even when the notice is agreed to S.2(3). 
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 The liability of manufacturers and retailers in negligence for damage 
caused during use of the goods almost certainly extends to personal injury, or 
damage to another property, and not to losses incurred solely on account of the 
goods being defective (i.e. damage to the defective article itself) although the 
matter is not entirely free from doubt. 
 
 This problem would not, of course, have arisen if the exclusions in the 
guarantee had, instead (but subject to section 2(1)), been made subject to the 
doctrine of reasonableness. 
 
(B) The Contra-Proferentem rule. 147 
 
 If there is any ambiguity as to the meaning and scope of the words used in 
a clause excluding or limiting liability, the doubt is resolved by constructing them 
against the party who has inserted them and who is now relying on them, and in 
favour of the other party. 
 
 So, in Webster v Hjiggin 148 in the course of negotiating a hire-purchase 
agreement for a second=hand car , the owner’s agent told the hirer that, if he 
took the car, the owner would guarantee that it was in good condition and that he 
would have no trouble with it. The hirer signed a hire-purchase agreement which 
contained this clause:  
 
“ The hirer is deemed to have examined (or caused to be examined) the 
vehicle prior to this agreement and satisfied himself as to its condition, and no 
warranty, condition, description, or representation on the part of the owner to the 
state or quality of the vehicle is given or implied... any statutory or other warranty, 
condition, description, or representation, whether express or implied as to the 
state, quality, fitness of roadworthiness being hereby expressly excluded.” 
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 The vehicle turned out to be, in the words of Lord Greene M.R. (at P.128) 
“nothing but a mass of second-hand and dilapidated ironmongery.” The court of 
Appeal held that the wording of the clause in the hire-purchase agreement was 
not sufficiently clear to abrogate the separate oral collateral agreement 
constituted by the offer of the guarantee and the signing of the hire-purchase 
agreement by the hirer.  
 
 Although the principle is confined to cases of ambiguity the courts are not 
reluctant to discover such ambiguity where to do so would permit them to remove 
the shield of exclusion. 
 
 This to some extent explains why draftsman adopt such apparently 
verbose and convoluted phraseology in producing the modern exclusion clause, 
in an endeavor to avoid any ambiguity. 
 
 For them avoiding it, however, such proximity sometimes creates 
ambiguity149; see the opinion expressed by the members of the First Division of 
the Court of Session in Alisa Craig Fishing Co. V Malvern Fishing Co. 
 
(C) Repugnancy  
 
 One effect of constructing contract, including the exemption clause, as a 
whole, would be the demise of the doctrine of repugnancy i.e. a device which 
permits the court to disregard the exclusion clause on the ground that if is 
repugnant to the main purpose of the contract. Until this view receives wide 
judicial support, however, the repugnancy doctrine is still likely to be canvassed 
before the courts.  
 
 An example is to be found in J. Evans & Son (Portsmouth) v Andrea 
Merzario 150 where a clause purporting to exempt a carrier from liability for 
damage to goods shipped on deck was struck out as being repugnant to a 
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binding oral promise given by the forwarding agents that the goods would be 
stowed in a hold. 
 
(D) Important Terms 
 
 The courts have always taken the view that the very clearest of language 
is necessary to exclude liability for important terms of the contract. That is so 
whether the terms important is to be found and ascertained at the time the 
contract is made or by reference to the seriousness of the consequences at the 
time of the breach. The matter was put succinctly by Lord Willberforce in the 
Suisse Atlantique case.151 
 
 “......it must be questioned of contractual intention whether a particular 
breach is covered (by the exclusion clause) or not and the courts are entitled to 
insist, as they do that the more radical the breach, the clearer must the language 
be if it is to be covered.”152 
 
(E) Liability for Negligence 
 
 In Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing Club 153 Scrutton L.J.said (at P.213) :  
 
 “.....in my view, where the defendant has protection under a contract, it is 
not permissible to disregard the contract and allege a wider liability in tort.” 
 
 However, there is a significant difference between disregarding the 
contract altogether and constructing the contract closely to ascertained whether 
the preference has effectively excluded his tortuous liability by means of 
contracted exemption clauses. While it is possible for a clause to be drafted in 
such a way that it excludes tortuous liability (usually for negligence, though the 
clause be subject to the constraints of the Unfair Contract Terms 1977, S.2(1) (2) 
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the usual attitude of the court is that it is exceedingly unlikely for negligence 
unless the clearest possible terms are used,154 
 
 As a matter of construction 155 the courts have establish that unless 
negligence is the only liability to which the words could apply, general words of 
exclusion will have no application to negligence. So, where the clause is framed 
in general terms, eg. a clause exempting liability “for all damage or for loss or 
damage” it will be first necessary to established whether the head of damage 
complained of could arise both as a result of negligence and of breach of a strict 
contractual duty, or whether it can only arise as a result of negligence.  
 
 If it can only arise as a result of negligence, then a clause in general term 
is more likely to be construed so as to protect against liability for negligence. 
 
 In Alderslade v Hendon Laundry Ltd. 156 the plaintiff sent some 
handkerchiefs to the defendant’s laundry which limited to their liability “for a lost 
or damaged article” to “twenty times the charge made for laundering.” The 
handkerchiefs were lost. The question arose as to which particular head of 
damage the limitation as to “lost or damaged” articles related. The court of 
appeal held that the only duty in relation to the safe custody of the handkerchiefs 
was that the laundry undertook to take reasonable care of them that is not to be 
negligent. So, if the handkerchiefs were lost, the only possible ground upon 
which the laundry could be held liable was that of negligent, since that was the 
only possible ground of liability for loss.    
 
 Everything ultimately depends upon the wording of the clause. Although 
liability for negligence may not be excluded in the absence of “very clear words” 
a widely drawn clause may produce this effect without referring to negligence 
upon which the profaners might be liable. If liability for negligence is excluded 
successfully, the injured party has no right of action for negligence either in 
contract or in tort.  
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 However the sole obligation is to exercise reasonable care the clause 
should, if it is to be effective, indicates that it is intended to exclude liability in all 
circumstances, including negligence. Otherwise, is may be constructed as a 
simple warning that the preferences will not be liable in the absence of 
negligence.  
 
 Being question on construction it will not inevitably be the case that if the 
only possible liability of the party pleading the exemption is liable for negligence, 
the clause is bound to be effective. 
 
 The operation of this dictum is illustrated by the decision in White v John 
Warwick & Co. Ltd. 157 The plaintiff who has hired a bicycle from the defendants 
was injured when the saddle tipped and threw him into the road. The plaintiff 
sued the defendants alternatively for breach of contract and in tort for negligence, 
and was met by an exclusion clause in the hire document to the effect that 
“nothing in this agreement shall render the owners liable for any personal injuries 
to the riders of the machine hired.” It was clear that damages could be claimed 
by the plaintiff, either on the ground of negligence, or for breach of the strict 
contractual duty to supply a machine that was reasonably fit for the purpose 
required.  
 
 The Court of Appeal held that the exemption clause only protected the 
defendants against strict liability (which was the liability in contract) and not 
against breach of the duty of care in tort.158 
 
 Under such a principle it is simply more likely than not that a clause will be 
held to exclude strict liability for negligence as well where for instance, it is 
constructed as an indemnity clause.159 
 
 Where a specific and precise words of exclusion, as opposed to general 
words, are used, which make it clear that the clause is intended to exempt the 
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person relying on it from liability in negligence, then effect must be given to it. 
Such words are, “will not be liable for any damage howsoever caused,” or “will 
not in any circumstances be responsible, 160 or”shall be indemnified against all 
claims and demands whatsoever”,161 or  “all merchandise is expressly accepted 
at owner’s risk.” 162 have all been held to indicate a clear intention to exclude 
liability for negligence. 
 
 In Rutter v/s. Palmer,163, the plaintiff left his car at the defendants garage 
for sale on terms that “customers’ cars are driven by our servants at customer’s 
sole risk.” The car was being driven. One of the defendants employees when it 
was involved in a collision and damaged. It was held that the clause effectively 
placed the risk of negligence on the plaintiff and his claim for damages failed. 
  
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 contains, provisions controlling to 
exclude liability for negligence. The Act’s provisions in this regard do not apply to 
things done or omitted otherwise that by a person in the course of a business or 
as occupier of premises for business purposes (s.1(3)), so in other “domestic” 
situations the common law rules are intended to apply. 
  
It does not cover any stricter duty, so there is no control under these 
provisions over exemptions from liability for breach of such duties as that 
imposed under Rylands v/s. Fletcher.164 Of course, if the facts which give rise to 
liability in negligence the clause exempting liability will come under control to the 
extent that it is relied upon to exclude or restrict liability for negligence. 
 
4.6.3 GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTUAL 
TERMS165 
 In addition to the special rules of construction so far considered, there are 
certain general principle of contractual construction that as apply as much to 
exclusion clauses as to other written terms of the contract, although, as applied 
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to exclusion, it is likely that they will generally be used by the courts to cut down 
the scope of a clause, not increase it. 
 
A. PLAIN MEANING: 
Words in a written contract will be given their plain and literal meaning, 
unless evidence is specifically added to show that the words are to be 
understood in some technical or special sense. The rule may not be applied 
where it would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the 
agreement.166 
 
B. UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT: 
Where the words are used that are capable of two meanings, the court will 
give to them the construction which will make the instrument valid rather than 
void.167 If, however, having adopted a valid construction, there is still further 
ambiguity, this will be construed contra proferentem.168 
 
C. EXPRESSIO UNIS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS 
 Where the written contract makes express mention of a certain thing, it will 
automatically exclude any other thing of a similar nature. So that, while use of 
general words such as “all the fixtures and fittings therein,” will include all the 
fixtures and fittings are instead enumerated in the document, all those not 
specifically, all those not specifically mentioned will not be included.169 
 
D. THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE 
 
 Where general words follow an enumeration of particulars, those 
general words must be limited by reference to the preceding particular 
enumeration, and be constructed as including only all other articles, acts or 
events of the like nature and quality. So where an exclusion clause in a charter 
party relieved the carrier from liability to deliver if prevented through “war, 
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disturbance, or any other cause,” it was held that the words, “any other cause” 
must be restricted to events of the same kind as war and disturbance and would 
not therefore, cover delay caused by ice.170  
 
However, this rule of construction is not invariably applied and is, indeed, 
rarely applied in commercial agreements. 
 
In Henry Boot Construction Ltd. v/s. Central Lancahire New Town 
Development Corporation.171 The contractors contracted to build a large number 
of dwelling houses, together with ancilliary work, for the employers. In connection 
with that work three statutory undertakers performed the work of laying the 
necessary mains for electricity, water and gas. The contractors, who were 
delayed in the building of the dwellings, alleged that the delay was caused by the 
failure of the statutory undertakers to complete their works with due expedition, 
and therefore claimed to be relieved from the penalties imposed upon them by 
the contract for delay, and additional payments which the contract permitted the 
contractors to claim where they suffered loss as a result of delay which was not 
their fault. The rectitude or otherwise of this claim under the contract is not 
material to the present discussion but, in course of reaching his decision, the 
judge was required to decide whether the phrase “artists, tradesmen or others 
engaged by [the contractors] in executing work not forming part of this contract.” 
included the statutory undertakers. Judge Fry Q.C. (sitting as a deputy High 
Court Judge) said (at pp. 14-15): 
 
 “On the face of it, and approaching it literally, the words are plain enough. 
An artist is an artist. A tradesman is clearly not the tradesman who calls at the 
house or keeps a shop. He is the tradesman of the building industry, the skilled 
worker. ‘Others’ is a word plain enough in the English language, and literally, it 
seems to me, that although the phrase employs a strange collection of words, on 
the face of it and to anyone but a lawyer it would present little difficulty. But of 
course the lawyer sees a phrase of this kind and immediately thinks of the 
 147
doctrine of ejusdem generis, and asks himself whether ‘the others,’ the general 
words following the specific words ‘artist and tradesmen’ ought to be cutdown in 
order to limit the apparent generality of the word “others” to persons ejusdem 
generis with ‘artists and tradesman’ fall into [counsel] suggested that it is the 
category of some minor skilled ancillary worker….they may be. It is not a very 
lengthy phrase to have to interpret to find the category….and I am disposed to 
think that if a category has to be found that may be right, but I ask myself does 
the ejusdem generis rule apply? The rule is ordinarily applied in the case of 
deeds, wills and statutes. It is of less force when one is dealing with a contract, 
and of still less force when dealing with a commercial contract…..the argument 
that ‘artists and tradesmen’ would be surplus age if ‘others’ means ‘anybody has 
little value in a commercial document. They may be regarded as intrusive or 
having got there by some historical course which has now been forgotten as the 
[J.C.T. Local Authorities Building Works Standard Form] has been redrafted from 
time to time. 
 Looking at the whole of this contract, I reach the conclusion that the 
ejusdem generis rule does not apply to this phrase, and there is no doubt that a 
statutory body corporate is a person for the purposes of interpretation, and it 
seems to me that the operation of the statutory undertakers in the case therefore 
fall within the description of work being done by artists, tradesman or others.” 
 
4.7 Some special exclusion clauses 
 
A. “With all faults” 
 Where the phrase “with all faults” has been employed, or some equivalent, 
the view seems to be that this relates to merchantability (or satisfactory quality, in 
its latest formulation) or fitness for purpose, and does not offset the duty to 
supply which correspond with their description, this being the core of the 
contract. In Shepherd v Kain, 177 there was a sale of a “copper-fastened vessel,” 
this being sold “with all faults, without allowance for any defect whatsoever”. The 
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court held that this did not suffice to protect the seller where what was delivered 
was not even a copper-fastened vessel. 
B. Excluding or limiting the damages recoverable 
 Where a clause provides for a precise sum to be recovered by way of 
damages in the event of a breach, that a clause will be enforceable if it is a 
genuine pre-estimate of the likely loss; but it will be ineffective if is a penalty 
clause and was inserted in terrorem, as an intended punishment in the event of 
breach.178 On the other hand, a clause which places an upper limit on the 
damages recoverable (such as £- X 1,000 or 20 times the contract price) while 
still to be construed contra proferentem will not be constructed quite as strictly as 
an exclusion clause properly so-called. This was made clear by the House of 
Lords in Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd. 179 According to 
Lord Wilberforce: 
“Clause of limitation are not regarded by the courts with the same hostility 
as clauses of exclusion: this is because they must be related to other 
contractual terms, in particular to the risks to which the defending party may 
be exposed, the remuneration which he receives, and possibly also the 
opportunity of the other party to insure.”180 
Since it is not entirely clear why such considerations are not relevant when 
considering clauses of exclusion, perhaps more weight should be given to Lord 
Fraser’s explanation for a more sympathetic view of limitations clauses. 
In this case, there was also the special factor that, as a contract clause itself 
made clear, the potential losses which could derive from negligence were great 
in relation to the sum that could be charged by the proferens for its services.181 
Where the clause excludes any right to damages, the tendency is to restrict 
it, if possible, to minor matters, or to limiting its effect to forbidding rejection or to 
confining a buyer to claiming a return of the purchase price and nothing beyond. 
It does seem, however, that of the clause clearly applies to a contractual duty, it 
will be effective to deny a party any claim to damages.182 
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C. Consequential loss 
 Where there is in a contract an exclusion of liability for “consequential” 
loss or damage, the courts have held that it embraces only loss or damage not 
resulting directly or naturally from the breach of contract.183 More specific 
guidance has been provided in British Sugar plc v NEI Power Projects Ltd 184 
where the relevant clause provided that: 
“The seller will be liable for any loss damage cost or expense incurred by the 
purchaser arising form the supply of any such faulty goods or materials or any 
goods or materials not being suitable for the purpose for which they are 
required save that the seller’s liability for consequential loss is limited to the 
value of the contract.” 
 
In BHP Petroleum Ltd v British Steel plc,185 a clause ran: 
“Neither the supplier nor the purchaser shall bear any liability to the other 
(and each party hereby agrees to indemnify the party relying on this 
provision) for loss of production, loss of profits, loss of business or any other 
indirect losses or consequential damages arising during and/or as a result of 
the performance or non-performance of this contract regard less of the cause 
thereof but not limited to the negligence of the party seeking to rely on this 
provision.” 
 
The court ruled that the clause was to be interpreted as though it read “for 
loss of production, loss of profits, loss of business or indirect or consequential 
losses of any other kind”. A defective pipeline had been supplied, and part of the 
claim related to deferral of production. The court said that such a claim was for 
loss of production or loss of profits or business and, as such, was excluded by 
the clause. 
 
In Leicester Circuits Ltd v Coates Bros plc, 186 a clause excluded liability for 
“consequential or incidental damage of any kind whatsoever…including without 
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limitation any indirect loss or damage such as operating loss, loss of clientele…” 
This was held not to exclude liability for loss of profit since, in the circumstances 
of the case, this would have been within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties and hence within the first limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale.187  
 
D. Imposing time limits 
 Clauses which require proceedings to be commenced, or defects to be 
notified, within a certain time are interpreted strictly. In Atlantic Shipping and 
Trading v Louis Dreyfus & Co, 188 a clause in a charter party required a claim to 
be made, and an arbitrator appointed, within three months of final discharge. This 
was held only to apply to the express terms of the contract and not to those 
implied by law. It has been maintained that there is: 
 
“no reason why [such clauses] should not be drafted so as to apply to even 
the most serious breaches, for (unless the period is so short that they 
effectively bar a right altogether) they do not exclude liability, they simply 
require that buyers take vigilant steps to finalize the transaction.” 
 
 
E. Excluding the right to reject 
Where clauses purport to exclude an otherwise existing right to reject the 
goods, it is clear enough that they do not of themselves exclude the right to 
damages.189 Since the right to reject does not exist in relation to a breach of 
warranty, it is supposed that the effect of such clauses is to indicate that the 
terms to which they apply are warranties, not conditions. This is supported by Re 
Walkers, Winser & Hamm and Shaw,190 in which such a clause was said to 
prevent and implied condition arising, and to render it a warranty instead. 
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F. Relevance of contract description 
 
 It seems to be established that certain exclusion clauses only operate 
where goods of the contract description have been supplied. A clause excluding 
the right to reject the goods “herein specified” is effective only when the goods 
“herein specified” have in fact been supplied, but not when the goods do not 
conform with their description. In Aron & Co v Comptoir Wegimont,191 the clause 
ran: “whatever the difference of the shipment may be in value from the grade, 
type or description specified, it is understood that any such question shall not 
entitle the buyer to reject the delivery….”. It was held that the terms as to 
shipment were independent and not part of the description so that rejection was 
still allowed. 
 
G.  Arbitration 
The Arbitration Act 1996, provides that the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations shall apply to a term which constitutes an “arbitration 
agreement”.192 This is a reference to “an agreement to submit to arbitration 
present or future disputes or difference (whether or not contractual)”.193 Section 
91 of the Act says that an agreement is unfair for the purposes of the Regulations 
so far as it relates to a claim for a pecuniary remedy which does not exceed a 
specified amount, currently £ 5,000.194 
 
H. Acknowledgment and declarations of non-reliance 
 In Lowe v Lombank,195 a clause in a hire purchase contract contained an 
acknowledgement that the goods were examined, found to be free of defects and 
to be of merchantable quality. It also contained an acknowledgment that the 
particular purpose for which the goods were wanted had not been revealed to the 
owner. Such clauses will not be conclusive, unless genuinely representing the 
intention of the parties. An estoppel might arise against the buyer or hirer, 
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however, even where he had not examined the goods, provided the seller 
thought on reasonable grounds that he had.196 
 
4.8 Exemption clauses and Third parties. 
 Questions can, and frequently do, arise as to whether an exclusion clause 
can operate to protect a person who is not a party to the contract. This is an 
issue which needs to he examined both in relation to the common law, and as 
the latter has been affected by the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
 
A. The common law 
 
 The basic rule is that the notion of privity of contract prevents non-parties 
form receiving any benefits or burdens which might be terms of an agreement 
made between others. In Adler v Dickson,197 a ticket for a sea voyage contained 
terms exempting the shipping company from liability. One such term provided 
that “the company will not be responsible for any injury whatsoever…arising from 
or occasioned by the negligence of the company’s servants”. The claimant, 
having fallen from the gangway, brought an action against the master and 
boatswain. The Court of Appeal held that reliance could not be placed on the 
exclusion clause because, on its true construction, it did not purport to offer 
exemption to these parties. If the clause had on such a construction extended to 
the master and boatswain, a majority of the court were still prepared to hold it 
unavailing. The “company’s servants”, declared Jenkins L.J., are not parties to 
the contract. 198 
 A similar finding was made in Cosgrove v Horsfall.199 The claimant had a 
free pass for buses run by the London Passenger Transport Board, of which he 
was an employee. The terms of the pass were that neither the Board nor their 
servants were to be liable to the holder for injuries however caused. The claimant 
suffered personal injuries as the result of the negligence of the defendant bus 
driver whom he sued personally. The Court of Appeal held the driver liable. He 
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could not claim the benefit of the exemption clause as he was not a party to the 
contract. 
 
 This strict view eventually received endorsement by the House of Lords in 
Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd.200 A contract for the carriage of drum 
chemicals from the US to the UK contained a clause limiting the liability of the 
carriers. When the chemicals were being unloaded, they were damaged through 
the negligence of a firm of stevedores who were employed by the carriers. Lord 
Denning considered that the appellant stevedores could claim the benefit of the 
exclusion clause since the respondents, the consignees, had assented to the 
limitation of liability; but this was a dissenting judgement. The majority held that 
the appellants could not claim the benefit of an exclusion clause when they were 
not parties to the contract. 
 
Although “I may regret it,” said Lord Reid: 
 
“I find it impossible to deny the existence of the general rule that a stranger to 
a contract cannot in a question with either of the contracting parties take 
advantage of provisions of the contract, even when it is clear from the 
contract that some provision in it was intended to benefit him.”201 
 
 It has been suggested that there are two ways that the strictness of these 
decisions might be avoided. The first suggestion is that use be made of the 
concept of agency. The second suggestion relates to an implied contract. In 
Pyrene Co v Scindia Navigation Co,202 the claimants in England sold goods to 
parties in India. The latter agreed with the defendants for the carriage of the 
goods to India. The contract of carriage limited liability to £200. The goods were 
damaged because of the defendants’ negligence. The claimants sued the 
defendants for £900. Devlin J. held that the claimants were bound by the clause. 
Although not parties to the contract, they were entitled to its benefits and so must 
also accept its burdens. Viscount Simonds later said that the decision could be 
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supported “only upon the facts of the case, which may well have justified the 
implication of a contract between the parties”.203 As Anson says, the implied 
contract was that all three parties intended the claimants to participate in the 
contract of carriage.204 
 
 In addition to such methods of avoiding the decision of the House of 
Lords, yet other authors have pointed to shortcomings in the judgment itself.205 In 
particular, the Law Lords relied on overseas decisions which really rested on the 
basis that the clauses were inappropriately worded, rather than the clauses did 
not extended to third parties.206 
 
 Most importantly, the decision, say these authors is “not easy to reconcile 
with the earlier decision”,207 that in Elder Dempster & Co v Patterson Zockonis & 
Co.208 Charterers had agreed to carry oil from West Africa to England. They 
chartered a vessel for this purpose. The bills of lading, made between the 
claimants and the charterers, contained a term purporting to protect both 
charterers and shipowners from claims arising out of bad stowage. When the oil 
was lost because of such stowage, the claimants sued both charterers and 
shipowners.  
 
It was held by the House of Lords that both parties were protected by the 
clause. Precisely why the House thought this to be so is unclear. Indeed, in 
Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd, no attempt to uncover the ratio was made 
in view of its very obscurity.209 Anson states that the most likely ratio appears to 
be that there was an implied contract between claimants and shipowners, the 
terms of which incorporated the exclusions and limitations contained in the bill of 
lading.210 
  
An alternative view was that of vicarious immunity, enunciated by Viscount 
Cave. This approach was to the effect that agents are entitled to any immunity 
conferred on their principals, and that this applied to the shipowners since they 
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took possession on behalf of, and as agents of, the charterers.211 Certainly, this 
line appealed to Scrutton L.J., not the least because he had enunciated this 
opinion in the Court of Appeal in this case,212 and which he later repeated, citing 
the decision of the House of Lords, in Mersey Shipping and Transport Co v Rea 
Ltd.213 Where there is a contract, he said, “which contains an exemption clause, 
the servants or agents who act under the contract have the benefit of the 
exemption clause…they can claim the protection of the contract made with their 
employers on whose behalf they are acting”.214 
  
This particular approach cannot be said to have survived Scruttons Ltd v 
Mid and Silicones Ltd. Even so, it now appears that the courts will strive to bring 
third parties within exclusion clauses and so bring the law closer to the 
commercial realities of the situation. 
  
In Herrick v Leonard & Dingley Ltd,215 McMullin J. distinguished the 
opinion of the Privy Council in that the document before him did not purport to 
include independent contractors, such as the defendant stevedores; and the 
stevedores had neither authorized nor ratified any attempt by the carrier to limit 
the former’s liability to the claimant cargo owner.  
 
Again, in The Suleyman Stalskiy,216 Schultz J. pointed out that in the case 
before the Privy Council the authority of the carrier to contract as agent of the 
stevedore was admitted, whereas it was not in the case before him. It has also 
been suggested that a stevedore who is ignorant of the terms of the bill of lading 
until after unloading the goods should not be capable of ratifying a contract made 
on its behalf by the carrier. In the Privy Council case, the stevedore received the 
bill two weeks prior to unloading: the stevedore was also the owner of the carrier 
and habitually did the latter’s stevedoring work. A reviewer has thus argued that 
the opinion of the Privy Council was given on a case resting on an “occasional, 
and unusual, fact situation”.217 It is still thought the better view, however, to 
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regard the wish of the courts to accord with commercial realities, and hence to 
give effect to exclusion clauses, as having the upper hand. 
 
B. Statute law 
 The position above described has been considerably affected by the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.218 Section 1 provides that the Act 
applies in relation to a third party in two cases: where the contract itself expressly 
so provides; or the relevant term purports to confer a benefit on a third party. 
Section 1(2) further provides, however, that this latter will not apply if, on a true 
construction of the contract, it appears that the contracting parties did not intend 
the third party to have the right to enforce the term. Section1(3) provides, as a 
condition for the Act to apply to third parties, that the third party must be 
expressly identified by name, class or description, but that the third party need 
not be in existence when the contract is made.219 This could, for example, allow 
the Act to apply to a company yet to be incorporated. 
 
C. Application to exclusion clauses 
 Thus far, the Act would not appear to apply to exclusion clauses, but this 
position is made good by s. 1 (6): 
 
“Where a term of a contract excludes or limits liability in relation to any matter 
references in this Act to the third party enforcing the term shall be construed 
as references to his availing himself of the exclusion or limitation.” 
 
 This will, for instance, allow a term of a contract excluding or limiting 
liability for negligence, and which expressly states that the limitation or exclusion 
is for the benefit of the other party’s “agents or servants or sub-contractors” to be  
enforced by such groups. 
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 A third party cannot lose the rights otherwise made available by the Act, 
unless, in accordance with s.2, the contract is varied with his consent. This is 
subject to there being an express term in the contract to the effect that such 
consent is not needed, or that consent is to be required in specified 
circumstances different to those set out in s.2(1). This latter is a references to the 
following: 
(a) the third party has communicated his assent to the term to the promisor; 
(b) the promisor is aware that the third party has relied on the term; or 
(c) the promisor can reasonably be expected to have foreseen that the third 
party would rely on the term and the third party has in fact relied on it. 
 
Section 3 of the Act enables the promisor, in any claim by a third party, to rely 
on any defence or set-off arising out of the contract and relevant to the particular 
term, which would have been available had the claim been made by the 
promisee. Section 3(6) makes it clear that this applies also when a third party 
seeks to rely on an exclusion or limitation clause, by providing that: 
 
“where in any proceedings brought against him a third party seeks in reliance 
on section1 to enforce a term of a contract (including, in particular, a term 
purporting to exclude or limit liability), he may not do so if he could not have 
done so (whether by reason of any particular circumstances relating to him or 
otherwise) had he been a party to the contract.” 
 
D. Exemptions form the 1999 Act 
Section 6(1) says that the Act does not apply to contract on a bill of 
exchange, promissory note or other negotiable instrument. There are also 
exemptions in relation to: 
(a) any contract binding on a company and its members under s. 14 of the 
Companies Act 1985;220 
(b) any term of a contract of employment against an employee; 
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(c) any term of a worker’s contract against a worker (including a home 
worker); or 
(d) any term of a relevant contract against an “agency worker”.221  
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Chapter 5 
 
Avoidance and Qualification of Exemption Clauses 
 
5.1 Introduction   
 
In this chapter, we discuss the methods by which the courts seek to 
avoid giving full effect to exclusion clauses, notwithstanding that the clauses 
has been incorporated into the contract and is apt to covet the damage which 
has occurred. 
 
5.2 Onus of proof   
 
           In Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Clearing Co,1 the terms of a contract 
for the clearing of the carpet contained a clause reading “All merchandise is 
expressly accepted at the owner’s risk”. The carpet was lost, presumably 
stolen. The defendants, pointing to the exclusion clause, argued that it clearly 
covered the case in hand because, on the balance of probabilities, the loss 
was due to their negligence: and that the burden of proof lay on the claimants 
to prove their case that the carpet had been lost because of fundamental 
breach, the later not been covered by the exclusion clause. The court of 
Appeal held unanimously that the burden of proof in this case lay upon the 
defendants. A bailee, Lord Denning M.R. said, must prove all the 
circumstances in which the loss or damages occurred. If no explanation is 
forthcoming, then it is quiet likely that the loss or damage was due to a 
fundamental breach of contract such as theft or delivery to the wrong address. 
The defendants were in the best position to provide an answer and onus of 
proof, which they had failed to discharge, accordingly lay on them.2 
 
This was assented to by Orr L.J. who found that, as a matter both “of 
justice and of common sense”, the burden properly rested on the defendants 
who were “both more likely to know the facts and in a better position to 
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ascertain them than the bailor”.3 Similarly, it was the view of Sir David Cairns 
that “however difficult it may sometimes be for a bailee to prove a negative, he 
is atleast in a better position than the bailor to know happened to the goods 
while in his possession” 4 
 
In reaching this decision, the court had to face certain difficulties 
caused by the decision of an earlier court of Appeal in Hunt & Winterbotham 
V. BRS (Parcels).5 Goods which had been entrusted to a carrier were lost. It 
was held that the carrier could rely on the limitation clause without disproving 
fundamental breach. In Woolmer V. Delmer Price Ltd,6 on the other hand, the 
defendants had agreed to store a fur coat “at customer’s risk”. The coat was 
lost in the way not explained and the defendants were held liable as the duty 
was on them to show that the loss was not due to their fundamental breach. 
 
Some doubt was cast on the correctness of this decision on the Hunt & 
Winterbotham case, although distinguished on the slender ground that it was 
a case of deposit not carriage.7 Furthermore, the court there left open the 
possibility that were fundamental breach was specifically pleaded, as most 
significantly it was not in the hunt V. Winterbotham case, the onus falls upon 
the bailee.8 Sir David Cairns found this important in Levis V. Patent Steam 
Carpet Cleaning Co,9 while Lord Denning M.R. and Orr L.J found nothing in 
the hunt & Winterbotham case to prevent them funding as they did. 
 
It is significant that Sir David Cairns drew attention to Lord Denning’s 
remarks In Spurling v. Bradskaw,10 where he said :  
 
“A bailor by pleading and presenting his case properly , can always put 
the burden of proof on the bailee.”11 This, the best answer to the problem, 
is supported by the Treitel: “It may be doubted whether a claimant can 
throw the burden of proof on the defendant by merely pleading 
fundamental breach. The burden might, however, pass to the defendant if 
the claimant could support his allegation by some evidence that the 
defendant might have been guilty of a fundamental breach.”12 This is just 
what happened in the Levinson case.13 
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5.3 Liability for fraud 
 
In Pearson & Son Ltd v. Dublin Corporation,14 Lord Loreburn had said 
that “no one can escape liability for his own fraudulent statements” by 
inserting in a contract a clause that the other party shall not rely on them.15 
Lord Halsbury agreed that “no craft or machinery in the form of contract can 
stop a person who complains that he has been defrauded from having that 
question of fact submitted to a jurry”,16 Lord James adding that: “When the 
fraud succeds, surely those who designed the fraudulent protection cannot 
take advantage of it…. As a general principle I Incline to the view that an 
express term that fraud shall not vitiate a contract would be bad in law.”17 
 
In that case, an action had been brought against the Corporation for 
deceit by its agent in misrepresenting the nature of the works to be 
undertaken under a particular contract. The Corporation had relied on the 
provision in the contract to the effect that the contractor should satisfy itself as 
to the nature of all existing works and all other matters relating to the contract 
works. The House of Lord concluded that the Contract contemplated honesty 
on both the sides, so that the clause relied on could not exclude liability for 
deceit. 
 
In WRM Group Ltd v. Wood,18 however, the Court of Appeal said that this 
case did not establish the proposition that it is not open to the parties to a 
contract to exclude the remedy of set off  in relation to allegedly fraudulent 
misrepresentations. It pointed to Society of Lloyds v. Leighs19 where Savile 
L.J. had said: “We know of no principle of law that should lead us to construe 
the words of the clause so as to exclude from its ambit any claim based or 
allegedly based on fraud.”20 
 
The Pearson Case was subject to further critical analysis by the House of 
Lords in HIH Casualty and General insurance Ltd & ors v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank & ors.21 Lord Bingham said this: 
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“It is clear that the law, on public policy grounds, does not permit a 
contracting party to exclude liability for his own fraud in including the making 
of the contract. The insurers have throughout contended for a similar rule in  
relation to the fraud of agents acting as such. After a very detailed 
examination of such authority  as there is, both the judge…and the Court of 
Appeal….decided against the existence of such a rule. It is true that the ratio 
of the leading authority on the point, S Pearson & Son Ltd v. Dublin 
Corporation, despite the distinction and numerical strength of the House, 
which decided it, is not easy to discern. I do not however think that the 
question need be finally resolved in this case. For it is in my opinion plain 
beyond argument that if a party to the written contract seeks to exclude the 
ordinary consequences of fraudulent of dishonest misrepresentation or deceit 
by his agent, acting as such, including the making of the contract, such 
intention must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms on the face of 
the contract.” 
 
Lord Wilberforce added: “There is no doubt that a party cannot contract 
that he shall be liable for his own fraud” 
 
In Frank Maas (U.K) Ltd v. Samsung Electronics (U.K) Ltd.22 The 
relevant clauses provided: “Company’s Liability howsoever arising and 
notwithstanding that the cause of the loss or damage be unexplained shall not 
exceed….” Further clauses in the contract provided as  follows: 
  
24.  The Company shall perform its duties with a reasonable degree of  
  care, diligence, skill and judgement. 
 
25. The Company shall be relieved of liability for any loss or damage if     
 and to the extent that such loss is caused by: 
(A) Strike, lock-out , stoppage or restrain of labour, the consequences 
whereof the company is unable to avoid by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; 
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(B) Any cause or event which the Company is unable to avoid and the 
consequences whereof the Company is unable to prevent by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.” 
 
The relevant goods were stolen from a warehouse by persons unknown. 
Accepting that the clause had to be construed contra proferentem, the court 
pointed out that Clause 24 covered not just negligence but also willful default. 
It could not possibly be the case that the disputed clause did not have the 
effect of limiting any such liability. To argue the contrary would be “to render 
clause 27A inapplicable in an important, common place respect. As a matter 
of contractual scheme, that seems unlikely”. 
      
It had been argued that “howsoever arising” used in Clause 27A amounted 
to “shorthand” for the bases of liability contemplated under Clause 25. That 
approach was rejected by the Court. Clause25 contained an exhaustive 
statement as to when Mass would be relieved of liability. It did not deal with 
the basis of any liability. It was, the Court said, understandable that Mass 
should be relieved of liability in certain limited circumstances. It did not follow 
from this, though that clause should be restricted likewise. As the Court said, 
if the Clause were co-extensive with Clause 25, it would have no point. It saw 
the scheme of the Contract as contemplating circumstances in which Mass 
would be unable to obtain relief under Clause 25, but could then limit its 
liability under the Clause in question. 
 
The argument had been put to the Court that, if the clause were 
interpreted as covering willfull default on the part of Mass’s employees, then it 
would also cover fraud on the part of Mass itself. The Court replied that, when 
it comes to personal fraud of a party, then, whether as a matter of public 
policy or construction, “Fraud is indeed a thing apart”. So far as concerns 
constructions, even with regard to the invocation of a limitation clause in the 
course of the performance of an otherwise valid contract, the Court said that 
the parties couldnot contemplate that one of them may take advantage of 
personal fraud. The various considerations already discussed (as to risk 
allocation, clarity of language and contexts) which point to the disputed clause 
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extending to Mass vicarious liability for willful default, suggest a different 
conclusion where personal fraud on FM’s part is concerned.23 
 
5.4 Liability for the breach of fiduciary duty   
 
Treitel argues that any attempt by a person under a fiduciary duty to 
contract out of liability for a willful default in that duty would be ineffective.24 
This argument is based on the fact that the promoter of the Company, who is 
under a fiduciary duty not to profit from the promotion without disclosing it, 
cannot contract out of that duty.25 It was, however, held  in  Armitage  v.  
Nurse26 that it was not contrary to public policy for a trustee to exclude liability 
for gross negligence.  
 
5.5 Liability for breach of rules of Natural Justice   
 
Treitel also cites a number of dicta of Lord Denning to the effect that the 
rules of domestic tribunals purporting to oust the rules of natural justice would 
be ineffective.27 Although Treitel offers no comment on this dicta, it is thought 
that Lord Denning’s views are right.28 
 
5.6 Oral undertakings   
 
This method of evading the full impact of exemption clauses can be 
introduced by reference to Couchman v. Hill.29 The catalogue for a sale by 
auction described certain heifers as “unserved”. The document also contained 
an exemption clause, stipulating that “All lots must be taken subject to all 
faults or errors of description (if any) and no compensation will be paid for the 
same”. Similar terms were contained in the conditions of sale exhibited at the 
auction rooms. The Claimant orally requested the defendant to confirm that a 
particular heifer was unserved, which confirmation was duly given. After the 
sale, the heifer was found to be in calf and died as a result of carrying a calf 
too young. It was held that the oral declaration overrode the exemption clause 
that the claimant was entitled to damages.30 
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A similar decision was reached in SS Ardennes (Cargo owners) v. 
Ardennes (owners).31 The Claimants shipped cargo to England from Spain on 
the defendant’s vessel. An oral promise was made by the later to the effect 
that the voyage would be direct to England. The written terms of the bill of 
lading allowed the defendants to reach London “by any route and whether 
directly or indirectly”. In fact, the vessel did not proceed directly to London, 
going instead via Antwerp. It was held that the oral promise was binding.  
 
In both these cases, the oral promises directly contradicted the written 
exemption clauses. It is clear, however that the courts are still prepared to find 
that an exemption clause has been overridden by an oral promise, even 
where that contradiction is not so glaring.  
 
Mendelssohn v. Normand32 sets a good example. The claimant left his 
car at a garage owned by the defendants. An exemption clause disclaimed 
liability for any loss, however caused; it was further provided that the terms of 
the agreement could only be varied if made in writing and signed by the 
management. On the relevant occasion, the attendant told him that the doors 
were not to be locked and that he, the attendant, would lock them himself. He 
did not and the luggage was stolen.  
 
It was held that the attendant’s promise was not within his actual 
authority: It never lay within his ostensible authority, and hence bound his 
employers, the garage owners.33 It was held that this rendered the exemption 
clauses ineffective. The reason was that: 
      
“the oral promise or representation has a decisive influence on the 
transaction- it is the very thing which induces the other to contract and it 
would be most unjust to allow the market to go back on it. The printed 
condition is rejected because it is repugnant to the express oral promise or 
representation”. 34 
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5.7 Misrepresenting the effects of a term.  
 
Where, the full effects of an exclusion clause have been misrepresented, 
that misrepresentation will be effective to qualify the terms of the clause as it 
originally stood. This may be looked upon as a spice of the oral undertakings 
discussed immediately above.   
 
The leading case in Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co.35 The 
claimant took the defendants shop a white satin wedding dress for cleaning. 
She was asked to sign a receipt which contained a clause exempting the 
defendants from all liability for damage to articles cleaned. She was given a 
document which she was asked to sign. She asked for an explanation of its 
contents and was told that it exempted the defendants from certain risks, and 
, in the present instances, from the risk of damage to the beads sequins on 
the dress. The claimant then signed the document, which in fact contained a 
clause exempting the defendants from liability for “any damage how ever 
caused”. When the dress was returned, it was stained, in the subsequent 
action, the defendants placed reliance on this clause. The Court of Appeal 
held that the defendants were liable to damages, and that no regard could be 
placed on the exemption clause. According to Somervell L. J, “owing to the 
misrepresentation the exception never became part of the contract between 
the parties”.36 Denning L.J. made the further point that it was quiet irrelevant 
whether the misrepresentation was innocent or fraudulent.  
 
In L’ Estrange v. Graucob,37 Scrutton L.J. had noted that a signed 
contract was binding on the signatory, regardless of whether he had read its 
terms or not. This the Lord Justice said, applied provided there was no fraud 
or misrepresentation.38 
 
In Dennis Reed v. Goddy, he appeared to take the view that if a person 
believes that a contract contains no exceptional clauses when it does, and the 
other party offers no explanation of the contract, this is tantamount to a 
misrepresentation of the terms.39 In Jacques v. Lloyd D Georage & Partners 
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Lord Denning made it clear that such indeed was his view. If an estate agent, 
he said, seeks to depart from ordinary and well-understood contractual terms, 
he must take care to explain the effect to the client. In the absence of such 
explanations, the estate agent would be precluded form enforcing a term 
which is “unreasonable or oppressive”. 40   
 
It was held in The Strasin,41 that were the typed entry on the face of bills 
of lading was inconsistent with the printed conditions on the back, the typed 
entry should prevail in determining whether bills were owners’ or characters’ 
bills. 
 
5.8 Fundamental terms and fundamental breach  
 
For a number of years, what was virtually substantive rule of law grew up 
to the effect that no exclusion clause was valid where a defendant was in 
fundamental breach of contract, or in a breach of fundamental terms. In 
Karsales (Harrow) v. Wallis,42 Denning L.J regarded it as: 
 
“now settled that exempted clauses of its kind, no matter how widely 
they are expressed, only avail the party when he is carrying out the 
contract in its essential respects… they do not avail him when he is guilty 
of breach which goes to root of the contract….If he has been guilty of a 
breach of those obligations in a respect which goes to the very root of the 
contract, he cannot rely on the exempting clauses.” 43 
 
The effect of such cases, it was said, was that a person in fundamental 
breach of contract could not rely on an exemption clause inserted in a 
contract to protect him.44 The House of Lords, however attempted to 
reinterpret the doctrine of fundamental breach as one of construction, so that 
it should be viewed strictly as an application of the principle that an exclusion 
clause should not, in the absence of clear words, be construed as applying to 
breaches tending to defeat the main purpose of the contract. It was accepted 
though, that, as a matter of drafting, there was no reason why a properly 
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drafted exclusion clause should not apply to some instances of a fundamental 
breach.45 
 
In subsequent cases, however, the Court of Appeal “behaved as if the 
House of Lords had never spoken at all”46 and appeared to reinstate the 
proposition that, as a rule of law, no exclusion clause could offer protection 
against a fundamental breach of contract.47  
 
The House of Lords, however, sought, and it would now appear 
successfully, to reimpose its views that everything depended on the 
construction of the clause in dispute. In Photo Production Ltd v. Securior 
Transport Ltd,48 Lord Wilberforce referred to Lord Denning’s declaration that 
Suisse Atlantique had affirmed the view that: 
 
“when one side has been guilty of fundamental breach of 
contract…and the other side accepts it so that  the contract comes to an 
end…then the guilty party cannot rely on the exception or limitation 
clause to escape from liability for his breach.”49 
 
Suisse Atlantique Societe d’ Armement maritime SA v. NV 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale. Lord Wilberforce replied, was “directly 
opposed” to any such interpretation and the effect of the judgments in that 
case was “to repudiate it”.50 He declared that : - 
 
“He had no second thoughts as to the main propositions that the 
question, whether, and to what extent , an exclusion clause is to he 
applied to a fundamental breach, or to a breach of fundamental term, or 
indeed to any breach of contract, is the matter of construction of a 
contract.”51 
 
These strictures appeared now to have had effect, in Ormsby v. H & H 
Factors Ltd, 52 it was said that attempts had in the past been made to 
“circumvent exemption clauses by the doctrine of fundamental breach. These 
attempts have been laid to rest by the House of Lords,,,”53 In George Mitchell 
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(Chesterhall) Ltd v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd,54 the Court of Appeal accepted 
that the question as to whether an exclusion clause covered a fundamental 
breach was a matter of construction; and in Edmund Murray Ltd v. BSP 
International Foundation Ltd, the Court of Appeal specifically stated that: 
 
“It is always necessary when considering an exemption clause to 
decide whether as a matter of construction it extends to exclude or restrict 
the liability in question, but, if it does, it is no longer permissible at 
common law to reject or circumvent the clause by treating it as 
inapplicable to fundamental breach.”56 
 
It is further more accepted that enactment of the unfair Contract Terms 
Act, 1977 has undermined the need for any separate doctrine relating to 
fundamental breach.57 In what is almost a statutory reversal of the old rule of 
law approach, S.9 of the 1977 Act provides that, where the test of 
reasonableness is to be applied to any term, that term may be given effect 
whether or not the contract has been terminated; nor will affirmation of itself 
affect the applicability of that test. 
 
5.9 Position as to fundamental breach  
 
By discussing such cases, we can conclude that fundamental Breach 
relives the parties from performing their obligation. Such life as there might be 
in the row discredited approach to fundamental breach lies with those cases 
where the clause seeks to allow a party not to perform the contract at all. In 
Suisse Atlantique, Lord Wilberforce said that the parties to a contract cannot 
contemplate so wide and ambit to an exclusion clause as to deprive the 
contract of meaning so reducing it to a “mere declaration of intent”. To that 
extent, he concluded, it may be “correct to say that there is a rule of law 
against the applications of an exception clause to a particular type of 
breach.”58 Lord Diplock also took the view that the parties to the contract were 
free to modify their obligations to whatever degree they choose”within the 
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limits that the agreement must contain the legal characteristics of a 
contract.”59   
 
Reference 
 
1. {1977} 3 All E.R. 498 
2. ibid., at 505 
3. ibid., at 506 
4. ibid., at 508 
5. [1962] 1 All E.R. 111 
6. [1955] 1 All E.R. 377 
7. [1962] 1 All E.R. 111at 115, per Lord Evershed M.R. 
8. ibid., at 119, per Lord Evershed M.R. 
9. [1977] 3 All E.R. 498 at 508 
10. [1956] 2 All E.R. 121. 
11. ibid., at 125. See also [1977] 3 All E.R. 
12. Treitel, Law of Contract(4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell), p. 193. This 
observation is not made in subsequent editions. But see generally 
op.cit. (7th ed.), p.191. 
13. The Levison case was accepted as correctly decided in Euro Cellular 
(Distribution) Plc v Danzas Ltd. [2003] ewhc 3161 (Comm). 
14. [1907] A.C. 351. See too Boyd & Forrest v The Glasgow & South 
Western Railway [1915] S.C. (hl) 20. 
15. ibid., at 353. 
16. ibid., at 356. 
17. ibid., at 362 
18. [1998] C.L.C. 189 
19. [1997] B.C.L.C. 1398. 
20. ibid., at 1407. 
21. [2003] UKHL 6. For earlier reports see: {2002] EWCA Civ 1250; [2001] 
1 All E.R. (Comm.) 719. 
22. [2004] EWHC 1502 (Comm). 
23. See too Granville oil v Davis Turner [2003]  EWCA Civ 570; [2003]  2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 356. 
24. Treitel, op cit., pp. 192-193. 
25. See Gower, Modern Company Law (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell), p.299; 
Gluckstein v Barnes [1900] A.C. 240. 
26. [1998] Ch 241. 
27. Treitel, op cit., p. 193. 
28. See Lord Denning in Lee v Showman’s Guild [1952] 1 All E.R. 1175; 
Edwards v Sogat [1970] 3 All E.R. 689; Enderby Town FC v The FA 
[1971} 1 All E.R. 215. 
29. [1947] 1  All E.R. 103 
30. ibid., at 105, per Scott L.J. 
31. [1950] 2 All E.R.517. 
32. [1969] 2 All E.R. 1215. 
33. ibid., at 1218, per Lord Denning M.R. 
34. ibid., at 1218. 
35. [1951] 1 All E.R. 631. 
 182
36. ibid., at 633. 
37. [1934] 2 K.B. 394. 
38. ibid., at 403. This case is discussed in Ch.1 at p.32. if there has been 
a misrepresentation including a contract, the fact that the printed 
terms and conditions clarify the point does not alter the fact that the 
misrepresentation did induce the making of the contract nor affect the 
remedies available under the Misrepresentation Act 1967: Peekay 
Intermark Ltd and another v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd. [2005] EWHC 830 (Comm). 
39. [1950] 1 All E.R. 919. 
40. [1968] 2 All E.R. 187, CA. The question of reasonableness is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9. See also the discussion of 
Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. V Stilleto Visual Programmes Ltd at 
pp.13-14 above. 
41. [2003] UKHL 12. 
42. [1956] 2 All E.R. 866. 
43. ibid., at 868. 
44. Guest, “Fundamental Breach of Contract” [1916] 77 L.Q.R. 98. Other 
relevant cases include : Yeoman Credit Ltd v Apps [1961] 2 All E.R. 
281 and Charterhouse Credit Ltd. V Tolly [1963] 2 All E.R. 432. 
45. Suisse Atlantique Societe D’Armement  Maritime SA v NV 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1966] 2 All E.R. 61 at 71, 89 and 93, 
respectively, per Lord Reid, Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce 
(hereafter reffered to as Suisse Atlantique). See also UGS v National 
Mortgage Bank of Greece SA [1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 446 at 450, per 
Pearson L.J. 
46. Cheshire, Fifoot and Frumston, Law of Contract (14th ed., Butterworths 
2001), p. 195. 
47. See in particular Mendelssohn v Normand [1969] 2 All E.R. 1215; 
Franworth Finance Facilities Ltd. v Attryde [1970] 2 All E.R. 774; 
Harbuttis “Plasticine” Ltd. v Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 All 
E.R. 225. See also Donaldson J.’s attempt to reconcile these cases 
with the Suisse Atlantique decision in Kenyon Ltd v Baxter Hoare & 
Co. Ltd. [1971] 2 All E.R. 708. 
48. [1980]  1 All E.R. 556. 
49. Harbutt’s “Plasticine” Ltd v Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 All 
E.R. 225 at 235. 
50. [1980] 1 All E.R. 556 at 560. 
51. ibid., at 561. 
52. January 26, 1990, CA. 
53. This was stated by the country court judge in remarks not commented 
on by the Court of Appeal . 
54.  [1983] 1 All E.R. 108. 
55. (1992) 33 Con LR 1. 
56. In Carter v Emin (unreported, February 15, 2001. Mayor,s and City of 
London County Court, the District Judge said that there had been a 
fundamental breach and that the particular exclusion clause would not 
protect the defendants. This appear to refer, however, to his findings 
that the clause was unreasonable, and not that it automatically failed 
to cover such a breach. 
 183
57. See [1980] 1 All E.R. 556 at 564, per Lord Wilberforce. See also 
George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock seeds Ltd [1983] 2 All 
E.R. 737 at 739, per Lord Diplock. 
58. [1966] 2 All E.R. 61. 
59. [1980} 1 All E.R. 556 at 567. 
 183
Chapter-6 
Harsh and Unconscionable Bargains 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
There is a definite, if slender, line of authority (as far as English law is 
concerned) showing that an agreement fairly stigmatized harsh and 
unconscionable may well be declared unenforceable in the courts. Should this 
prove too drastic in the individual case, there is nonetheless a degree of 
precedent, founded principally on certain remarks by Lord Denning, that if an 
individual clause (more often than not an exclusion clause) is unreasonable it 
well be struck down. This is in addition to ss. 137-140 of the consumer Credit 
Act 1974 which permit the reopening of credit agreements where the credit 
bargain is extortionate. 
 
6.2 Unconscionable Bargains  
 
In the leading case of Fry v. Lane1 claim was made that the sale of 
reversionary interest should be set aside. Reviewing the earlier decisions, Kay 
J. observed that three criteria had to be fulfilled before equity would set aside 
a particular bargain. First, the victim must be “poor and ignorant”; secondly, 
the sale must be at an under value; thirdly, the victim must have had no 
independent advice.2 
  
This was up-dated by the judgement of Megarry J. in Creswell v. 
Potter.3 A matrimonial home had been conveyed to a husband and wife as 
joint tenants, at law and equity. The marriage broke down and the wife was 
handed a document to execute, described as a conveyance. In fact, it 
released to the husband all wife’s interest in the home. She received no 
consideration other than an indemnity against the liabilities under a mortgage 
of property. She had believed that the document made it possible for the 
property to be sold without her rights being affected. 
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The Judge assessed the case against the three criteria laid down by 
Kay J. There was no doubt but that the disposition had been at an under 
value. It was also a fact that the wife had received no independent legal 
advice. As for the final requirement, that the claimant be “poor and ignorant”, 
Megarry J. gave this a modern tone. More appropriate terms, he said, would 
now be “member of the lower income group” and “less highly educated”. 
Furthermore, this latter was to be construed in a relative sense: while the wife 
needed alertness in her career as a telephonist, in the context of property 
transactions she could fairly be described as “ignorant.” 
 
This approach to the third condition clearly gives the courts 
considerable scope. While the better-off may obtain independent legal advice, 
they are as capable as the impoverished of believing independent legal 
advice to be unnecessary. 
 
Although no reference was made to the above cases in Jones v. 
Morgan,4 the formulation there adopted was broadly to the same effect. The 
Judge in the lower court had referred to the three elements which the High 
Court had identified, in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd and others v. Total Oil Great 
Britain Ltd,5 as characteristics of a case in which the court would interfere to 
relive a party of a bargain on the ground of unconscionability: (i) that one party 
was at a serious disadvantage to the  other, “whether through poverty or 
ignorance or lack of advice or otherwise”, so that circumstances existed of 
which unfair advantage could be taken; (ii) that the weakness of the one party 
had been exploited by the other in some morally culpable manner; and (iii) 
that the resulting transaction has been, not merely hard and improvident, but 
overreaching and oppressive. The lower court had also referred to the 
observation in Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v. Marden6 where it had been 
said that “a bargain cannot be unfair and unconscionable unless one of the 
parties to it has imposed the objectionable terms in a morally reprehensible 
manner, that is to say in a way which affects his conscience.” 
 
In the instant case, the Court said that the law on unconscionable 
bargains was not “in dispute”. It agreed with what had been said in the 
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Marden case, adding that the observations in that case had been approved in 
Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v. Total oil Great Britain Ltd7 where it had also been 
said that : “there must…be  some impropriety, both in the conduct of stronger 
party and in terms of transactions itself (through the former may often be 
inferred from the latter in the  absence of an innocent explanation) which in 
the traditional phase ‘shocks the conscience of the court’, and makes it 
against equity and good conscience for the stronger party to retain the benefit 
of a transaction he has unfairly obtained.”8 
 
That the law is not confined to the impoverished is readily deductible 
from those early cases where reversioners of no small means were relieved 
from the consequences of their improvident agreements.9 It is better, then, to 
read the expression “poor and ignorant” as now meaning “incapable of coping 
with the individual transaction without independent legal advice”.10 
 
A strong boost of the relief that grossly inequitable contracts are 
unenforceable was provided by the House of Lords in Schroeder Music 
Publishing co Ltd v. Macaulay.11 The Contract was one whereby a young and 
unknown songwriter entered into an agreement with a music publishing 
Company, whereby the latter engaged his services exclusively for the period 
of five years. Such was the stringency of the contract in favour of the 
publishers (they were, for example, under no obligation even to publish any of 
the songwriter’s publications) that it was urged that the contract was void for 
being an unreasonable restrain of trade. Lord Reid stressed that this particular 
contract one cast in standard form, was not made freely by parties bargaining 
on equal terms, nor molded under the pressure of negotiation, competition 
and public opinion.12 This being so, he held the agreement unenforceable. 
Lord Diplock took a robust line. In cases, he declared, the court intervenes to 
protect those “whose power is weak against being forced by those whose 
bargaining power is stronger to enter into bargains which are 
unconscionable”.13 His Lordship continued by dividing standard form contracts 
into two categories. One such category related to contracts molded and 
produced by parties of equal bargaining power. Here a strong presumption is 
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raised that the contract is fair and reasonable. Such contracts include bills of 
lading and policies of insurance.14 
 
This presumption, Lord Diplock maintained, does not apply to the more 
modern category of standard contracts of which the nineteenth century ticket 
cases are probably the best examples. These have not been subject to 
negotiation between the parties. They have been imposed by parties whose 
bargaining power enables them to say: “if you want these goods or services at 
all, these are the only terms on which they are obtainable. Take it or leave 
it”.15 
 
Such cases raise no presumption of unconscionability, but the court 
must all the terms of agreement to determine the issue of enforceability.16 The 
vital factor to note was that, although this was a case involving an  alleged 
restrain of trade, lord Diplock pushed the discussion beyond such confines. 
His clear belief was that any standard form contract imposed upon a party of 
weaker bargaining power could be void for unconscionability, regardless of 
the nature of contract. Indeed there is no reason to suppose that Lord Diplock 
would, if pressed, confined himself to standard terms contracts. A verbal 
contract, or a written contract produced for the particular occasion only, can 
equally be imposed on weaker parties. 
 
The decision of the House of Lords was applied in the not dissimilar 
case of Clifford Davis Management Ltd v. WEA Records Ltd17 Composers of 
popular songs signed publishing agreements with music publishers. Among 
the terms of agreements were clauses assigning copyright in the songs to the 
publishers and giving the publishers the right to reject any work without 
payment. Even when a work was retained, the publishers were under no 
obligations to exploit it. The present action was for an interlocutory injunction 
to prevent the composers from breaking the agreement. Since this was the 
nature of the action, no firm rule of law was required or given. Lord Denning, 
however, quick to point to the words of Lord Diplock in the House of Lords. He 
found it clear on the evidence that the composers have received no 
independent legal advice: it may well be said that “there was such inequality 
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of bargaining power that the agreement should not be enforced…” 18Certainly, 
the balance of convenience was that the injunction ought to be discharged.19 
 
The Court of Appeal had enunciated similar principles in Lloyds Bank v. 
Bandy.20 The owner of land had mortgaged his property to support a business 
venture of his son. The bank had foreclosed and sought possession of the 
land. The evidence showed that the owner was an elderly man not well 
versed in business affairs. Nor did he receive any independent advice. 
Reviewing the cases, including Fry v. Lane, Lord Denning found the principle 
to be that relief I given to one: 
 
“who, without independent advice, enters into a contract on terms 
which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly 
inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reason of 
his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with 
undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of 
another”.21 
 
Sir Eric Sachs was only concerned with the fact that the bank, by failing 
to ensure that the mortgagor had independent advice, was in breach of its 
duty to take fiduciary care.22 
  
This particular case is extraordinarily close to one which it did not cite, 
the decision of Crisp J. in Harrison v. National bank of Australia Ltd.23 An 
elderly woman, without legal advice, gave a bank security over land. The 
money was to aid her son in law in a business venture. She knew that she 
would be liable should the business fail, although she was completely ignorant 
of the business matters. Crisp J. set the agreement aside, noting the court will 
set aside a bargain entered into “without due deliberation, without 
independent advice and not knowing its true effect”.24 
 
In Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, Lord Denning recognized that not “every 
transaction is saved by independent advice”.25 This had already been attested 
to in Grealish v. Murphy.26 A settlement of land and money was made by a 
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person suffering from some degree of backwardness. He received 
independent legal advice, but the solicitor neither knew all the facts nor gave 
the settler a complete explanation of the nature and the effect of the 
settlement. The solicitor was also unaware of the full extent of the Settlor’s 
backwardness. In such circumstances, and despite the independent advice, 
the court set the agreement aside.27 
 
These cases indicate a willingness to accept that contracts may 
become unenforceable if harsh and unconscionable, particularly where 
independent advice has not been obtained.28 While exclusion clauses were 
not an issue in any of these cases, it still seems safe to say that the measure 
and extent of any exclusion clause will be relevant factor in determining 
whether a contract may be so inequitable as to be unenforceable. Although a 
decision has never yet had to be cast in such terms, it must be possible that a 
consumer contract or a business contract for the hire of television, the 
purchase of goods, or the leasing of the equipment, will be declared void, not 
least because of the harshness of the exclusion clauses. 
 
Mere harshness, however, would never suffice. In Boustany v. 
Piggot,29 it was said that, for the contract to be set aside in equity as 
unconscionable, the behaviour of the stronger party must be characterized by 
some moral culpability or impropriety. He must be guilty of some actual or 
constructive fraud. It is not enough to prove that a bargain in harsh, 
unreasonable or foolish. 
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Chapter  7 
The Effect of Discharge by Breach on Exemption Clauses 
 
7.1 Introduction   
 
It was perhaps never very likely that the proponents of fundamental 
breach would allow their doctrine to die just because of some obiter dicta on 
the subject from the House of Lords.1 
 
In that respect, therefore, the recent decision of the court of Appeal in 
Harbutt’s  “Plasticine” Ltd.  v Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.2 need cause no 
surprise. What had happened in that case, was that the defendants had 
agreed to manufacture some equipment and to install it in the plaintiff’s factory 
under a contract, clause 15 of which limited the defendant’s liability to the 
amount of the contract price. (£ 2,330). A small and easily corrected defect in 
the equipment caused a fire which destroyed the factory and resulted in a loss 
to the plaintiff’s of some £ 1,50,000. The Court of Appeal held (Lord Denning 
M.R. dubitante) that on its true construction clause 15 covered the loss in the 
events which had occurred. The whole court nevertheless joined in the events 
which had occurred. The whole court nevertheless joined in holding that the 
destruction of the factory and consequent discharge by breach of the contract 
had the effect of making clause 15 is applicable. Judgement was given for the 
full amount of the loss.  
 
It is surprising about Harbutt’s case that at least to a contract lawyer, is 
its findings that a contractor can be impressed with a liability even though he 
has adopted the correct formula for excluding it. It is rather odd and one may 
be forgiven for suspecting that somehow or somewhere, something has gone 
wrong. The Court of Appeal justified their decision by reference to discharge 
of the contract for breach.  
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7.2 The Ordinary Law of Discharge by Breach  
 
 For some time now, the common law had recognized that the conduct 
or non-performance of one party to a contract may be such that the conduct 
or non-performance of one party to a contract may be such that, in justice , 
the other party ought to be allowed to recover damages without himself 
having first to perform his own side of the bargain.3 That is the question with 
which discharge by breach is concerned, and it has two aspects: the 
conditions under which the remedy arises, and the incidents of the remedy  
when it applies. Unfortunately, in both cases there is some degree of 
uncertainty. Writing in 1916, Morison said the situation was an 
“embarrassment” to every practicing lawyer. 4 If the position is any better 
today it is mainly because, since then, trends and tendencies have had longer 
to develop. 
 
A. The conditions of the remedy   
 
The conditions for discharge by breach exist at common law when one 
party to a contract has by the default of the other been denied, the substance 
serious degree, the substance of what he bargained for.5 
 
Two methods have been used for fixing the appropriate measure of 
seriousness  
 
(1) Reference to the character of the term broken or not performed. Eg.  
divisions of contractual terms into dependant and independent 
covenants, conditions precedent and concurrent and conditions and 
warranties. 
(2) Reference to the quality or scale of the breach eg.  the concepts of 
failure of consideration, self-induced frustration and repudiation.6 
 
Experience has shown that neither of these two approaches is 
sufficient by itself. Thus, the dependent – independent covenant test has to be 
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modified by the  introduction of a test of substantial performance.7 The 
question whether a term were a condition precedent tended at times to be 
decided ex post facto by reference to the scale of the breach. 8 For much of 
this century, the condition –warranty test was thought of as exclusive.9 In 
practice, it too was modified by the device of characterizing the term broken 
by reference to the importance of the breach rather that by reference to the 
intention of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. 10 Another 
device was to allow the existence of a class of conditions, only the more 
extensive breaches of which could give rise to discharge.11 The significance of 
the Hongkong Fir Case 12 when it appeared was not that it evolved a new 
category of term so that it divided warranties into two classes. It was that it 
reaffirmed what seemed to have been forgotten, that the nature of the term 
broken and the scale of the breach can, each of them, be relevant to the 
question whether a discharge by breach is justified.13 
 
Equally, the Hongkong Fir case, did not establish that discharge by 
breach can occur only on a breach of condition or on the frustration by delay 
of a commercial adventure.14 All the following approaches (and it is not 
claimed that the list is exhaustive) still retain some degree of life: 
? Breach of condition 15  
? Failure of condition precedent16 
? Non-performance of a dependent covenant17 
? Breach of fundamental term18 
? Repudiation19 
? Anticipatory breach20 
? Failure of consideration21     
? Self-induced frustration22 
? Self-induced impossibility23 
? Fundamental breach24 
 
While these approaches are all of them directed to the same object, it 
would be a mistake to regard them as incidental. Thus, breach of a condition 
is the breach of a term so fundamental that any default gives a right to elect a 
discharge.25 Fundamental terms, it was at one time suggested, are more 
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fundaments even that.26 Repudiation denotes words or conduct evincing an 
intention not to perform.27 That intention may be deliberate, or it may be 
deliberate, or it may be forced upon the defaulter by his inability to perform, 
despite his best endeavors. Failure of consideration may embrace anything 
from a relatively slight breach of an entire contract to a gross breach which 
leaves the injured party with substantially nothing of what he bargained for.28 
Self-induced impossibility occurs when further performance passes beyond 
the powers of the parties, as for example when a master aborts a contract 
affreightment by scuttling his ship and cargo.29 On the other hand, self-
induced frustration can occur when performance of a kind may still be 
possible but would be commercially different from what was contracted for.30 
 
The two avenues of approach to discharge by breach, by way of the term 
broken and by way of breach itself, are occasionally given the labels of 
fundamental term and fundamental breach.31 Those words, however, acquired 
overtones before the Suisse Atlantique case which since then are no longer, 
justified. Moreover they tend to obscure the fact that there are more than two 
approaches to the problem. On both these grounds, it is submitted their use in 
this way is undesirable. 
 
B. The incidents of discharge by breach   
 
A description of the incidents by breach presents rather more difficulty 
through, fortunately, strong trends have become apparent in the law. 
 
The initial problem is whether discharge by breach operates automatically 
when a sufficient breach occurs, or whether it is in the election of the innocent 
party. Outside, the field of anticipatory breach, there is very little indication in 
the nineteenth century cases of any need for an election and, as late as, 
1916, Morison felt able to argue that discharge was automatic on breach of 
condition or on failure of consideration.32 Since then, however, the trend has 
been very strongly towards assimilating discharge by breach to anticipatory 
breach by requiring an election by the innocent party and a communication of 
 194
that election by the innocent party and a communication of that election to the 
wrongdoer.33 The reason usually given is that allow a wrongdoer unilaterally 
to terminate the contract would be to allow him to profit by his wrongdoing.34 
This argument depends on the hypothesis that the effect of discharge by 
breach is a termination of the contract, a point which will be dealt with 
separately. In practical terms, however, it does seem good sense to allow the 
injured party a choice in cases where the possibility of an acceptable degree 
of performance or substituted performance remains. 
 
On the other hand, it would not be hard to imagine cases where it would 
be otiose to require an election because further performance would literally 
have become impossible.35 The scuttling of a ship and cargo has already 
been instanced. The destruction of both factory and equipment in the 
Harbutt’s “Plasticine” case is another example and the Court of Appeal was 
no doubt correct in dispensing, as they did, with the need for an election in 
that case. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether, as dicta in that case seem 
to suggest, mere frustration as distinct from impossibility would be enough. If 
it were, there would be practical difficulties for both parties on the facts of 
cases like that of the Hongkong Fir.36      
 
The other requirement under this head, that the election must be 
communicated to be effective, 37 is again good sense, in that it would be 
undoubtedly be unfair to the party in breach to leave him uncertain whether or 
not a discharge had taken place. Here, again the law seems to allow for some 
degree of flexibility and it looks as though the requirement of communication 
will be dispensed with in cases where the wrongdoer has deliberately made 
communication will be dispensed with in cases where the wrongdoer has 
deliberately made communication impossible.38 
 
The next problem is whether or not discharge by breach results in a 
termination of the contract. Many observers may find it surprising that this 
should be regarded as a problem at all. 39 What makes it so is that termination 
of the contract is not in any way necessary to what discharge by breach seeks 
to achieve, which is to release the injured party from any further obligation to 
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perform his part And to enable him, nevertheless, to recover damages from 
the other side. The only termination that involves is of the injured party’s 
obligations and of the wrongdoer’s power to perform, 40 except by way of 
reduction of damages.41 Moreover, it is commonly insisted that the contract 
survives for purposes of recovery of damages by the injured party42 and, as 
an aspect of that, arbitration clauses normally continue to apply.43 What, it is 
submitted, discharge by breach really does is not so much to “terminate” as to 
“truncate”. Its function is, notionally at least, to take the parties direct from the 
point of termination to the point where the completion is due. 44 In doing so, it 
gives the injured party a immediate right of action. It deprives the wrong doer 
of any rights or advantages which might have accrued to him during that 
interval, and by removing any further possibility of completion, prevents his 
enforcing the obligations of the party injured, including for example those 
arising under covenants in restraint of trade.45 
 
Nevertheless, despite protests in the House of Lords that the contact does 
not terminate 46 and despite the evidence for its survival after discharge, it has 
to be admitted that many would say a literal termination does occur. On this 
theory such things as demurrage clauses, 47 exception clauses48 and 
covenants in restraint of trade are rescind beyond recall, while other parts of 
the contract including arbitration clauses, some how manage to retain after 
rescission the same effect they would have had without it.  
 
If, however, it is accepted that discharge by breach does effect an actual 
termination of the contract, the next question is the point from which that 
termination operates. Theoretically, there are several possibilities; in 
particular, the point at which the contract is entered into, the moment of 
election and the moment of communication of election. The first of these, 
termination ab-initio, does in fact exist as a remedy under the name of 
rescission49 but it is to be distinguished from discharge by breach, more 
especially because it involves a surrender by the injured party of his rights to 
recover damages.50 The real choice lies between the moment of breach on 
the one hand and the election, or its communication on the other. 
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In those cases where the breach renders as election otiose, termination 
and breach are no doubt simultaneous. On the other hand, in cases where an 
election is required, termination would have to be retrospective if it were to 
date beck to the breach. The question has practical consequences only where 
the wrongdoer after breach continuous to perform and this may explain why it 
has been so little discussed in the cases. Nevertheless there does seem to be 
wide agreement that discharge by breach is prospective rather than 
retrospective in its effect.51 This in fact is what would be expected, 
consistency with the idea of discharge by breach as a decision by an injured 
party thenceforth no longer to be bound to perform his side of the bargain. 
And though there is apparently no case on the point, it would seem fait to 
assume that, in those cases where communication of the elections is 
required, termination will date from the communication. The consequence of 
all this would be that the contract would govern the dealings of the parties 
down to the moment of termination, but would have no application, but would 
have no application to what took place thereafter. 
 
7.3 Exemption Clauses and Discharge by Breach   
 
There is a distinction, essential to any understanding of the effect of 
discharge on exemption clauses, which needs to be made at once. It is 
between exemption clauses directed to the very breach upon which the claim 
to discharge is based and clauses directed to other breaches or obligations. 
On facts like those of Harbutt’s “Plasticine”, 52 it is the difference between an 
exception clause purporting to govern the destruction of the premises by fire 
and say, a clause dealing with other matters such as compliance with 
specification, liability for theft or vandalism and so on. To claim that on 
discharge for a breach not itself the subject of an exception clause, the 
wrongdoer lost the benefit of his exemption clauses, would be one thing. To 
say that a contract could be discharged despite an exemption clause covering 
the very point, and that the discharge would in turn cause the clause to 
become inapplicable, could be quite another. 
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A further point that has to be made, however apologetically, is that the 
effect of discharge by breach may depend very materially on what the function 
of an exemption clause is conceived to be. If exemption clauses have a 
bearing on the obligations of the parties the answer is one thing; if they have 
nothing to do with obligation, but operate merely well be another. The 
jurisprudential arguments for the former view have been canvassed at length 
elsewhere.53 What the theory says, though, is that exemption clauses have a 
substantial effect in any of several different ways. Thus, an exemption of an 
implied term by law prevents the implication of that term into the contract. 
When a contractor follows one of his promises by an exemption clause saying 
he will not be liable in certain circumstances for failure to perform it, what he is 
really doing is to qualify his promise. And this is to whether he excluded his 
liability altogether or merely limits it to a given amount or imposes a time limit 
on claims against him. What he says in effect is “I undertake this liability, as 
limited by my exemption clauses.” And he says this as he enters into his 
contract. Accordingly, this is the measure of his obligations from the start,54 so 
that at no stage can it ever be possible to decide what he has undertaken by 
referring to his promises alone, without taking into account the qualifications 
he has placed upon them. 
 
While this theory has attracted a measure of judicial support since 
1964, 55 it is still far from gaining universal acceptance. The excuse for 
resurrecting it here is that the Harbutt’s “Plasticine” case56 demonstrates as 
clearly as may be the extra ordinary consequences which can be made to 
flow from an adherence to the rival approach. While it will be argued that even 
on that approach, Harbutt’s “Plasticine” was wrongly decided; the 
“execeptions-as- qualifications” theory offers a much more direct path to that 
result. It is proposed first to consider the effect of discharge on exemption 
clauses on the assumption that such clauses qualify obligations and then to 
return to the other approach. 
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A. Exemption Clauses as substantive   
 
On the assumption that exemption clauses have a qualifying effect on 
obligation, certain of them at least can have a crucial relevance to the first 
question with which discharge by breach is concerned, which is whether the 
conditions for the remedy exist. 
 
Some clauses go to the very question whether the term broken or the 
breach alleged is of a kind upon which discharge can be founded. A clause 
which, for eg prevented the implication of any condition as to title under 
section 12 of The Sale of Goods Act1983 would have the effect that failure to 
pass title could not be the breach of a condition of the contract. Similarly, a 
limitation of the right to reject goods could (though not necessarily would) 57 
have the effect of reducing what would otherwise be a condition to the status 
of a warranty. Less obviously, an exemption of all liability for breach of what 
would otherwise be a promissory condition could have the effect of preventing 
the promise operating as a ground for discharge by breach, even though it 
might not stop failure to perform operating as the failure of a contingency 
under the contract. These, presumably, were the types of clause Lord 
Wilberforce held in mind when, in the Suisse Atlantique case, he said:    
 
“An act which, apart from the exemption clause, might be a breach 
sufficiently serious to justify refusal of further performance, may be 
reduced in effect, or made not a breach at all, by the terms of the 
clause.”58   
 
Clearly, discharge by breach can have no effect if the “breach” upon 
which the claim to discharge is founded falls within the scope of the clause. 
The reason is that the conditions for discharge by breach are prevented by 
the exemption clause for ever arising. Whether such exemption clauses would 
be affected by a discharge founded on some other breach not covered by 
them would depend upon the effect of a valid discharge by breach on 
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exemption clauses generally, and the solution here turns to some degree on 
the view taken of the ordinary incidents of discharge by breach. 
 
In the first place, if the effect of discharge by breach is not a 
termination of the contract but, as has been claimed in the House of Lords, 59   
a termination only of certain obligations and rights; the position is quite 
straight forward. Upon the discharge, the injured party acquires an immediate 
right to recover damages from the wrong-doer for his breach and the contract 
remains alive for that purpose. It then becomes a matter for the court to 
determine what the obligations of the wrongdoer are and the recoverable 
damages flowing from such breach of those obligations as he has committed. 
 
The measure of those obligations is not to be found merely by 
reference to the contractor’s promises in isolation from the qualifications he 
placed upon them. The promises and the exceptions must be looked at 
together, and this is as true of partial qualifications as it is of total exclusions. 
This being so, discharge by breach as such would have no effect whatever on 
exception clauses. Whether the wrongdoer would be impressed with liability 
would depend solely upon the interpretation of the contract, upon whether the 
acts complained of fell within the contractor’s promises and outside the 
qualifications or limitations he had placed on those promises. 
 
The other possible view of discharge by breach is that it literally 
terminates the contract, albeit only in future. Since displacement is only as to 
the future, it would follow that the exception clauses would apply in full force 
until the moment of termination. Again the result is that, at least until that 
point, whatever breaches occur happen subject to the exemption clauses and 
it is only acts committed after termination which would be unprotected. The 
result in the Harbutt’s “Plasticine” case60 Would be that at the point of time 
when the factory was destroyed by fire, the obligations of the contractor were 
limited to payment of not more than £2,330 that was what the parties agreed 
when they entered into the contract, and it was still their contract at the point 
when the loss occurred. 
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There is another way of reaching the same result, even assuming that 
the effect of discharge by breach is a literal termination of the contract. Even 
on that assumption, the contract remains alive for the purpose of recovery by 
the injured party. This must mean that the contract remains alive for the 
purpose of assessing the wrongdoer’s liabilities and these in turn depend 
upon his obligations. Once again, the exemption clauses are just as essential 
a part of the definition of those obligations as are his positive promises. It 
would be extra- ordinarily difficult to justify the survival of the one without the 
other. 
 
The result of all is that there is nothing magical about discharge by 
breach; nothing in it to justify any disregard of the terms of the contract. The 
determinant of whether an exemption clause protects a party to a contract 
remains in every case whether remains in every properly bears such an 
interpretation. 
 
B. Exemption Clauses are procedural   
 
While it is submitted that the  exemption clauses-as-qualifications 
theory offers a solution to the difficulties raised by Harbutt’s “Plasticine” it 
would be a pity if the case against that decision were seen to rest solely on a 
particular  and possibly over-subtle academic argument. Even on the other 
approach, Harbutt’s “PLasticine” raises doubts.  
 
The finding in that case, that discharge by breach prevents reliance on 
a clause which directly covers the events which occurred, could be justified on 
four possible grounds. 
 
1) One would be that, as a matter of substantive law, exemption clauses 
can have no application to breaches of the type which ordinarily 
justifies termination. This of course is the “fundamental breach” 
principle which the House of Lords rejected in the Suisse Atlantique 
case. 
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2) The second ground can be disposed of as quickly. It would be that as a 
matter of construction the exemption clauses were subject to a 
condition that they would not apply in the event of what, apart from 
them, would be a repudiatory breach. This was the sort of approach the 
House of Lords rejected in Hain v. Tate & Lyle 61 when they held that 
there was no warrant for a finding that the exemption clause in that 
contract was alone subject to a “no-deviation” condition. In any event, it 
was not the construction adopted by the Court of Appeal in the 
Harbutt’s “Plasticine” case. 
3) One is that, on a discharge, the exemption clause terminates 
retrospectively to appoint before the breach occurs. This of course runs 
counter to the predominant view that discharge by breach operates 
only in future. More than this, Lord Denning himself, in the course of his 
judgement, accepted that the discharge operated “for the future”.62 
4) The last possibility and; though it was never declared in the 
judgements, undoubtedly the one on which the Court of Appeal based 
their reasoning is that the exemption clause had no relevance or effect 
before termination occurred and that, after that point, it could not take 
effect because the contract of which it was part had been rescinded. 
Superficially, perhaps, that approach looks attractive enough. On any 
analysis, though, it tends to breach down.  
 
For one thing, it assumes that when the parties exclude or limit liability 
for breach, the liability refereed to is one declared and imposed at the point of 
adjudication. But a much more natural interpretation is that the liability 
concerned is liability for breach of contract and that, of course, accrues at the 
moment of breach.63 At that particular moment, on any view of the effect of 
discharge by breach, the contract (including the exemption clause) is still in 
existence. 
 
Again, the approach carries the surely uncomfortable consequence 
that despite assertions in the Suisse Atlantique case that liability for 
fundamental breach can be excluded, 64 that rule would have no effect unless 
the injured party after breach elected that it should.   
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Just as difficult is the fact that it involves in effect the partial rescission 
of the contract. Here again, it is not just that the House of Lords has rejected 
any suggestion that the injured party has a right to both approbate and 
reprobate, to affirm some parts of the contract and terminate others.65 
 
The Court of Appeal would no doubt claim that the contract as a whole 
had been terminated. The fact remains that, somehow, the contract does 
survive for the purpose of fixing the wrongdoer’s responsibility and for 
assessing the damages recoverable by the injured party. Even if exemption 
clauses were not qualifications attached by the wrongdoer to his undertakings 
and were not procedural obstacles to recovery, they would still be relevant to 
the purposes for which the contract survives. 
 
Thus, if a party to a sale of goods is charged that he has not given title, 
it must be germane, even as only a procedural defence, that the contract 
expressly provides that no undertaking as to title is given or is to be implied. 
 
Equally, if the contract is to be referred to in order to assess damages 
payable for its breach, it is surely relevant that the parties have agreed that 
damages should be limited to a stated amount. 
 
Even assuming that discharge brings about a total termination of the 
contract, there needs to be some explanation of why only some of the 
relevant parts of it take part in the subsequent revival. 
 
For eg  no self-evident justice in the suggestion that liquidated 
damages clauses lack this capacity for revival, with the result that injured 
parties lose the benefit of them if they elect a discharge.66  A partial 
explanation which might conceivably be advanced would be that on 
termination the wrongdoer loses the capacity to compel performance by the 
injured party. 
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The answer to that is that on any view of the nature of exemption 
clauses they are not promises or obligations which can be enforced or 
performed. Indeed, they have nothing whatever to do with the injured party’s 
promises or obligations. 
 
At the risk of over emphasizing the point, it needs to be repeated that 
the real test of the applicability of an exemption clause, on discharge, by 
breach or at any other time, is quite simply whether on its proper construction 
the clause covers what has occurred.67 On the facts of the Harbutt’s 
“Plasticine” case, this means that the liability of the contractor would have 
been limited to £ 2,330, always provided that the exemption clause did in fact, 
on its proper construction, cover the events which had occurred. 
 
In the Suisse Atlantique case, 68 the House of Lords, went a long way 
towards reaching this sort of conclusion. It is at least conceivable that they 
would have gone the whole way had it not been for two factors; 
 
1) The agreement of counsel appearing before them that discharge by 
breach makes an exemption clause to apply69 and 
2) The line of cases on deviation and quasi-deviation on which, it seems 
certain, counsel’s agreement was based.70 
 
7.4 The Effect of the Deviation Cases   
 
In the strict sense, deviation is what occurs when a carrier of goods, 
without lawful excuse, departs from the contract route.71 But the incidents of 
deviation are found in connection with other types of bailment, in which 
context they are usually referred to as “quasi-deviation”.72 
 
These incidents occur whenever a bailee, without lawful excuse, 
disregards limitations upon his authority as bailee, as for example when he 
holds goods in a place, 73 for a purpose, 74 or at a time75 when he has no 
mandate to do so. When that happens, he automatically becomes an insurer 
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against loss or damage to the goods and in so doing loses the protection, not 
only of his contractual exemptions, but even of the common law exemptions 
of the Act of God and of the Queens enemies.76 His only available defence is 
to show that the loss or damage would have occurred anyway.77 
  
The explanations for these phenomena come from the nature of bailment 
itself. When a bailee’s authority to hold the bailed goods has been limited in 
particular ways and he then fails to observe those limitations, he ceases to 
hold the goods within the ambit of the bailment and is reduced to the status of 
a mere detainor. As such, he loses the benefits of the bailment relationship 
and thereafter has to carry the risk of loss or damage to the goods.78 
 
An alternative partial explanation is that when a bailee, by altering the 
nature of an adventure, alters the risks, he automatically loses the protection 
of his exemption clauses because they are directed only to the risks which 
attend the bailment itself.79 But whichever way they are to be explained, the 
important points are that deviation and quasi-deviation are peculiar to 
bailment,80 and that they are unique in bringing about an automatic non-
application of the exemption clauses as from the moment the deviation 
commences, without the need for an election to that effect by the injured 
party.81 It is this features which have caused difficulty in relation to discharge 
by breach. 
 
As might be expected, the origins of these phenomena in the law of 
bailment were lost sight of as the nineteenth century advanced and by 1890 
the courts had begun to seek explanations in the law of discharge by 
breach.82 
 
 
At that time, the requirement that the injured party elect a discharge 
had not fully emerged, so that the absence of any such election in typical 
deviation cases was not seen as embarrassment. 
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For a similar reason, the fact that on a deviation, the exemption 
clauses cease to apply from the moment the deviation commences was not 
seen to raise any problem either. But because the non-applicability of the 
exemption clause was thought to depend on recession for breach and 
because there is no warrant for a selective that the contract as a whole, and 
just he exemption clause, was rescinded from that moment.83 
 
This in turn caused embarrassment over the question of freight in 
cases where goods had been delivered in good time at their port of 
destination, notwithstanding an intermediate deviation. If the contract 
terminated, it seemed, freight caused to be recoverable, even though, in 
commercial circles, it had always been regarded as payable in such cases.84 
 
The courts had to turn round and invent devices which would have 
been quite unnecessary under the ordinary rules of discharge by breach.85 
 
Under those rules in the absence of any earlier election by the injured 
party, a timeous delivery of the goods would have been a substantial 
performance and no question of discharge by breach would have arisen. 
 
Once the need for an election became establish under the ordinary law 
of discharge by breach, further distortions were found to be necessary in the 
deviation cases. 
 
The question of election was one of the problems of the House of 
Lords had to contend with in Hain v. Tate & Lyle in 1936. The solution they 
adopted was to hold that termination of the contract operated automatically 
from the moment of breach, unless the injured party chose to affirm it. This 
can be contrasted with the ordinary rule, that on a discharge by breach , the 
contract remains in being unless and until the injured party elects to terminate 
it. There were other distortions forthcoming.  
 
It was assumed by the House in the Hain case that it was termination 
of the contract which prevented the exemptions applying. A corollary to this 
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was that, if the contract was affirmed, the exception would protect the 
wrongdoer. In truth, though affirmation by itself can never have that effect. 86 
 
Exemption clauses can only take effect if they are drawn widely 
enough to do so. Prima facie, exemption clauses in contracts of affreightment 
are not to be interpreted as applying to he risks of a deviation. They could be 
made to apply an affirmation only if the contract were varied to that effect, 
whether by an agreed alteration to the contract route or by an alteration to the 
exemption clause itself. 
 
No doubt, on the facts of Hains v. Tate & Lyle, 87 it would be easy 
enough to imply such a variation, but in principle there is no reason why the 
owner of goods which have been damaged during a deviation should, by 
subsequent affirmation, be denied the right to recover his loss. These two 
beliefs, that it is termination which denies the wrongdoer the protection of his 
exceptions, and that affirmation of the contract gives him back that benefit, 
eventually caused trouble during the heyday of the fundamental breach 
theory. 
 
In Charterhouse Credit v. Tolly, 88 the hirer of a vehicle under a hire 
purchase agreement had affirmed his contract, notwithstanding that the owner 
had committed a fundamental breach. This affirmation, it was thought, would 
prevent the hirer’s recovering damages because it meant that the exemption 
clauses now protected the wrongdoer. The apparent problem would never 
have arisen had the inquiry been directed to the question whether the 
exemption clause, on its proper construction, covered the breach complained 
of. The Court would have decided that the exemptions did not cover delivery 
of an unroad worthy car. 89 
 
There is one solecism, though, from which the deviation cases seem to 
have remained free. Nowhere has it been held that discharge by breach for 
deviation prevents reliance upon a liberty clause directed to the question of 
deviation itself. 
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It is this, as much as anything, which sustains the myth that exemption 
clauses are somehow different in function from the rest of the contract and 
that, on discharge by breach, the obligations of the wrongdoer can be defined 
and enforced without reference to any qualifications the contract, may have 
placed upon them. 
 
It was deviation which in turn, led to and sustained the concept of a 
fundamental breach the effect of which was to disqualify a wrongdoer from 
relying on his exemption clauses, however widely drawn.90 
 
In the earliest stages in the development of that doctrine, it was 
recognized in some degree that he fundamental (deviation) type of breach 
must be different from breach of a condition (the ordinary discharge by 
breach) since, maintestly, promissory conditions could successfully be 
excluded. Hence the characterizations of the new breach as “fundamental” 
and as something narrower that breach of condition.91 Inevitably though, the 
existence of the cases identifying deviation with discharge by breach meant 
that sooner or later the distinction would be lost. Deviation equals 
fundamental breach; discharge by breach equals deviation. The circle was 
finally completed when, in the Suisse Atlantique case, the House of Lords 
categorized “fundamental terms” and “fundamental breach” as shorthand 
expressions for the circumstances given rise to discharge by brach.92 
 
In sum, what bedevils the common law of discharge by breach, it is 
submitted, is this existence, parallel to each other, of two mutually 
inconsistent streams of authority, discharge by breach proper and deviation. 
That would be a difficult enough position by itself but it is made worse by itself 
but it is made worse by the fact that, between them, the two streams have 
spawned a spurious third. It is a situation in which one might not be surprised 
to find a near flood of cases, comments and articles in which judges and 
academics resorted to one refinement after another in vain attempt to 
reconcile the irreconcilable. 
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Chapter 8 
Unlawful Exemption Clauses 
 
8.1 Fair Trading Act 1973 
 
 Prior to its repeal by the Enterprise Act 2002 1. The Fair Trading Act 1973 
set out a procedure for the control of undesirable “consumer trade practices”. 
Section 13 defined a consumer trade practice as one carried out in 
connection with the supply of goods, or services, to consumers and which 
related: 
 
(a) to the terms or conditions (whether as to price or otherwise) on or subject 
to which goods or services are or are sought to be supplied; or 
(b) to the manner in which those terms or conditions are communicated to 
persons to whom goods or are sought to be supplied; or 
(c) to promotion  (by advertising, labeling or making of goods, canvassing or 
otherwise) of the supply of goods or the supply of services; or 
(d) to methods of salesmanship employed in dealing with consumers; or 
(e) to the way in which goods are packed or otherwise got up for the purpose 
of being supplied; or 
(f) to methods of demanding or securing payment for goods or services 
supplied. If such a practice can be identified, s.14 gives to the Director 
General of Fair Trading, to the Secretary of State , or any other Minister, 
the power to refer to the Consumer Protection Advisory Committee 
(established by s. 3 of the Act) the question whether the particular 
practice “adversely affects the economic interests of the consumer”. 
 
If the Committee found that the consumer was adversely affected, there was 
nothing in the Act to determine the appropriate consequences. No s.14 
references were ever made. There were , however, four s. 17 references to the 
Committee. These were references made by the Director General under s.14 
(and only by the Director General) but where it appeared to him that the 
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particular trade practice had, or was likely to have, any of the following effects as 
set out in s.17(2):  
 
(a) Misleading consumers as to or withholding from them adequate 
information as to, or an adequate record of, their rights and obligations 
under relevant consumer transactions. 
(b) Otherwise misleading or confusing consumers with respect to any matter 
in connection with relevant consumer transactions. 
(c) Subjecting consumers to undue pressure to enter into relevant consumer 
transactions. 
(d) Causing the terms and conditions on, or subject to which, consumers 
enter into relevant consumer transactions to be so adverse to them as to 
be inequitable. 
 
Then the Director General could (he was not obliged to) attach to his 
reference proposals recommending to the Secretary of State that the latter use 
the powers of the Fair Trading Act to control the particular trade practice. 
 
 It was the task of the Committee, under the terms of s. 21, to report 
on whether the practice did adversely affect the economic interests of consumers 
and whether it did so by reason, or partly by reason, that it had, or was likely to 
have, one or more of what may be called the s.17(2) effects. If the Committee 
reported affirmatively on these questions, it had then to state whether it agreed 
with the Director General’s proposals as set out in the reference, or would agree 
if those proposals were modified in a manner specified in the report, or whether it 
disagreed with the proposals but made no modifications. In this last case, the 
proposals for reform could not be treated as effectively at an end. If, though, the 
Commission had taken either of the two other paths the issue would then be 
remitted to the Secretary of State under s.22. Where the Committee accepted the 
Director General’s proposals,   the Secretary of state could, but did not have to, 
give effect to the proposals through an Order made by statutory instrument. If the 
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Committee had accepted the proposals, but with modifications, the Secretary of 
State again had an absolute discretion either to implement the original proposals 
or the proposals as modified, or, of course, to decline to do anything. An Order 
made by the Secretary of State had to be approved by both Houses of 
Parliament. At this stage, the Director General’s proposals, in their original or 
amended form, achieve the force of law. 
 
Reference 17(1) of April 24, 1974 
 
The first of the four s.17 references so far made to the Committee, and the 
only one relevant to exemption clauses, has its origins in the provisions of the 
Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. he provisions of this Act, now 
contained in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, rendered void those terms in 
consumer transactions which sought to exclude the implied terms relating to title, 
fitness for purpose, satisfactory quality and correspondence with description, 
including the terms as to title and satisfactory quality and correspondence with 
description, including the terms as to title and satisfactory quality implied by s. 
4(1) of the trading Stamps Act 1964 2. 
 
In his reference, the Director General specified three practices which 
caused him concern. The first practice concerned the wording of notices 
displayed on trade premises or vehicles, in advertisements or catalogues, or in 
documents furnished to consumers acquiring goods, when the wording purports 
to exclude or restrict the implied terms which had been rendered inalienable by 
the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act. The relevant terms are now, of course, 
implied by the 1964 Act, the 1973 Act and the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
 
The second practice dealt with written statements furnished to consumers 
by suppliers of goods relating to the consumers rights against suppliers, but 
which fail to advise the consumers of rights implied by law in their favour. The 
last practice was also concerned with written statements furnished to consumers 
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by suppliers of goods which fail to advise consumers of their implied statutory 
rights against suppliers. In this case, however, the written statements covered by 
the practice related to the rights of consumers against third parties, such as 
manufacturers, or to the obligations of such third parties to consumers. In other 
words, this practice dealt with what are commonly referred to as manufactures 
“guarantees”. 
 
The Committee’s report contained the conclusion that each:  
 
“consumers trade practice adversely affects the economic interests of 
consumers in the United Kingdom, and does so by reason that it has, or is 
likely to have, the effects…. Of misleading consumers as to their rights 
under relevant consumer transactions or otherwise confusing them as to 
the terms of the transaction”.3 
 
The Committee suggested some modifications to the Director General’s 
proposal, but otherwise gave them complete support. An order contained in a 
statutory instrument reflecting the modified proposals was laid before, and 
approved by both Houses of Parliament. 
 
8.2 Consumer Transactions (Restrictions on Statements) Order 1976 (SI   
 1976/1813)  
The first practice 
 
The first practice was covered by a fourfold prohibition. Article 3(a) 
rendered it unlawful for persons in the course of a business to display at any 
place where consumer transactions4 are effected (wholly or partly) a notice 
containing statement purporting to apply, in relation to consumer transactions 
effected there, terms rendered void by s.6 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 
which refers to the implied terms of correspondence with description, satisfactory 
quality and fitness for purpose and the implied terms relating to title.5 The same 
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prohibition applied where the notice purports to exclude the warranty of 
satisfactory quality implied by s.4(1)(c) of the Trading Stamps Act 1964. 
Following the repeal of the 1964 Act, the prohibition now applies in relation to 
exclusion of the conditions as to fitness for purpose and satisfactory quality 
implied on the redemption of trading stamps for goods under the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982. 6 
 
It is worth pointing out that those places are within the prohibition when 
transactions are only “partly” effected there. Hence places are caught when 
goods are selected from one establishment or store, but the sale is concluded in 
another. A notice at either place is within the order. 
 
It should also be remembered that it is enough for the notice to contain a 
statement which “purports” to apply to a particular exclusion clause. In other 
words, a notice drawn insufficiently to the consumer’s attention after the contract 
was made, nevertheless falls within the Order. 
 
The second practice 
 
This practice is not concerned with void terms or with the display of 
notices on trading premises, but only with written statements furnished by 
suppliers of goods to consumers which purport to set out the rights and 
obligations of the parties and which fail to advise consumers of their rights to 
goods which are of satisfactory quality, are reasonably fit for the purpose, and 
which conform to their description. 
 
Article 4 of the 1976 Order provides that in two instance a criminal offence 
arises unless the relevant statement is qualified by another in close proximity 
which is clear and conspicuous and to the effect that the relevant statement does 
not or will not affect the statutory rights of a consumer. 
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The two instances embodying the relevant statement are as follows. First, 
the supply to a consumer, pursuant to a consumer transaction, of goods bearing 
(or goods in a container bearing) a statement about the rights that the consumer 
has against the supplier or about the obligations to the consumer accepted by 
the supplier. The article spells out those rights and obligations which “arise if the 
goods are defective or are not fit for a purpose or do not fit for a purpose or do 
not correspond with a description “. The Article also stresses that the offence 
arises whether or not those rights or obligations are legally enforceable. Yet 
again, therefore, statements brought to the consumer’s notice too late to became 
a term of the transaction are within the prohibition. 
 
The other instance relates to documents being furnished to a consumer 
transaction in the course of a business or to persons likely, as consumers, to 
enter into a consumer transaction where the documents contain statements as 
described above. The Article also provides that the Order covers documents 
furnished to consumers likely to enter into consumer transactions through the 
agency of the person supplying the document. The doorstep seller is covered by 
this provision: so also, one imagines, is the dealer who arranges a hire purchase 
contract with a finance house.  
 
The universal commercial purpose is, in these cases, to add the words:  
 
“This does not affect your statutory rights.” The Order, however, does not 
make these words mandatory: it states only that there must be a statement that 
the statutory rights of the consumer are unaffected. Since few consumers will 
know what these rights are, it may be wondered if such commercial practice is 
within a fair interpretation of the Order. It certainly accords more with its spirit to 
interpret the requirement of the order as meaning that the particular document, 
goods or container ought to give a summary in some form or other of those 
statutory rights. 
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Article 2 of the Order actually defines “statutory rights” as being rights 
arising under the 1973, 1979, and 1982 Acts, other than the implied terms as to 
title, and it seems a fair conclusion that this indicates the way that the wording of 
a statement that such rights are unaffected ought to be drafted.7 
 
The third practice 
 
The third practice, in essence, involves manufacturers’ guarantees. The 
Committee cited with approval the following extract from the Moloney  Report. 8 
 
“The important general considerations is that the issue of guarantees 
enables and encourages the retailer to lead the customer into thinking that 
the manufacturer alone is liable to attend to defects and thus permits him 
to avoid his responsibilities. We adopt the view that the consumer is 
widely ignorant of his legal rights and in this state readily accepts that any 
guarantee reaching him indicates the sum total of the redress he is 
entitled to claim.” 
 
The Committee itself concluded that : 
 
“the wording used in “guarantees” and similar undertakings by 
manufacturers (where no reference is made to the rights of the consumer 
against the supplier) reinforces these beliefs….”9 
 
Article 5 tackles this problem by first defining the situation to which the 
penal provisions are directed. This is the supply of goods in the course of a 
business to another where, at the time of supply, the goods were intended by the 
supplier to be, or might reasonably be expected by him to be, the subject of a 
subsequent consumer transaction. Note that the supplier is caught even though 
he did not intend the goods to be the subject of a consumer transaction and did 
not concern himself with whether they would be. It is enough that, judged 
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objectively, it was reasonable to expect him to foresee a subsequent consumer 
transaction. Note too, the expression “subsequent consumer transaction”. It is 
this which prevents Article 5 from applying to retailer-consumer transactions and 
so limits it to manufacturer’s guarantees. 
 
In cases covered by Article 5, the supplier must not supply goods which 
bear, or are in a container which bears, a statement   setting out, describing or 
limiting the obligation accepted by the supplier, or to be accepted by the supplier 
, in relation to the goods, whether legally enforceable or not. The qualification to 
that is that no offence arises where there is in close proximity to the above 
statement another which is clear and conspicuous and to the effect that the 
statement does not, or will not, affect the statutory rights of a consumer vis-à-vis 
description, satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, 10 subject to the same 
qualification, it is also an offence to furnish a “document” in relation to goods 
containing an exemption or limitation clause as just defined. 
 
Article 5 makes further provisions for two cases in which no offence is 
committed. In the case of goods or containers, no offence arises where the 
goods have not become the subject of a consumer transaction. It appears from 
this that no offence arises in the case of goods or containers of they are only 
likely to be the subject of a consumer transaction, but have not yet so become. 
Doubtless exemption clauses in such cases are not usually to be seen until after 
purchase, but this need not always be so. It is, for instance, quite likely that for 
display purposes a particular good will stand outside its container. 
 
In the other case, which relates to the furnishing of documents, no offence 
arises unless the particular goods were the subject of a consumer transaction, or 
the document was supplied to a person likely to become a consumer, pursuant to 
the particular transaction. 
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Guidelines published by the Office of Fair Trading for manufacturer’s 
guarantees suggest that manufacturers should avoid the use of undesirable 
restrictions in their guarantees. For instance, it would be better if a guarantee 
were not to require that goods be returned in their original packing; were not to 
leave it to the guarantor to decide whether or not he goods are defective; and 
were not to require the return of a guarantee card as a condition of claiming 
under a guarantee when a reasonable time is not allowed for the return of the 
registration card. These are, however, only guidelines and no penalty attaches to 
their breach. 11 
 
8.3 Assurances as to Future Conduct 
 
At one time, The Fair Trading Act 1973 allowed the Office of Fair Trading 
to seek assurances from traders persistently in breach of their obligations to 
consumers. Accordingly, it was possible for an assurance to be obtained from 
those infringing the provisions of the 1976 Order. The provisions of the 1973 Act 
were, however, repealed and replaced by the powers given to “enforces” under 
the Enterprise Act 2002. 12 Under the Act, an enforcer can seek a court order, if 
no undertaking is given, to the effect that the particular trader will not engage in 
conduct which amount to a “domestic infringement” . 13 Breach of the 1976 Order 
is specified as a “domestic infringement”. 14 
 
8.4 Defences 
 
Section 25 of The Fair Trading Act 1973 provides a defence modeled on s.24 
of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. The person charged can provide a defence if 
he can show that the offence was:  
 
(1) due to a mistake, or to reliance on information supplied to him, or to the 
act or default of another person,15 an accident or some other cause 
beyond his control; and 
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(2) that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to 
avoid the commission of such an offence by himself or any person under 
his control. 
 
The use of this defence, where it rests on the act or default of another 
person or on reliance on information supplied, is restricted: the person seeking to 
employ the defence shall not , without leave of the court, be entitled to the 
defence, unless within a period ending seven clear days before the hearing, he 
has served a notice in writing on the prosecutor, giving such information 
identifying or assisting in the identification of that other person as was then in his 
possession. The courts have made it very plain that the defence, with particular 
regard to the need to show due diligence, is far from easy to establish. 16 
 
8.5  Innocent publication of an advertisement 
 
Where proceedings are brought for an offence arising out of the publication of 
an advertisement, the person charged has a defence under s.25(3) of The Fair 
Trading Act 1973 if he can prove that : 
 
(a) it is his business to publish  or arrange for the publication of 
advertisements; and 
(b) he received the advertisement for publication in the ordinary course of 
business ; and 
(c) he did not know and had no reason to suspect that publication would 
amount to an offence. 
 
This defence is applicable to the media, radio, television and newspapers: it is 
not usually available to advertising agencies. It will only be available to agencies 
when the advertisement was received by them for publication. Since it is, in fact, 
their task to prepare the advertisement, this will hardly ever happen, if at all.  
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8.6    Trade Descriptions Act 1968 
 
Section 1 of The Trade Descriptions Act 1968 prescribes both the application 
of false trade descriptions to goods and the supply, or offer to supply of goods 
bearing false trade descriptions. In numerous cases, these provisions have been 
held to apply to cars bearing false milometer readings. It has also been accepted 
that it is possible to “disclaim” or exclude, liability of a false milometer, hence 
avoiding liability under the Act. 17 Where a note of caution has been sounded in 
this context is that the disclaimer itself could be an illegal, because false trade 
description. As was said by Donaldson L.J. in Corfield v. Starr, 18 “in appropriate 
cases those whose duty it is to enforce consumer protection legislation may like 
to consider laying alternative information based upon the disclaimer itself.”19 
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Chapter 9 
Void and Ineffective Exemption Clauses 
9.1 Introduction   
 
In certain cases, Parliament has provided that certain exclusion and 
limitation clauses are to be void and of no effect. It must be realized that such 
legislation does not render the continued use of such clauses unlawful. It 
merely means that they have no legal validity. It is true, however, that the 
continued use of void exemption clauses does mislead those contracting 
parties who are ignorant of the law into believing that particular claims cannot 
be maintained. It was because there was evidence of this happening that the 
Director General of Fair Trading referred to the Consumer Protection Advisory 
Committee the practice of traders continuing to use those exemption clauses 
which had been rendered void by the supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973. 
 
9.2 Consumer Credit     
 
The Consumer Credit Act 1974 contains a considerable number of 
provisions which can fairly be regarded as inserted into the Act for the 
protection of the debtor (where the contract relates to the provision of credit) 
or the hirer (where the contract is one of rental or hire). 1 Section 173(1) of the 
Act provides that any term in a regulated agreement or linked transaction is 
void if, and to the extent that, it is inconsistent with a provision “for the 
protection of the debtor or hirer or this relative or any surety contained in the 
act or in any regulation made under this Act.” 
 
The Subsection bites not only on exemption clauses contained in 
regulated or linked agreements. It applies also to clauses contained in 
regulated or linked agreements. It applies also to clauses in “any other 
agreement relating to an actual or prospective regulated agreement or linked 
transaction. “ This appears to be essentially an anti-avoidance device. It 
means that a separate contract, one which is not itself a regulated agreement, 
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cannot provide that such protective measures as are inserted into the 
agreement by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 are themselves to be excluded. 
Were it otherwise, the relevant terms of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 could 
easily be avoided. 
 
Section 173(2) takes the matter further by recognizing the provision 
that a provision of the Act may, in certain circumstances, impose duties or 
liabilities upon a debtor or hirer, or his relative, or any surety. Where this is so, 
subsection (2) continues a term is inconsistent with that provision if it purports 
“to impose, directly or indirectly, an additional duty or liability on him in those 
circumstances.” 
 
Section 173 (3) provides that, notwithstanding s.173(1), nothing in the 
Act operates to prevent a person consenting to a thing being done which 
could otherwise only be done on an order of the court or the Office of Fair 
Trading. The person’s consent, according to subs. (3), must be given at he 
time the particular thing is to be done. 
 
There is nothing specific in the 1974 Act regarding the use of unfair 
terms in consumer credit agreements. Such matters are dealt with by the 
general law (notably the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations ) 
and also by the power of the OFT to take account of contract terms in the 
course of its deciding whether to grant, withhold or revoke the license required 
by consumer credit and consumer hire businesses. 
 
The European Commission has, however, produced plans to update 
the laws of the EU states on consumer credit, and these contain specific 
proposals on the unfair terms. It proposes that the following terms will be 
automatically unfair. Those which:  
 
(a) impose on the consumer, as a condition for a drawdown, a requirement 
to leave as surety, in full or in part, the sums borrowed or granted, or to 
use them, in full or in part, to constitute a deposit or purchase securities 
or other financial instruments, unless the consumer obtains the same 
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rate for such deposit, purchase of surety as the agreed annual 
percentage rate of charge; 
(b) oblige the consumer, when concluding a credit agreement , to enter 
into another contract with the creditor, credit intermediary or  a third 
party designated by them, unless the costs thereof are included in the 
total cost of the credit;  
(c) vary any contractual costs, indemnities or charges other than the 
borrowing rate; 
(d) introduce rules on the variability of the borrowing rate that discriminate 
against the consumer; 
(e) introduce a system involving a variable borrowing rate which does not 
relate to the net initial borrowing rate proposed when the credit 
agreement was concluded and which would exclude all forms of 
rebate, reduction or other advantages; or 
(f) Oblige the consumer to use the same creditor to refinance the residual 
value and, in general, any final payment on a credit agreement for 
financing the purchase of movable property or a service. 
 
It must be borne in mind, however, that so far these are only proposals.2 
 
9.3 Transport   
 
Section 151 of The Road Traffic Act 1960 renders void exclusion 
clauses purporting to negative or restrict liability for death or personal injury to 
a passenger in a public service vehicle. Any antecedent agreement or 
understanding between the user of a motor vehicle and his passenger(s) 
which purports to restrict the driver’s liability to that passenger in respect of 
risks for which compulsory insurance cover is required (as to which, see s.143 
of the Road Traffic Act 1988) is void under s.149(2) of that Act. 
 
Section 29 of The Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 invalidates a 
provision contained in a contract for the carriage of a passenger in a public 
service vehicle where that provision purports to restrict the liability of person in 
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respect of a claim which may be made against that person in respect of the 
death or personal injury to a passenger while being carried in, or who is 
entering or is alighting from the vehicle, or which purports to impose any 
conditions as to the enforcement of such liability.3 
 
The carriage by Air Acts (Implementation of the Monetral Convention 
1999) Order 2002,4 under the heading “Liability of the Carrier and Extent of 
Compensation for Damage” provides that any provision tending to relieve the 
carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this 
convention shall be null and void. An identical provision also applies in 
relation to combined carriage (that is carriage partly by air and partly by some 
other mode). 
 
9.4 Housing    
 
Section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1985 implies into certain 
leases covenants by the landlord to repair. By virtue of s.12, these terms can 
be excluded but only by court order made with the consent of the parties. 
 
The Defective Premises Act 1972 imposes a liability on local 
authorities, their builders, sub-contractors and architects if they fail to build in 
a professional or workmanlike manner (as the case may be ) with proper 
materials , or fail to ensure that the dwelling is fit for human habitation. By s.6 
(3) of the Act, it is not possible to exclude or restrict the operation of such 
provisions by any agreement. 
 
Section 25 of The Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 states 
that any agreement which has the effect of excluding, modifying or frustrating 
the operation of the Act is void. 
 
Section 179 of The Housing Act 1985 provides for the unenforceability 
of provisions affecting the right to buy. 
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Section 24-28 of The Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 provide in certain 
circumstances for security of tenure. Originally, a clause providing for 
contracting out was valid only if authorized by court order. The new procedure 
requires a landlord to serve a prescribed notice on the tenant at least 14 days 
before the parties enter into such an agreement . The tenant must sign a 
simple declaration that he has received and accepted the consequences of 
the notice. If the parties wish to waive the 14 day period, the tenant will have 
to sign a statutory declaration rather than a simple declaration, that he has 
received and accepted the consequences of the notice. In the case of an 
agreement to exclude security of tenure, the declaration must be made before 
the tenant enters into the tenancy or becomes contractually bound to do so. In 
the case of an agreement the declaration must be made before entering into 
the agreement.5 
 
9.5 Seeds   
 
The warranties arising from the statutory statements required under 
regulations made under the Plant Varieties and Seeds Act, 1964 ss.16 and 
17, in relation to seeds cannot be excluded. 
 
9.6  Patents   
 
The Patents Act, 1977 s.45 repeats the provisions formerly contained in 
s.58 of The Patents Act 1949, enabling contracts relating  to patents to be 
determined by either party an three months notice after the patent or all 
patents by which the article or process was protected at the time of making of 
the contract has or have ceased to be in force. Contracting out is expressly 
said to be of no avail. 
 
9.7  Feeding Stuffs   
 
Section 73(2) of The Agriculture Act 1970 provides that the warranty of 
fitness of animal feeding stuffs implied by the Act has effect regardless of any 
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contract or notice to the contrary. Similarly, the warranties arising from the 
statutory statements required to be given by the Act cannot be excluded. 
 
9.8 Consumer Safety   
 
Part I and II of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 deal with product liability 
and consumer safety, respectively. Section 2 of the Act provides that the 
producer of a defective product is liable for the damage which it causes. 
Section 7 provides that liability cannot be limited or excluded by any contract 
term, by any notice or by any other provision. Part II of the 1987 Act makes 
provision for the enactment of safety regulations. Section 41(1) provides that 
a person affected by breach of a safety regulation will have a right to bring an 
action as on a breach of statutory duty. Subsection (4) provides that, except 
as may be provided by the relevant safety regulation, the rights granted by 
subsection (1) cannot be limited or excluded by any contract term, by any 
notice or by any other provision. Safety regulations made under the 
Consumer Protection Act 1961 are deemed to be made under the Consumer 
Protection Act, 1987.6 
 
9.9 Disability Discrimination   
 
Part III of The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 prohibits discrimination on 
the grounds of disability in relation to the supply of goods, facilities and 
services. 
 
Section 26 provides that any term in a contract for the provision of goods, 
facilities or services or in any other agreement is void if it: - 
 
(a) requires a person to contravene this Part; 
(b) attempts to limit or exclude the operation of this Part; or 
(c) attempts to prevent a person from making a claim under this Part. 
An exemption is made in the case of an agreement to settle a claim.7 
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9.10 Social Security        
 
Section 91 of The Pensions Act, 1995 provides for the inalienability of 
certain rights under an occupational pension scheme and provides that an 
agreement contravening such inalienability shall be enforceable.8 
 
9.11 Solicitor and Client   
 
Section 60(5) of The Solicitors Act 1974 provides that a term in an 
agreement in relation to contentious business to the effect that a solicitor shall 
not be liable for negligence, or that he shall be relieved from any responsibility 
to which he would as a solicitor otherwise be subject, is void. 
 
9.12 Employment    
 
Section 1(3) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 invalidates 
any provision contained in a contract of employment or apprenticeship, or in 
any collateral agreement, in so far as it has the effect of excluding or limiting 
any liability of the employer in respect of personal injuries caused to the 
particular person by the negligence of persons injuries caused to the 
particular person by the negligence of persons in common employment with 
that person. 
 
Section 203 of The Employment Rights Act 1996 contains a general 
restriction on contracting out of the Act’s provisions. Section 14 of the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 applies broadly similar controls in relation to 
those of its provisions dealing with the right to be accompanied at disciplinary 
and grievance proceedings. 
 
Section 49 of The National Minimum Wages Act 1998 provides that any 
attempt to contract out of the provisions of the Act has no legal effect, nor is it 
possible to preclude a person from bringing proceedings under the act before 
an employment tribunal. The two exceptions to this are where an agreement 
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has been reached where a conciliation officer has taken action under the 
1996 Act; and where a compromise agreement has been agreed between the 
parties.  
 
Regulation 35 of The Working Time Regulations 1999 provides that any 
provision in an agreement (whether a contract of employment or not) is void in 
so far as it purports: 
 
(a) to exclude or limit the operation of any provision of these Regulations, 
save in so far as these Regulations provide for an agreement to have 
that effect; or 
(b) to preclude a person from bringing proceedings under these 
Regulations before an employment tribunal 10 
 
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 
1981.11 are designed to protect the rights of employees on a change of 
employer. Regulation 12 provides that any agreement which is designed to 
exclude or limit the operation of the Regulations is invalid. 
 
9.13 Late Payment   
 
The Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 provides for 
interest to be added to qualifying debts which are paid late. Section 14 of the 
Act applies S.3(2)(b) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.12 to any contract 
term which purports to have the effect of postponing the time at which a 
qualifying debt would otherwise be created. This is stated to be the case 
whether or not the relevant contract is on written standard terms, and will thus 
have the effect of applying the reasonableness   test to all such contract 
terms. 13 
 
9.14 Distance Selling   
Under The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000, 14 
certain measures are enacted for the protection of consumers entering into a 
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distance contract. Regulation 25 provides that there can be no contracting out 
of these provisions. Regulation 25 also provides that, the Regulations impose 
a duty or liability on a consumer, no term can impose a further duty or 
liability.15  
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 
 Sir David Hughes Parry observed in his address to the Holdsworth 
Club:- 
 “All this abide me to the view that we must at all times keep in mind the 
question whether the time is not approaching when the whole structure of 
contract law with its preconceived ideas and nineteenth century doctrine, has 
not become so rigid and static that it cannot be expected to bear on all fronts 
the strains and stresses of modern economic and social pressures.” 
 
 It has to be admitted that the changes in social and economic spheres 
have been so fast that law should not be allowed to lag behind. On the other 
hand, it is necessary to recognize the importance of preserving the integrity of 
agreements and the fundamental rights of the parties to deal, trade, bargain 
and contract while on the other hand illiterate individual who is the victim of 
gross inequality of bargaining power usually being the poorest member of the 
community. 
 
It was said of Aristotle that whenever he set up a theory he begin, like 
an oriental despot, by killing off all possible rivals. And this seems to be the 
fashion in the peaceful world of scholarship. It has not been my object to 
rebute various theories discussed above and to find out some another one. 
The task of formulating a comprehensive theory of contract that shall do 
justice to its many sources and various phases, is one that I shall not 
undertake here. No one of the theories discussed above covers the whole 
field of contract. 
 
The modern law of contract does not altogether erase the concept of 
agreement and intention. The ancient too much emphasis on intention of the 
interests of justice. Parties have now a right to vary or exclude the normal 
rules by express agreement. The classical principles are yet there. Modern 
laws weakness is that the changes are only piece meal here and there. The 
basic principles of 19th century as revealed by the judgments of that period do 
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remain in main. Intention is yet divined by judges to decide many issues. 
There is no doubt that to treat standard form contracts or exemption clauses 
as normal is to be depreciated. Traditional theories of contracts does not 
apply to them. 
 
The complexity of modern activities makes it also difficult to provide for 
all eventualities. It is, therefore, difficult to solve the riddles of the law of 
contract overnight. It is still a problem. The existence of the problem is a sure 
indication of the growth of that law. Mr. Justice Holmes1 rightly observed : 
 
“The law is always approaching and never reaching, consistency. It 
is for ever adopting new principle from life at one end and it always 
retains old one from history at the other …. It will become entirely 
consistent only when it ceases to grow.” 
 
Sir David Hughes Parry2 took into account the opinion of Morris, L.J., 3 
that though the history of the law of contracts fascinates and the theory and 
principles of its philosophy are rich in interest, “the interest of the litigation is in 
his own case.” Parry then observes: 
 
“All this abide me to the view that we must at all times keep in mind 
the question  whether the time is not fast approaching when the 
whole structure of contract law with its preconceived ideas and 
nineteenth century doctrine, has not become so rigid and static that 
it cannot be expected to bear on all fronts the strains and stresses 
of modern economic and social pressures.” 
 
One features of the past in Common Law has been the stability and 
fixity of its legal machinery. The rule of precedent has come to stay. Rightly, 
Judge Cardozo has declare :  
 
“what has once been settled by precedent will not be unsettled 
overnight, for certainly and uniformity are gains not lightly to be 
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sacrificed; above all is this true when honest men have shaped their 
conduct upon the faith of the pronouncement.” 
 
But it has to be admitted that the changes in social and economic 
sphere have been so fast that law should not be allowed to lag behind. 
 
There is no doubt that traditional theories of contract does not apply to 
standard form contracts. The concept of agreement, and intention is yet relied 
by judges to decide many issues. It is submitted that under certain 
circumstances law must also go beyond the original intention of the parties to 
settle controversies as to the distribution of gains and losses that the parties 
did not anticipate in the same way. Some recognition must always be given to 
the will or intention of those who made the contract, but the law must always 
have regard for the general effect of classes of transaction and it cannot free 
man from necessity of acting at their peril when they do not know the 
consequences that the law will attach to their acts - and this needs to be 
emphasized in any attempt to formulate a rational theory.  
 
 The important question that has arisen from this study is whether 
freedom of contract is still relevant? The case law answer is “yes, it is 
relevant.” It is still a basic tenet of contract law that the parties to a contract 
may, absent statute, control and establish their contractual rights and 
obligations unless a court refuses to enforce such contract because it is 
deemed “unconscionable” or it is against “public policy and good morals” or it 
will amount to a “fundamental breach of contract”. 
 
          The Forgoing brief survey reveals that there are two fundamental and 
opposing principles competing for supremacy: (1) that it is in the interest of 
the society that contracts made of persons of full age , understating and 
capacity ought to be enforced and (2) that this principle ought not to be 
made a tool in the hands of hard bargainers strength to impose 
unreasonable terms on the less favourably situated parties. It is in other 
words, the conflict between of contract and restraint that should be placed on 
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such freedom to ensure its availability to all the members of the society. It 
has been stated: 
 
“In actual life real freedom to do anything in art as in politics, 
depends on acceptance of the rule of our enterprise. As has 
been remarked elsewhere, the rules of the sonnet do not 
hamper real poets but rather help weak ones. Real or positive 
freedom depends upon opportunities supplied by institutions 
that involve legal regulation.”  
 
             From this point of view, the movement to standardize the forms of 
contract even to the extent of prohibiting variations or the rights to “contract 
out” is not to be viewed as a reaction to , but rather as the logical outcome 
of, a regime of real liberty of contract. It is a utilization of the lessons of 
experience to strengthen those forms which best serve as channels through 
which the life of the community can flow most freely. 
 
            It is said that standardization of contracts is inimical to real freedom. 
But it is a fallacy. By standardizing contract the law increases that real 
security which is the necessary basis of initiative and the assumption of 
tolerable risks. 
 
          It is also submitted that a review of typical and representative cases 
illustrate that the courts have not and are not applying with supine 
indifference and slavish devotion the traditional concept of freedom of 
contract. Cases that have been reviewed indicates that there has been no 
wholesale deviation from the freedom of contract doctrine and that much 
judicial restraints has been exercised in those cases which on their “ 
peripheral foils” the courts have felt justified in a qualifying freedom of 
contract. 
 
(The courts have reflected enlightened concern for the delicate balance 
between the unquestioned need to preserve integrity of agreement and the 
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desirability to require basic fairness in order that ‘ mutual assent’ is equated 
to meaningful assent) 
 
           It is also evident that courts have been anxious to get at the real 
intention of the parties to a contract and give effect to that even though the 
process might cause some hardship to same one or the other. One might 
recall the observations of Lord Wright in Sacmmel v. Ouston.4 
 
           The object of the court is to do justice between the parties, and the 
court will do its best, if satisfied that there was an ascertainable and 
determinate intention to contract, to give effect to that intention. Looking at 
substance and not mere form. It will not be deferred by mere difficulties of 
interpretation. 
 
         The rules adopted by our superior courts had not been different. Thus 
by respecting the intention of the parties and giving effect to that , the judicial 
tribunals have shown their anxiety to hold the torch of freedom of contract 
high up inspite of all the present incussions made upon that freedom from 
several directions. 
 
           Lord Denning expressed the opinion that an unreasonable onerous 
term in a standard form contract would not be enforced by courts, for “ there 
is a vigilance of the common law which , while allowing freedom of contract , 
watched to see that is not abused.” 5 
 
It is submitted that in placing judicial restraint on freedom of contract 
when the contract is drafted beyond the age of minimal requisites of fairness, 
the courts are fostering the preservation and not the emasculation of contract 
law. Freedom of contract is not an illimitable concept. Courts have been 
determined to find out whether there was in reality, “mutual assent” between 
the parties. Courts have reflected enlightened concern for the delicate 
balance between the unquestioned need to preserve integrity of agreements 
and desirability to require basic fairness in order that “mutual assent” is 
equated to meaningful assent. 
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It is fallacy to say that exemption clauses contained in standard form of 
contracts are inimical to real freedom. By standardized contracts, the law 
increases that real security which is the necessary basis of initiative and the 
assumption of tolerable risk. As has been remarked elsewhere, the rules of 
the sonnet do not hamper real poets but rather help weak ones. 
 
The movement to standardize the forms of contract even to the extent 
of prohibiting variations or the right to ‘contract out’ is not to be viewed as a 
reaction to, but rather as the logical outcome of, a regime of real liberty of 
contract. It is a utilization of the lessons of experience to strength in those 
forms which best serve as channels through which the life of the community 
can flow most freely. 
 
Courts in England, and India have tried to hold the torch of freedom of 
contract by respecting the intention of the parties and giving effect to it. 
 
It is very clear that exemption clauses in ‘standard form contracts’ are 
very preformulated stipulations in which the offeror’s will is predominant and 
that conditions are dictated to an undetermined number of acceptants and not 
to one individual party. The party can ‘take it or leave it’ but cannot negotiate 
its terms and conditions. It has become a device for adjustment of law to the 
needs of society. These contracts represent a new trend in contract branch 
and society as a whole has been benefited for them. The purpose of these 
contracts was to encourage business activity. Kessler has also remarked:- 
 
“In so far as the reduction of costs of production and distribution thus 
achieved is reflected in reduced prices, society as a whole ultimately 
benefits from the use of standard contracts.”6 
 
There is no doubt that with the change in social structure, standard 
form contracts have become tools of oppression and misconduct. The general 
situation everywhere is one of continuing abuses by trade and industry, 
ineffectiveness of judicial and self-imposed contracts, and an absence of 
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comprehensive mandatory legislation. There is no doubt that standardized 
contracts, like other laws, serve the interests of some persons better than 
those of others, and the question of justice thus raised demands the attention 
not only of legislature but also of courts that have to interpret them. The 
important lacuna is that no special methods have been used in England and 
India to cope with the problems of these contracts. 
 
Common Law of England is highly contradictory and confusing and 
potentialities to cope with the problems of exemption clauses in standard form 
contracts have not been fully developed. However, as a result of prolitic and 
persistent litigation, it is possible to hazard certain conclusions.  
 
 British Legislation has tended either to forbid specific terms, or to 
require delivery of a specific form giving details of the transaction (as in the 
Money Lending Act), or to lay down guidelines within which and by reference 
to which a tribunal may determine what is fair (as in Restrictive Trade 
Practices Legislation). Legislature in England has tried to remedy the 
individual cases but they could not enact a general act (as has been in Israel 
and Sweden) or a general provision that could meet with the abuses of these 
clauses. The approach that has been followed by British Legislation is no 
doubt a pragmatic one yet it is submitted that it is a slow process and will take 
too much time to check the abuses of standard form contracts and exemption 
clauses. 
 
 So far as the English Courts are concerned, they have developed 
some covert techniques to control these unfair clauses e.g. Doctrine of 
Fundamental Breach , Gibaud Rule, Four Corner Rule, and certain maxims 
etc. Courts can construe language into patently not meaning what the 
language is patently trying to say. It can find inconsistencies between clauses 
and throw out the troublesome one. It can even reject a clause as counter to 
the whole purpose of the transaction. It can reject enforcement by one side for 
want of mutuality, improper notice etc. Clause can also be rejected on 
grounds of inequality or because the clause is unconscionable. Such clauses 
are excluded where the document did not appear to be contractual in nature, 
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where the offerees attention was not adequately drawn to the conditions, or 
where the notice of them was given after the contract was concluded. But all 
these covert techniques adopted by the courts have failed to meet the 
problems arising out of these contracts in England. Courts still apply 
traditional principles in interpreting these contracts and their attention has 
been confined to find out defects in the formation process of the contracts 
rather than its contents. British Courts have failed to develop general criteria 
for marking out a clear boundary between admissible and inadmissible 
clauses. And since they all rest upon the theory that the clauses in question 
are permissible in purpose and contents, they invite the draftsmen to return 
the attack. Courts are empowered to cancel any clause but are still not 
empowered to rewrite it so as to do equity between the parties.  
 
 The Law of Commercial Contracts does not effect only the relative 
economic strength of various groups operating on the economic market, but 
also their standards of social conduct and it is in these standards which 
exemption clauses in standard form contracts seeks to change. 
 
 A fundamental breach of contract is true not simply the terms of an 
individual contract, but a fundamental deviation of the values which those 
names represent and which reflect as much the degree of honesty in 
commercial dealings of the quality of the goods which one may expect to find 
on the economic market. We should not forget that allocation of risk affects 
the character of a contract and, therefore, terms in contracts cannot be 
regarded as merely “a convenient means of repairing an obvious oversight.”7 
Fair conduct is expected from parties and exemption clauses are not an open 
“seasame” which provide “the correct formula” for exclusion of contractual 
liability and a free pass to deviation without limitation from the legal norms. 
 
 By eliminating the necessity of resorting to fictional interpretation, the 
doctrine of fundamental breach has made its greatest contribution. Because 
of its flexibility, judges (and scholars) are now unleashed to develop a 
common law capable of striking down clauses which do not square with the 
fundamental obligations of their contracts. Although Llewellyn did not draw on 
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the English precedents for his comments, he made his final plea for 
commercial law “decencies” in language remarkably identical to fundamental 
breach terminology: 
 
(A) Transaction-type which had an iron essences that neither form nor 
formula could reach ……. An essence which contains a minimum of 
balance, a core without which the type fails of being …… the doctrine 
of “repugnancy”……. Kills off the clause which will not square with the 
iron core.8 
 
So far as the English Law is concerned, the judgement in the Suisse 
Atlantique case and attacks made by various jurists on it, the doctrine has 
suffered a set-back and its further development has come to stand still at the 
hands of judiciary. It is submitted that the doctrine has value in it. It has 
become a great source of protection to the consumers in various types of 
contracts. Legislation in England has recognized the importance of it by 
passing the Supply of Goods_ Implied Terms Act, 1973. 
 
 In India importance of this doctrine has been recognized partially. 
Decisions are generally given on the basis of Section 23 of the Indian 
Contract Act dealing with public policy. 
  
 There is no doubt that the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach of Contract 
has been of much use to the courts in England and partially in India in 
preventing Exemption Clauses from becoming an instrument of oppression, 
exploitation and justice. Fundamental Breach is not simply the Breach of the 
terms of an individual contract, but a fundamental deviation of the values 
which those norms represent and which reflect as much the degree of 
honesty in Commercial dealings as the quality of the goods which one may 
expect to find on the economic market. Fair conduct is expected from parties 
and exemption clauses are not an open “seasame” which provides for “the 
correct formula” for exclusion of contractual liability and a free pass to 
deviation without limitation from the legal norms. It is this element of fair 
conduct which Professor Coote in his learned attack on the doctrine of 
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fundamental breach has consistently tried to exclude from the law of contract, 
although he appears to acknowledge its significance outside legal relation. 
 
 By eliminating the necessity of restoring to fictional interpretation, the 
doctrine of fundamental breach has made its greatest contribution. This 
doctrine has curtailed the liberty of parties to blow hot and cold. Consumers 
had great protection under it. It has been of great help in controlling abuses of 
exemption clauses in various branches of law.  
 
 But now in England judicial controversy has started regarding the true 
nature and function of this doctrine. After the judgement in Suisee’s case, 
fundamental breach of contract by one party may exonerate the other from 
the burden of exemption clauses but only as a matter of construction of the 
contract. If a clause is properly drafted then according to this decision even 
fundamental breach may be covered. This judgement brought the doctrine to 
a stand still although Lord Denning’s judgement in Harbutt’s case still 
supports the view that it is a rule of law. It is submitted that instead of going 
into a judicial battle over the function and effect of this doctrine, it will be better 
if the solution is left to the parliament. 
 
 Under English law, it can be said that term which is, undue, 
inappropriate, unjustifiable, unwarrantable, unseemly or, as it is generally 
called improper. 
 
 A contract term may typically be regarded as improper towards 
consumer if, deviating from valid dispositive law, it gives entrepreneurs an 
advantage or deprives consumers of a right and in that way produces a 
weighting of the parties rights and obligations so lopsided that a reasonable 
balance between the parties no longer exists. 
 
 This thesis also attempts to speak about what is reasonable. As a test, 
Speidel suggests that after the buyer has established a prima facie case of 
oppression, the seller should have the burden of proving that the term is 
commercially reasonable. 
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 Spediel test of commercial reasonableness has one major flow. It has 
been pointed out that all business pursue profits and those tactics which 
maximize profit are by definition commercially reasonable. The contract model 
relies upon bargaining to insure the fairness of the exchange: a bargained for 
clause is commercially reasonable. Speidel must look to other safeguards, but 
he fails to provide any. 
 
 Slawson9 retains the need to inquire into what would have been the 
result had there been bargaining or at least complete and understandable 
disclosure of terms. Slawson fails to develop standards for determining which 
terms should be enforced. His views are that Buyer’s expectation should 
govern the terms. 
 
 Beside all these, there may be other reasons for oppressive contract 
terms. As Kessler has suggested one cause of oppressive contract may be 
market concentration or the presence of monopoly power. Unconscionable 
clauses may also be found among contracts drafted in apparently 
unconcentrated markets. It may be that low income consumers are too 
uneducated and ill-informed to act rationally.            
 
 The way out of all this difficulty is not a particularly hard one to find. 
The chief step of course would be to recognize that deviation and quasi-
deviation generic and are to be kept distinct from discharge by breach. The 
second necessary step would be to allow the substantive doctrine of 
fundamental breach to remain where the Suisse Atlantique case left to it, 
decently interred. The third step would be to complete the process begun by 
the House of Lords in that case and more directly to the acceptance of a 
universal rule that the effect of exemption clause depends in their proper 
interpretation, and on that alone (questions of travel illegality, and the like, 
apart.)10 
 
 No doubt, same would object that do all this would be to reduce the 
courts to a state of impotence. Such a result, it is submitted, need not follow at 
all. There is already in existence an impressive array of interpretative devices 
 246
for containing exemption clauses, and they are open to still further 
development. It is worth remembering what same of them are:- 
 
(1) Every exemption dues is to be interpreted, in case of ambiguity, contra 
profrentem.11 
(2) Only in the clearest circumstances will general words of exemption be 
interpreted to cover important terms or liability for serious breaches. 12 
The more important the term or the breach, the clearer those 
circumstances must be.13 
(3) Exemption clauses are to be interpreted consistently with the main 
objects of the contract, and under this head, the literal meaning can be 
modified substantially.14 
(4) In case of genuine inconsistency with the positive parts of the contract, 
exemption clauses can be modified or ignored altogether on grounds of 
repugnancy.15 
(5) Exemption clauses have no application to acts falling beyond the 
contemplated ambit of the contract.16 
(6) General words of exemption have no application to negligence unless 
negligence is the only liability to they would apply.17 
(7) In bailment contracts, exemption clauses have no application once the 
bailor exceeds any limitation on his authority.18 
(8) A suggestion by Kito J. that the courts extend to exemption clauses the 
rule that a release should ordinarily be limited to those things, which 
were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time release, 
was given.19 
(9) A suggestion from another Australian judge, Bright J., that the 
presumption of an intention to do justice , used in the interpretation of 
statutes, be adapted to exemption clauses.20 
(10) There is already a presumption that commercial parties intend their 
agreements to have contractual effect.21 On the existing authorities, 
this could well be extended to a presumption that particular promises 
within contacts are also intended to have enforceable contractual 
content.22 
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(11) There is the rule, long propounded, but overlooked during the 
fundamental breach era, that the onus is upon the proferens so to word 
his exceptions as to make them clear to class of persons to whom they 
are addressed.23This must give at least some scope for consumer 
protection. 
 
Properly applied and developed rules of interpretations such as these 
would achieve virtually all that fundamental breach could have done and more 
besides. Importantly, they would make for considerably more flexibility, 
allowing, for example, differences to be drawn between consumer 
transactions on the one hand and commercial ones on the other, or between 
transactions commonly or not commonly the subject of insurance cover in this 
way the law would be enabled to come to the aid of the “little” man without 
incurring risk of being the destroyer of commercial bargains. All of this could 
be achieved without distortion of the law of contract as a whole. The reproach 
against fundamental breach is not just that it was a concept arbitrary in its 
application.18 And distorting in its influence inimically, enough, it is also 
served to divert attention from other hand and, it is submitted effective ways of 
achieving the objects it was intended to serve. 
    
The pursuit of elegance for its own sake would be an object unworthy of 
any system of law. On the other hand, that doctrinal coherence has its 
advantages no law teacher and, one suspect, few legal practitioners would 
deny. The common law of discharge by breach, it is submitted, is one field 
where a return to first principles would be not unjustified. 
 
In the amended section prepared by law commission it has to be 
expanded and a list should be added with it enumerating various “obvious 
cases” or “offensive Terms” or “unconscionable clauses”. In the preparation of 
such a list help can be taken from the Israel Code of standard form contracts. 
Definition of these terms used in drafting standard form contracts can be as 
follows:- 
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(1) Terms which exclude or limit the liability of the supplier towards the 
receiver, where such liability would arise either by virtue of a contract 
or statute, but for the existence of the restrictive conditions. 
(2) Terms which entitle the supplier to cancel or change the conditions of a 
contract or to delay its execution in his sole discretion, or to bring about 
otherwise the termination of the contract or of rights arising from it or 
the right to decide unilaterally whether the goods are defective and 
whether the defect comes within their responsibility. The termination 
mentioned above should not depend on the fact the receiver broke the 
contract or depend on the fact that the receiver broke the contract or 
depends on circumstances independent of the supplier. 
(3) Terms which permit the receiver to exercise a right arising out of a 
contract only after having obtained the consent of the supplier or of 
someone else on the latter’s behalf. 
(4) Terms which contain the clause ‘in existing condition’ or ‘as is’ for the 
sale of factory new goods. 
(5) “Force Majeur” terms which give a party the right to postpone 
indefinitely full performance of his obligations on grounds of 
circumstances outside his control. 
(6) A term which gives the performing party the right to raise the contract 
price because of circumstances within or outside his control. 
(7) Terms which force the receiver to deal with the supplier in matters not 
directly concerned with the object of the contract or restrict the liberty of 
the receiver to deal in such a matter with a third party. 
(8) Term which forms a waiver declared beforehand on the part of the 
receiver in regard to rights which would arise out of the contract, but for 
the existence of such a waiver. 
(9) A term which empowers the supplier or somebody else on his behalf to 
act in the name of the receiver in order to realize a right of the supplier 
towards the receiver. 
(10) A term which establishes that the books or other documents made by 
the supplier or on his behalf should be binding upon the receiver or 
impose otherwise upon the receiver the burden of proof in regard to 
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matters where such burden of proof would not exist, but for the said 
term. 
(11) A term which makes the right of the receiver to obtain relief in legal 
proceedings dependent upon the fulfillment of a condition precedent or 
limits the said rights by fixing the said rights by fixing a time-bar or 
otherwise. Submission to arbitration is, however, valid. 
(12) A submission to arbitration if the supplier has a greater influence than 
the receiver upon the appointment of the arbitration or in regard to the 
fixing of the place where the arbitration is to take place, or a condition 
which entitles the supplier in his sale discretion to select a court for the 
decision of a dispute. 
 
Explanation – If any one of the above mentioned conditions has been 
invalidated by the court, this does not necessarily entail the invalidity of the 
other conditions or terms contained in the contract. 
 
 It will also apply to cases in which state is a supplier. These clauses 
are given merely for the guidance and are certainly not comprehensive 
examples or in any way limitation on the powers of the courts. 
 
 So far the Indian scene is concerned, we should be aware that 
modernization and industrialization of the country has given birth to the 
standard form contracts in various spheres of trade and commerce. In our 
daily life they have been indispensable. But it is highly surprising and 
unfortunate that courts are not serious new challenge. Their decisions show 
complete indifference of the efforts made and techniques developed by the 
English courts which are, in essence, of the nature of private legislation. 
 
 There have been few cases and that too have been decided with 
reference to Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Even the present Law 
Commission of India that has submitted its 13th Report on the Law of Contract 
has neglected to refer to this burning problem of the Law of Contract which is 
today challenging its very basis mutuality. 
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 It is submitted that the Law of contract in India with its preconceived 
ideas and the 19th century doctrines must change in response to the socio-
economic changes in the country and ideological revolution which is engulfing 
the entire nation, otherwise it will collapse under the strain and stresses of the 
modern social and economic pressure. In a democratic set up governed by 
the rule of law, it is of the highest importance that law should be certain and 
should provide proper protection to its citizens. The task of judiciary to quote 
Justice Bhagwati : 24 
 
 We must remember that the law must adopt itself to the changing 
needs of society and whenever it is possible we must not hesitate to adopt 
new principle for otherwise law will become “antiquated straight Jacket and 
then dead letter”, and “the judicial hand would stiffin in mortmain if it had no 
part in the work of creation.” 
 
 Of course, we must be prepared to pass through the travails of the 
emergence of the modern law of contract. It is submitted that a new section 
should be added after section 23 of the Indian Contract act. This section 
should have general application to all commercial transactions and courts 
should be empowered to declare any bargain unconscionable under it. For the 
time being it will be a sufficient check on the abuses of Standard Form 
Contracts and Exemption Clauses. 
 
 To conclude it can be said that exemption clauses are an international 
phenomena and an international problem. In both the countries under study, it 
has been realized that a certain control of exemption clauses, is 
indispensable. The reason for this is the protection of weaker party. As has 
been pointed out already, the “freedom of contract” which the supplier 
invokes, has become a fiction, the customer is usually neither able nor 
competent to bargain, and that remedy has to be provided either by 
legislature or judiciary.  
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 As a result of prolific and persistent litigation it is possible to hazard 
certain conclusions which can help to control the unfair exemption clauses in 
standard form contracts. 
 
 Exemption Clauses change the general and normal allocation of risk 
between the parties and apart from exceptional cases there is no legitimate 
reason for the insertion of exemption clauses in standard form contracts. It 
may be legitimate to stipulate exemption where choice of rates is provided, 
where risk is difficult to calculate, unforeseen contingencies affecting 
performance, such as strikes, fire and transportation difficulty etc. But such 
clauses as ‘as is clause’ terms in non-compliance with mandatory legislation, 
warranty clauses, clauses providing for fundamental breach of contract or 
which are against the main purpose of the contract are not admissible and will 
not be enforced by courts.  
 
 All the judgments indicates to the fact that in order that condition laid 
down in standard form contracts may be binding it is essential that it should 
be reasonable and particular notice of them is required to the customer. 
 
 As regards incorporation of exemption clauses in standard form 
contracts and their binding effect on the customer certain conclusions can be 
drawn from the cases already decided:- 
 
(1) Exempting condition must be reasonable and must come within four 
corners of the contract. 
(2) The exempting conditions, in specific terms, must be drawn specially 
to the other party’s attention at, or before, the time of contracting. 
(3) Some important clauses may be printed in red ink with red hand 
pointing to it before notice could be held sufficient. 
(4) Where the conditions purports to exclude a statutory liability, “there 
must be clear indication which would lead an ordinary sensible person 
to realize that a term (exempting from liability for personal injuries) as 
a result of negligence on the part of the occupiers of the premises” is 
incorporated. 
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Any particularly drawn clause which is destructive of rights should be 
incorporated by signature. 
 
So far as the construction and interpretation of exemption clauses is 
concerned, attitude of the courts has been one of hostility. 
 
 A court can construe language into patently not meaning what the 
language is patently trying to say. It can find inconsistencies between clauses, 
and throw out the troublesome one; It can even reject a clause as counter to 
the whole purpose of the transaction. It can reject enforcement by one-side for 
want of mutuality, improper notice etc. Clause can also be rejected on 
grounds of inequality or because the clause is unconscionable. 
 
 Besides, party can avail of the exemption clauses only when he is 
carrying out his contract in its essential respect. He is not allowed to use them 
as a cover for his misconduct or indifference. They do not avail him when he 
is guilty of fundamental breach of contract.  
 
 But, it can be said that common law of standard form contracts is 
contradictory and confusing because of diverse judgement given by the 
courts. The techniques e.g. Doctrine of fundamental breach of contract, 
Gibaud rule, four corner rule, followed by the courts to control exemption 
clauses are not sufficient. The objection to such techniques is obvious. They 
fail to develop general criteria for marking out a clear boundary between 
admissible and inadmissible clauses. And since they all rest on the theory that 
the clause in question are permissible in purpose and content, they invite the 
draftsman to return to the attack. Covert techniques followed by the courts in 
England to control unfair exemption clauses cannot be relied on. Instead there 
should be direct control of the clauses. 
 
 The basic weakness of this provision is that it has failed in laying down 
a standard on the basis of which court can deal and determine the meaning of 
the terms unconscionable. 
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 The need of the day is the protective legislation for controlling unfair 
exemption clauses not in any particular branch, but in general. 
  
 Thus, it would seem that in the area of law there is room for much 
development and change. Critics of the present position point to the rigidity of 
law and the absurd results it has led. There can be little doubt that some 
alteration of the law is overdue and needed. 
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